



**A STUDY ON
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S POLICY
TOWARD DENUCLEARIZING THE
KOREAN PENINSULA**

by

Da Wool Shin

Supervised by

Professor Andrew GLENCROSS

*Master thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MA in Global and European Politics*

December 1, 2021

AUTHOR DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is my own work and effort and that it has not been submitted anywhere for any award or other degree in any other institution. Where other sources of information have been used, they have been properly acknowledged.

I also certify that the content of the print and digital versions of this dissertation are strictly identical in terms of content.

I understand that any plagiarized or improperly cited material will result in sanctions, including, but not limited to, the rejection of this dissertation, as will any discrepancy of content between its print and digital versions. I confirm that my dissertation does not contain material for which the copyright belongs to a third party or that for all third-party copyright material in my dissertation, I have obtained written permission to use the material and attach copies of each permission.



Da Wool Shin

DISSEMINATION AGREEMENT

Availability within the School

I understand that the European School of Political and Social Sciences (ESPOL), based at Lille Catholic University, France, will keep print and digital copies of this dissertation for at least 5 years. This copy may be made available for consultation by ESPOL Faculty.

- By ticking the optional checkbox next to this paragraph, I agree that the print and digital copy of this document be made available for consultation by the School's students.

Availability of print copy outside of the School

- By ticking the optional checkbox next to this paragraph, I agree that the print copy of this document be made available through Lille Catholic University's Library, to anyone allowed to access said Library, including through inter-library loan.

Availability of digital copy outside of the School

- By ticking the optional checkbox next to this paragraph, I agree that the digital copy of this document may be made available through Lille Catholic University's online repository, to anyone allowed to access the repository.



Da Wool Shin

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to thank my supervisor, Dr. Andrew Glencross, for his constructive feedback on drafts.

I also thank my second reader, Dr. Camille Kelbel, for taking precious time to read and evaluate this thesis. Finally, I am grateful to Dr. Oriane Calligaro, for her help in developing the idea of writing this thesis

Furthermore, I want to thank all my friends, in Lille, Seoul and California, for their support.

DEDICATION

To Youngjin,
my amazing husband and soulmate,
who has been supportive, encouraging and considerate
throughout my study.

This thesis would not have been completed without your never-ending support.

And to Irene,
my daughter and endless source of love,
who has patiently waited for mom to finish her “homework.”
There is nothing more important than you in this world.

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to understand the dynamics behind the European Union (EU) policy decision toward North Korea. Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, the EU has attempted to build peace on the Korean Peninsula despite the geographical distance. Its initial approach to North Korea was conciliatory; it addressed the North Korean nuclear issue with dialogue and economic and technical assistance. However, in 2003, it decided to halt all assistance (except for humanitarian aid). The Union also adopted economic sanctions and suspended political dialogue in 2009. It abandoned the engagement policy and took a tougher approach. These changes in the EU policy are examined as a qualitative case study based on the concepts of the Normative Power Europe and liberal intergovernmentalism.

This thesis argues that the tendency of member states to pursue their national interests and preferences led to the shift in the EU's approach to the country from active engagement to active pressure. The EU wanted to become a normative power in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. It published statements and strategic reports regarding North Korea, highlighting normative objectives, such as WMD non-proliferation and peace. However, in the implementation process, the EU policy measures became coercive, following the national interests of some member states. Their pro-sanction attitudes were related to their commitment to the transatlantic relationship in addressing global and European security issues. To maintain a good relationship, they chose to be in concordance with the United States in terms of policy toward North Korean nuclear development. Europe's low political and economic relations with North Korea also enabled it to abandon the engagement. Hence, the EU's policy change reflected the national preferences of member states and caused the discrepancy between the EU's ideals and reality.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgement</i>	5
<i>Abstract</i>	7
<i>Table of Content</i>	8
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	10
<i>List of tables and figures</i>	11
Chapter 1. Introduction	12
1.1. Problem Statement	12
1.2. Research Question and Hypotheses	14
1.3. Research Method and Data Collection.	17
1.3.1. Qualitative Case Study	17
1.3.2. Document Analysis	19
1.3.3. Data selection	20
1.4. Academic Literature Review	22
1.4.1. EU Non-Proliferation Policy	22
1.4.2. International Reactions to the DPRK Nuclear Program	25
1.4.3. The EU's Foreign Policy toward the Korean Peninsula	27
Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework	30
2.1. Concepts of the EU's International Identity	30
2.1.1. Civilian Power Europe	30
2.1.2. Military Power Europe	31
2.1.3. Normative Power Europe	32
2.2. Theories of European Integration	36
2.2.1. Supranationalism	36
2.2.2. Intergovernmentalism	37
Chapter 3. Policy of Active Engagement 1993–2003	40
3.1. Background	40
3.1.1. Birth of the Common Foreign and Security Policy	40
3.1.2. Birth of the EU Common Policy on Nuclear Disarmament	42
3.1.3. The DPRK's Nuclear Programs and International Responses	43
3.2. The EU's Active Engagement	45
3.2.1. EU–DPRK Diplomatic relations	45
3.2.2. Political Dialogue	47
3.2.3. KEDO	50

Chapter 4. Policy of Critical Engagement 2003–2009	54
4.1. Background	54
4.1.1. Changes in the Common Foreign and Security Policy	54
4.1.2. Evolutions of the EU Non-Proliferation Policy	55
4.1.3. The DPRK’s Nuclear Programs and International Responses	56
4.2. The EU’s Critical Engagement	57
4.2.1. EU-DPRK Relations	57
4.2.2. Political Dialogue	60
4.2.3. KEDO	60
Chapter 5. Policy of Active Pressure 2009–Present	62
5.1. Background	62
5.1.1. Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy	62
5.1.2. Evolution of the EU Non-Proliferation Policy	64
5.1.3. The DPRK’s Nuclear Programs and International Responses	65
5.2. The EU’s Pressure and Sanctions	67
5.2.1. EU-DPRK Relations	67
5.2.2. Political Dialogue	71
5.2.3. The EU’s Restrictive Measures against North Korea	72
Chapter 6. Analysis	75
6.1. EU’s Policy Objectives toward North Korea	75
6.1.1. Active Engagement 1993–2003	75
6.1.2. Critical Engagement 2003–2009	78
6.1.3. Active pressure 2009–2021	79
6.1.4. Assessment of Hypothesis 1	81
6.2. Member States’ National interests and preferences	85
6.2.1. Initial Attitudes toward the DPRK	85
6.2.2. Critical Attitudes toward the DPRK	86
6.1.3. Sanctions	93
6.1.4. Assessment of Hypothesis 2	97
Chapter 7. Conclusion	100
Bibliography	102

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CPE	Civilian Power Europe
CVID	Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EEAS	European Union External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EPC	European Political Co-operation
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
HR/VP	High Representative/Vice President
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KEDO	Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization
LWR	Light-Water Reactor
MPE	Military Power Europe
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPE	Normative Power Europe
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
ROK	Republic of Korea
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

List of Tables

Table 1	The EU's foreign and security identity theories	35
Table 2	EU-DRPK Relations from 1993 to 2002	47
Table 3	Timeline of North Korea's nuclear tests	66
Table 4	Changes in EU policy measures toward North Korea	82

List of Figures

Figure 1	EU institutions' aid to North Korea, 2002–2009 (USD, Million)	59
Figure 2	EU's annual budgets allocated for non-proliferation	65
Figure 3	EU-DPRK trade, 2000–2017 (USD million)	69
Figure 4	EU-DPRK total trade volume, 2016–2020 (USD thousand)	70
Figure 5	EU institutions' aid to North Korea, 2008–2019 (USD, Million)	71
Figure 6	Accumulated number of persons and entities restricted by the EU and the UN	74

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

At the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, Europe was forced to face and adapt to dramatic transformations in international politics that the end of the Cold War introduced. The end of the Cold War raised questions about the role of the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in European security issues. As White (2001: 95) notes, “[i]t became apparent that Europeans would have to be prepared to take much greater responsibility for their own security rather than rely on the United States.” In addition, the political changes in the region, triggered by the German reunification and the emergence of factors destabilizing European security occurring in the neighboring regions (such as the Gulf War and the ethnic war in the region of former Yugoslavia), became new political and security challenges for Europe. Those significant changes in the international political environment served to emphasize the necessity of political integration beyond mere economic integration. Accordingly, the European Community, to become the European Union (EU), decided to create a new structure of foreign and security policymaking that would address global issues commonly in 1993. Eventually, the Union established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, in 1993. With the creation of the CFSP, the EU was now ready to move forward from internal integration to common global approaches (Kim, 2007; Millard and Yi, 2018).

Although it exposed multiple problems at the beginning of implementing the CFSP,¹ the EU is currently one of the major global actors who actively participates in peacemaking and peacekeeping actions and contributes to forming and maintaining global governance in security. The EU actively operates the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Europe and Africa, especially in its southern and eastern neighboring countries that directly influence security threats to Europe to prove its power as an effective international actor (Forti, 2018; Kim, 2007; Kim and Choi, 2019). In terms of global security, the EU also has actively formed and led the discourse against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear

¹ For example, the European response to the Bosnian war that took place from 1992 to 1995 clearly showed the ineffectiveness of the capabilities and expectation gap of the CFSP. Hill (1993) argued that a significant gap between high expectation and its actual capacities, as well as the questions of competence between the EU institutions and member states, brought in the immaturity and limits of the common policy.

weapons. It has promoted the non-proliferation regime in the framework of multilateral cooperation with other powerful states and international organizations such as the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Its efforts and engagement in non-proliferation came to a visible outcome in 2015. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was regarded as a successful diplomatic case of Brussels. Based on the CFSP, the EU finally proved that European foreign governance had the ability to achieve internally and externally effective outcomes (Blockmans and Viaud, 2017; Cronberg, 2017a).

Europe's involvement in international security issues so far seems to focus on the neighboring regions and to restrict its ability as a regional actor. Its activities have been mainly displayed in nearby places. However, the EU has tried to expand its influence beyond Europe and neighboring regions, such as Africa and the Middle East, where it traditionally exercises political leverage. Its concerns on distant threats were clearly stated in the European Security Strategy (ESS). In the document (European Council, 2003b: 6–8), the Council addressed the EU's interests were influenced by regional wars and nuclear risks in Asia, as well as crises closer to home. It also expressed the willingness to make a contribution to a better and more secure world. The conflicts in the Korean Peninsula and nuclear activities in North Korea were mentioned in the paper as examples about which the EU was concerned. In the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (2016) replacing and updating the ESS, the European Council also expresses its concerns in dealing with Asian security and non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula (EEAS, 2016b: 38). As declared in its foreign and security strategy documents, the EU has been continually developing policies directed at the Korean Peninsula and expanded its scope of actions in terms of politics and security (Esteban, 2019; Lee, 2009; Kim and Choi, 2019).

From the view of globalization, the EU's concerns over North Korea's nuclear issue are not surprising. The North Korean nuclear program has been a global topic to which the major powerful states— the United States, Russia, Japan, and China — have already paid enormous attention, and lots of international actors participated actively in the process to resolve it. Also, the nuclear development program of North Korea, as well as that of Iran, has been regarded as the most severe nuclear proliferation crisis to global security. For such reasons, the EU has paid great attention to North Korea's nuclear problems.

The Union firstly took a conciliatory approach in the mid-1990s. By operating various programs and participating in the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), it attempted to induce North Korea to freeze its nuclear program and open itself to the world. In addition, the EU and its member countries provided humanitarian and economic

development assistance and the medical health program to North Korea despite the Bush administration's rigorous policy toward the country (Park, 2007). Brussels and Pyongyang held annual political dialogues to discuss issues in various issues such as humanitarian and technical assistance beginning in December 1998. However, their relationship began a new phase in the early 2000s, right after the EU and North Korea established a formal diplomatic relation in May 2001. The second nuclear crisis caused by North Korea's operation of its highly enriched uranium program in 2002 led to the transformation of the EU's active engagement policy toward the country. In 2003, the Union gradually shifted its stance to the critical engagement policy that emphasized its core principles of non-proliferation: it publicly condemned North Korea for WMD-related activities. However, Brussels did not give up a diplomatic way to address the nuclear problem: it continued political dialogue with Pyongyang during this period. More changes in the EU policy occurred in the late 2000s. After the second nuclear test of the DPRK in 2009, the EU started to abandon engagement in North Korean affairs and press the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to freeze its nuclear program by adopting sanctions. The EU not only transposed the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council against North Korea into the EU legal framework but also adopted its first autonomous restrictive measures. Its reaction to North Korea's nuclear activities in this period became tougher than in the previous two periods. The Union officially cites its policy toward the country as the critical engagement policy (EEAS, 2018). However, it is clearly shown that the Union has reduced the approach of engagement in North Korean affairs, such as talks and aid programs, and tightened sanctions against the country (Alexandrova, 2019). It seems that the EU has taken a strict policy to halt the nuclear weapons development of North Korea (Esteban, 2019; Ko, 2019).

This turn to a hardline policy raises some questions: why did the EU decide to increase pressure and take a firm stance on the issue? Why did the EU abandon the engagement approach to the country? Has its foreign policy objective changed, which eventually introduced the changes in the policy? Or, was there another reason that played an essential role in the evolution of the policy? This thesis focuses on revealing the reasons behind the change in the EU's policy courses. The theories of European integration and the concepts of the EU's international identity are used to find answers to these questions.

1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

The aim of this master's dissertation is to reveal reasons and dynamics behind the shifts

in the EU's North Korea policy, especially its policy to deter the North Korean nuclear program. Concerns over North Korea's nuclear program led to the EU's accession to KEDO in 1997, which was its first direct involvement in North Korea's nuclear issue. Its policy approach changed alongside its involvement from the late 1990s until the early 2020s. In 1999, the European Council announced a policy framework to build bilateral relations in line with its engagement policy (European Council, 1999c). However, by 2018 the European External Action Service (EEAS) suggested that it would pursue the critical engagement policy, combining both pressure and communications (EEAS, 2018). Many scholars considered that the EU's policy course for North Korea gradually changed again in the period between 2009 and 2015 because the EU no longer maintained communication channels with the North (Bondaz, 2020; Esteban, 2019; Ko, 2019; Vandenhoute, 2017).

This thesis focuses on changes in the EU's approach to North Korea, especially its motives for a change in policy course; in other words, the reasons for the EU's abandonment of engagement and reinforcement of pressure. Accordingly, the following research question is presented: how can the changes in the EU's policy from active engagement to active pressure be explained?

The EU's retraction of its engagement policy was unexpected for two reasons. First, the engagement approach to North Korea was considered a fairly effective measure to address the nuclear issue at the time (Choi and Kim, 2016). Pyongyang welcomed political dialogue with Brussels (Berkofsky, 2003). Bilateral talks were held annually (except in 2005 and 2006) and addressed delicate issues such as nuclear development and human rights. Diplomatic relations between Europe and the DPRK, starting in 2001, ensured that communications between both sides were maintained. With such dialogue and communication channels, the EU was able to urge North Korea to fulfill its international obligations (Jung, 2018; Yonhap News Agency, 2003). In addition, the policy helped highlight the EU's role in the broader matter of the Korean Peninsula (Choi and Kim, 2016). By keeping communication with the North open, the EU came to be regarded as a desirable partner for North Korea and an influential actor for other stakeholders and the international community during the late 1990s and the 2000s. However, the EU gradually adopted a rugged stance, expressing unwillingness to maintain dialogue and engagement with the country. This would not help it stand out in its role in the non-nuclear process on the Korean Peninsula. Despite the effectiveness and benefits of the engagement approach, the EU became alienated. Accordingly, accounting for Brussels's unexpected changes in attitude requires further consideration?

The first factor that could have led to the change in policy course is the EU's foreign

policy objective. It is clear that the policy course can be changed when the EU sets a new policy objective. However, how can the EU's policy objectives toward North Korea be defined? Three concepts are commonly used to analyze the EU's international presence: Military Power Europe (MPE), Civilian Power Europe (CPE), and Normative Power Europe (NPE). When regarding the EU as a unilateral international actor, these concepts suggest what type of actor the EU is on the international scene based on its main priorities for external policy and the means used to achieve its goals (Kim and Choi, 2019). First, CPE refers to the EU's pursuit of European economic interest and the international community's interest through the implementation of the CFSP (Duchêne, 1994). Second, the concept MPE argues that the Union seeks to expand its influence on regional and global security issues with military force (Smith, 2000). Third, NPE refers to the EU acting to spread European and universal norms (Manners, 2002). These concepts help analyze what kinds of objectives—military, civilian, or normative—the EU has pursued over the last three decades to determine whether there were any changes in terms of its primary policy goals (such as a policy that gradually increased in severity).

The second factor to be considered is the awareness of and attitudes toward the issue by member states. This can be explained from an intergovernmental perspective. While the concepts of the EU's external identity focus on its objectives for the CFSP as a unitary actor, the intergovernmental perspective concentrates on how the common foreign policy is formulated (Ko, 2019). Despite the existence of institutions that deal with the EU's foreign affairs at the European level (notably the EEAS, which is the diplomatic service and combined foreign and defense ministry of the EU), its decision-making processes are not free from member states' positions and interests. The EU's external policy is made based upon the principle of unanimity, and the European Commission and European Parliament's roles in making policy decisions are largely limited (Publications Office of the EU, 2016). It could be said that the intergovernmental nature remains in the area of external relations. The Council of Ministers, representing the interests of member governments, leads the entire foreign policy decision-making process and delivers final decisions to the European Commission for implementation (Publications Office of the EU, n.d.). Due to a decision-making process that does not allow the EU sole competence in the foreign and security area, member states can play significant roles in formulating and implementing the EU's external policy in accordance with its domestically-generated interests. Thus, member states' newly established attitudes and interests regarding North Korea's nuclear issues resulted in the EU's change of policy course from engagement to pressure.

Accordingly, the hypotheses proposed in this thesis are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: The EU's primary policy objective toward North Korea changed, which eventually led to the engage policy being abandoned while the pressure policy was reinforced.

Hypothesis 2: The changes in member states' attitudes and perceptions toward the North Korean nuclear program incited the evolution of the EU's approach to North Korea.

The research question presented in this thesis (“how can the changes in the EU’s policy from active engagement to active pressure policy be explained?”) is answered by verifying these two hypotheses. To address and answer this question, this thesis first examines the three concepts of the EU’s external presence and theories of EU integration. Then, the EU’s policy toward North Korea during three different periods will be assessed to confirm that each policy period had distinctive features that separated one from the others. Then, the two hypotheses will be examined. At this stage, the policy objectives pursued by the EU during each policy period will be identified. This will contribute to clarifying the correlation between the EU’s North Korea primary policy objective and the policy changes. Member states’ attitudes toward North Korea will also be analyzed to verify that their interests were responsible for the changes in the EU’s attitude toward the Korean Peninsula.

1.3. RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA SELECTION

1.3.1. Qualitative Case Study

Social sciences attempt to accumulate scientific and theoretical knowledge of political phenomena. In the pursuit of academically meaningful achievements, researchers should bear in mind that “any theoretical approach must be judged by how well it holds up empirically” (Huber and Dion, 2002: 5–6). In other words, a theory can be acknowledged by the scientific community when it has been successfully tested and found to have the strong support of evidence verified and collected through the application of scientific methods. Hence, at the early stage of a research process, it is vital to select the right research method for the given type of data and brings validity and rationality to the outcome.

The study of EU foreign policy lies between European studies and international relations: it can be regarded as European studies in that it addresses EU common policy, while it deals with EU relations with a third country as a study of international relations. Researchers in both fields use various scientific research methods that can be traditionally categorized into quantitative and qualitative methods. While it is not easy to make an obvious distinction between qualitative and quantitative approaches due to the frequent application of both methods

or a mixed-methods approach within a single research study (Read and Marsh, 2002; Johnson et al., 2008; Patton, 2001), some distinguishing features are embedded in the two methods. The quantitative method, on the one hand, involves a process of analyzing numerical data or large sets of quantified data. The qualitative approach, on the other hand, is concerned with understanding and interpreting the behaviors and attitudes of actors. It uses non-numerical data, such as discourse, texts, or comments, and produces descriptive explanations (Minichiello et al., 1990: 5; Harrison, 2001: 74; Johnson et al., 2008). This research aims to examine changes in the EU's policy toward North Korea. The motives for the policy shift can be well understood through the reviews of past and present data reflecting the EU's (or its member states') behaviors toward and perceptions of North Korea. Thus, it can be said that this study can be more successfully carried out through an interpretative and descriptive approach that will offer more in-depth explanations than statistical or numerical data could. Thus, a qualitative research approach is chosen in this thesis for analyzing the context in which the EU changed its policy.

This thesis uses a case study as the structural and procedural framework for various qualitative research approaches. Case studies have been one of the first-used research methodologies in the realm of qualitative research. In the term “case study,” a case signifies “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time” (Gerring, 2007: 19–20). In other words, a case study is an in-depth examination focusing on a particular case or a few cases. Case studies aim to understand complex social phenomena as the methodology enables researchers to comprehend meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 2003: 2). It currently accounts for a significant proportion of research methodologies employed in social sciences research, including in international politics and European studies (Starman, 2013; Pahre, 2005). Accordingly, research on EU foreign policy—lying between European studies and international relations—also has largely depended on this methodology. A substantial portion of the European studies literature is dominated by either regional or thematic case studies (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004). According to Tonra and Christiansen (2004: 3), the popularity of this methodology in the study of EU foreign policy lies in the fact that it provides the “empirical meat of substantive analysis.” In order to fully comprehend the Union as an international actor, it is essential to pay close attention to what it has done (or not) and where it has failed (empirical data). Case studies enable researchers to retain significant and meaningful features of EU foreign policy.

In spite of the significant use and importance of the case study in both international relations and European studies, scientists have long regarded case studies to be weak in testing hypotheses, pointing out the absence of a well-structured testing process and the difficulty of

generalizing research results. However, case studies are effective for explaining outcomes in an individual case because they focus on a single case or small-N cases rather than large-N data. The case study is helpful to infer and test arguments that define how the independent variable causes the dependent one (Evera, 1997). This thesis aims to reveal causal relations between the EU's behavioral changes, on the one side, and its external identity and member states' preferences, on the other side. Accordingly, a case study can be a useful methodology in this research.

As the case study is an intensive investigation of a specific phenomenon at a single moment in time or over some periods of time, it is necessary to define the temporal scope of this research. This thesis is a single case study split into three time periods that match with the EU's different policy approaches toward North Korea. The three timespans of this research are: Active Engagement (1993–2003), Critical Engagement (2003–2009), and Active Pressure (2009–present). The first stage covers the EU's and its member states' active approaches to North Korea, including the normalization of relations with the DPRK, as well as financial and technical assistance. The second period addresses the policy of the two-track approach—an approach not only using economic and diplomatic restrictive measures but also maintaining communication channels—lasting from 2003 until 2009 (EEAS, 2018). The final time scope reflects the turn to an unfriendly approach, abandoning dialogue and trade starting from 2009 to the present day.

1.3.2. Document Analysis

The selection and interpretation of data are at the core of this research. This thesis chooses document analysis as its method because “document analysis is particularly applicable to qualitative case studies” (Bowen, 2009:29). Bowen (2009: 27) stated that “document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents.” Similar to other qualitative methods, this method entails the examination and interpretation of data in order to elicit meaning, understand the phenomenon, and build empirical knowledge; it relies on the analysis and inference of documents (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). However, documents used with this method do not entail records of information; they are “potential sources of empirical data for case studies” (ibid.). Prior (2003) asserted that social products are generated and interchanged in socially organized ways. In sum, documents are a useful source of information since they provide a record of EU activities because “[d]ocuments of all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem,” as Merriam explained (1988: 118).

Document analysis merges the features of content analysis and thematic analysis in that it analyzes documents (one of the types of data frequently used in content analysis), but the documents are carefully selected based on the understanding of the phenomenon (the way that thematic analysis collects data). Accordingly, document analysis involves “a first-pass document review, in which meaningful and relevant passages of text or other data are identified” (Bowen, 2009: 32). Thus, the researcher is required to exhibit the ability to distinguish significant and pertinent information from irrelevant data for data selection.

This form of data analysis has been frequently chosen by researchers due to several reasons. First, it is a time-saving and efficient qualitative method because it involves data selection rather than data collection (Bowen, 2009). Hodder (2000: 704) asserted the importance of documents in qualitative research given that “the information provided may differ and may not be available in spoken form” while “texts endure and thus give historical insight.” This means that documents are less influenced by the researcher’s intervention in the research process, which guarantees the stability of the research. However, selected documents are inevitably biased as the selection process involves the researcher’s subjectivity (Yin, 1994). Accordingly, if a researcher is more careful in data selection, acknowledging the disadvantages, this method will bring benefits to answering the research questions.

1.3.3. Data Selection

As document analysis is chosen as the research method, data selection is of importance in the research design. The criteria that this thesis sets forth for the data selection are the time frame and the relevance to the research questions. In terms of time frame, this thesis will heavily rely on documents published from 1993 to the mid-2010s. Although this thesis covers the period to the present day, the research questions deal with the changes in the EU policy toward North Korea that occurred around 2003 and 2009. Thus, documents from the periods of transition will be studied most intensively. Some documents published either before 1993 or after the mid-2010s will also be reviewed, but their roles will be limited to providing background information, especially historical insights.

Documents used in this thesis will also be selected in consideration of their relevance to the purpose of the research. This thesis aims to examine the dynamics behind changes in EU policy toward North Korea. Accordingly, EU documents reflecting the CFSP—especially the policy toward North Korea—will be primarily selected. Conclusions of the European Council meetings and General Affairs Council meetings, past and present EU treaties and regulations, papers and official statements published by the European Commissions (including the European

Union External Action Service (EEAS), the Council, and the Parliament) will be used to track policy changes. Especially, EU strategic reports toward Asia and non-proliferation—“Toward a New Asia Strategy” in 1994, “the European Union Lines of Action Towards North Korea” in 2000, “the EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004” in 2001, “European Security Strategy” in 2003, and “the European Union Global Strategy” in 2016—will help in analyzing the EU’s attitude and position toward North Korea’s nuclear program and in testing Hypothesis 1.

Documents issued by member states will also be dealt with in this research, especially in the examination of Hypothesis 2. With intergovernmental accounts, national governments and their interests are major actors in building and reformulating EU common policy. Accordingly, this thesis will refer to documents that reflect member states’ attitudes toward North Korea’s nuclear program and nuclear non-proliferation. Among the twenty-eight-member states, France and the United Kingdom will be focused on.² They are the countries that actively participated in addressing nuclear non-proliferation issues, e.g., the Iranian nuclear deal and UK negotiations with Libya. In addition, as European permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), these two countries took the lead in adopting UN sanctions against North Korea. Due to their noticeable presence in non-proliferation and sanctioning activities, the two countries are assumed to have influenced the evolvement of the EU’s policy course relating to the North Korean nuclear program. Thus, documents reflecting the position and national interests of France and the United Kingdom, including politicians’ memoirs, will be used.

In addition, documents covering non-EU member states that have influenced the EU’s policy toward North Korea (North Korea and the United States) will help attain the research goal. Documents published by North Korea’s government regarding the EU and its nuclear program are largely limited in terms of access because the North Korean regime has barely revealed its government documents publicly. However, Rodong Sinmun, an official newspaper of the Communist Party of North Korea, delivers the regime’s intention and position on certain international topics. Reviewing Rodong Sinmun will help in analyzing the North Korean government’s position on EU-DPRK relations and provide background knowledge to understand its nuclear program better. This thesis will also cover documents reflecting the US-Europe relations and the United States’ reactions to North Korea’s nuclear program. The US—one of the major actors in North Korean nuclear issues and an old ally of Europe with shared

² The UK is not currently a member of the EU, but as it was a major member during the period where the policies were changed, British activities and policy will be taken into account in this paper.

security interests—has led the international community’s discussion on North Korea and influenced the EU’s policy toward the country. Official documents and statements published by the US government, as well as American politicians’ memoirs, revealing interstate negotiations, will allow me to conduct an in-depth analysis on the issue.

Finally, the thesis draws extensively on documents of international organizations, notably the UN (UNSC), the IAEA, and KEDO. Their documents are not directly related to the EU CFSP but include information about nuclear non-proliferation activities and reactions to North Korea’s nuclear developments of the EU, its member states, and the international community. Accordingly, by examining these documents, the thesis will provide a comprehensive understanding of the EU’s non-nuclear activities and its role in addressing the issue at the international level.

However, the data selection for this thesis has an intrinsic limitation. This thesis will highly depend on documents of external communication, especially official documents and statements that the EU has published. Informal documents, such as letters, proposals, and drafts, would reveal the internal perspective of the EU and its member states toward North Korea and its nuclear program (Kutsyuruba, 2017). They would shed light on the EU’s or its member states’ internal decision-making processes and real intentions. However, such informal documents will not be included in the selected data due to limited access. The reliance on formal documents may be considered a drawback of the data collection

1.4. ACADEMIC LITERATURE REVIEW

Prior to identifying the research questions of this thesis, it is crucial to understand the ideas and arguments of existing knowledge in research areas relevant to the topic. The relevant research areas of the topic can be largely divided into three parts: 1) the European policy in nuclear non-proliferation, 2) the international nuclear non-proliferation regime toward the DPRK, and 3) the European foreign and security policy toward the Korean Peninsula. This thesis reviews academic literature related to these three parts.

1.4.1. EU Non-Proliferation Policy

Blavoukos et al. (2015) argued that research on the European role in nuclear weapon non-proliferation started in the late 1980s and early 1990s, preceding the actual role of the EU in the field. According to them, the pioneers, notably Harald Müller, explored policies and public attitudes among member states to the EU’s role in global WMD non-proliferation

governance and activities to reduce nuclear threats by the Soviet Union and Russia. These pioneered studies attracted some attention in the relevant academic field. The wider and in-depth research on the EU and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime started booming in accordance with the release of “the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” in December 2003. Portela (2003) pointed out the adoption of the strategy could be an opportunity for the EU to become a relevant non-proliferation actor on the international stage if appropriately implemented. Before this adoption, according to the author, the EU was an ineffective non-proliferation actor with two features. First, it preferred the multilateral framework and performed well at the multilateral level with international cooperation. In addition, the EU showed the tendency to take a broad approach to lower regional tensions and mostly to chase after the framework that the United States crafted. The author expected the changes induced by the strategy. Portela and Kienzle (2015b) explained how the adoption of the WMD strategy has brought in the development of non-proliferation policies of the EU. In fact, the strategy did not change the general direction of non-proliferation policies but enhanced the existing framework of the EU, such as multilateralism, technical cooperation among member states, and cooperation with the United States. However, Kienzle and Portela asserted that the EU enlarged its perspective from Russia to other regions, especially the Middle East.

Many scholars revealed through their studies that the limits of the EU nuclear non-proliferation would continue. Jasper and Portela (2010) explained the dilemmas that the EU faced within the context of non-proliferation. First of all, they pointed out there was an absence of serious conversations on nuclear weapons possessed by two European countries, France and the United Kingdom (UK), despite the increase in collaboration among member states in the domain and the importance of such discussions in terms of the further integration. In addition, according to them, the EU attempted to enhance its common policy toward non-proliferation, and there was an actual and evident progression. However, member states still displayed a tendency to handle nuclear issues by themselves outside of the EU framework. The authors were concerned that this dilemma could deteriorate the cohesion and coherence of policies in the domain at the European level. Van Ham (2011) asserted that member states were still unconvinced of the EU’s ability to implement non-proliferation policies successfully and to bring effective results. This attitude of member countries led to the continuance of applying intergovernmentalism to WMD policies. Van Ham (2011; p. 4) considered that the efforts made by the EU were “insufficient to meet some of the specific objectives set out in 2003.” Grip (2011) believed that there was a gap between the EU’s external and internal policies in the field of non-proliferation. The incoherency between them became a major limit to generate synergy

in European efforts on non-proliferation.

The EU's prominent role in the Iranian nuclear deal process has given rise to numerous studies analyzing the features and implications of the EU's non-proliferation policies within the context of the CFSP. Blockmans and Viaud (2017) focused on the EU's role of facilitating and mediating the deal. They asserted that the EU took a role in convening discussions about the nuclear deal and in coordinating disputes among the participants. Cronberg (2017a) cited the EU's effective multilateralism as a success factor of the Iranian nuclear deal. According to her, effective multilateralism encouraged the EU to overcome its deficiencies as a global actor and to lead discussions when the deal met with difficulties. Adebahr (2014), however, criticized the EU's non-proliferation policy for lacking a strategic mindset going beyond the deal. Adebahr (ibid.) pointed out that the Union's policy showed inefficiency in resolving issues such as Syria and Ukraine, although the successful approach to Iran highlighted the EU's role as a conflict mediator or international diplomatic actor.

Academic research on the EU's policy toward North Korea's nuclear weapons was, however, scarcely conducted until the occurrence of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002–2003. The European Council officially expressed concerns about the North's nuclear development and the withdrawal from the IAEA of the DPRK and set its own security strategy for WMDs (European Council, 2003b; 2003d). Researchers started to pay attention to the EU's role in North Korea's nuclear development problems. Some scholars, such as Frank (2002), have discussed that the Korean Peninsula could be regarded as a test case for the EU's active role in global politics. However, this view was refuted in that the European role in this matter was relatively limited and marginal. Berkofsky (2003), who is one of the pioneers in this study, claimed that the EU policies did not play any significant roles in a peacebuilding dialogue on the peninsula, although the nuclear issues of North Korea would inevitably influence the Brussels-Pyongyang relations, and the nuclear threats provoked by North Korea were one of the top global agenda items in terms of security. The author regarded its tendency to align with US policies toward North Korea's nuclear issues and stay under the US' shadow as a cause of these less-influential policies (Berkofsky, 2003). Lee (2005) examined the EU's role in resolving the nuclear crisis on the peninsula, pointing out the fact that the EU's role and abilities were overestimated despite the absence of military capacity. Also, he argued that the EU's role was complicated and inconsistent with the Union's two-track approach toward DPRK affairs; a hard stance in light of WMD and a tender approach in the humanitarian area. However, the Union's role in nuclear non-proliferation of the Korean Peninsula has been widely researched. In later work, Berkofsky (2010) called on the EU's more active role in the Korean Peninsula to

overcome its current position, perceived as uncertain by other actors. Bluth and Winn (2013) emphasized that using hard power such as military capabilities or economic sanctions led by the United States would not be helpful in reducing the nuclear tension on the peninsula, but rather it could result in undesirable results. They argued that the EU's role in negotiating a peace process is important and necessary. As reviewed, existing academic research on the EU's North Korea policy in terms of security attempted to account for the Union's past and current role in stabilizing the peninsula, but the dynamics behind the policy decision-making were rarely researched.

1.4.2. International Reactions to the DPRK Nuclear Program

With the rise of international concerns about the North Korean nuclear crises and efforts to resolve the problems, assessing the bilateral and multilateral policies for the denuclearization of North Korea has become one of the popular security topics in the relevant academic field. A substantial number of existing studies on international responses to DPRK nuclear issues can be divided into two parts: bilateral and multilateral approaches (InterKorean-related approaches are not considered in this thesis.) In terms of bilateral approaches, most works have attempted to reveal the effectiveness of the nuclear negotiation between the United States and the DPRK, as the United States has played a leading role in the international non-nuclear regime. Husenicova (2018) reviewed the US policy toward North Korea after the end of the Cold War and diagnosed the reasons the policies have failed. She added that North Korean nuclear issues had influenced US policies toward major stakeholders of the issues such as South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Some scholars focused on the US policies of particular timeframes or administrations. Yoon (2003) analyzed the coercive diplomacy strategy of the Clinton administration in terms of the role of incentives (the carrot-and-stick approach). Kim and Hundt (2011) assessed the policy strategy of the Bush administration, while Snyder and Byun (2009) identified the challenges that the Obama administration's policy toward North Korea was facing and assessed its preparations for North Korean instability. As the two US-DPRK summits were held during the Trump administration in 2018 and 2019, many articles attempted to assess the administration's strategy toward North Korea and its nuclear weapons from different points of view. For example, Cha and Katz (2018) regarded the changes in North Korea's nuclear negotiation strategy with the United States as the successful result of the Trump administration's madman strategy and sanctions against North Korea. Therefore, the United States should not withdraw sanctions against North Korea, and consistent pressure through economic sanctions was the only and appropriate way to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue without war. On the other hand, some scholars argued that the administration showed a confused

strategy: it resumed the bilateral dialogue with North Korea but at the same time stressed the feasibility of using the military forces against the country (Buszynski, 2009; Khoo, 2019; Kim, 2019; Nah, 2020; Nakato, 2013; Narushige, 2009; Woo, 2018). Other countries' policies or roles in denuclearizing the DPRK were also examined by scholars, but the scope of the countries was limited to Japan, China, and Russia. The EU policies toward North Korea in terms of nuclear weapons, reviewed in the previous part, make up only a marginal portion of all international policies.

Of the research dealing with multilateral non-proliferation approaches, the framework of the Six-Party Talks is mainstreamed. The Six-Party Talks, which lasted from 2003–2007, emerged as a forum of multilateral dialogue to resolve the North Korean nuclear issues in a peaceful way. Many scholars, especially South Korean experts, examined the possibility of institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks. Kim (2005) examined necessary elements in order to switch the talks to a multilateral organization for cooperation. Interestingly, some also explored the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a successful case. Lim (2009) analyzed the institutionalizing process of the CSCE to find some implications which would be applied to the talks. Kim, M.-S. (2011) analyzed the decision-making process and structural features of the CSCE from the legal perspective for further development of the existing talks. However, after the declaration of North Korea's pullout from the talk, research on the talk showed pessimistic views. Scholars analyzed the causes for its failure and sought to find an alternative multilateral forum to discuss North Korea's nuclear issues. For example, Blank (2011) suggested a forum for five actors, excluding North Korea.

Besides the four major countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the EU has recently attracted the attention of the academic field as an axis of multilateral parties. Some scholars have attempted to assess the possibility of the EU's role as a mediator in the multilateral process, such as in the Six-Party Talks. Dehshiri and Shahmoradi (2019) asserted that Brussels's role would be crucial whether or not a nuclear deal with Pyongyang went well, even though the Union was so far not at the center of the negotiation. If the process of a deal reaches a final stage, the EU will play the role of mediator by assuring North Korea that the promises signed would be kept, regardless of changes in the governments of the United States and South Korea. If the negotiations fail, Brussels would be a mediator who persuades Washington not to consider a military option. Schmidt (2006) indicated that the EU had some exclusive advantages over other major protagonists: the absence of strategic interests at stake, a firm stance against a regime change in North Korea, and the presence of European diplomatic missions in Pyongyang. He asserted that due to some serious hurdles that would hinder the EU

from playing an active role in this matter, the EU could contribute better in a multilateral framework. Lee (2017) examined the preconditions required in order to guarantee and enhance the EU's role in multilateral dialogues. However, various research assessed that there was little prospect of the EU's increased role. Berkofsky (2010) pointed out that Brussels' role in the Korean peninsula security issue would remain very limited in the future. This was because not only the North Korean nuclear issue has not been a top priority of the CFSP, but also the Union had been excluded for a long time from any type of multilateral dialogue dealing with the Korean peninsula security issues. Kodama (2005) suggested that the complexity of the EU's institutional structure and the slowness of its decision-making process in terms of external issues constrained the Union from promising active engagement in the matter.

1.4.3 The EU's Foreign Policy toward the Korean Peninsula

The two previous parts of the literature review pointed out the lack of existing research about the EU's current policy on North Korean nuclear issues. One may pose the following question: have political scientists not been interested in EU foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula? In fact, the EU's policies towards the Korean Peninsula were barely researched until the mid-1990s. In the late 1990s, South Korea became an important country for the global economy, and the trading between the EU and South Korea increased. As the EU-Republic of Korea (ROK) trade increased, academia started to pay attention to this new level of the bilateral relationship: economic cooperation was always a main field of concern in terms of EU-ROK relations for researchers, but research on the security or political partnership was marginal (Chung and Lee, 2019). Soon, researchers broadened the scope of their research as bilateral economic cooperation led to the active political and security one: the EU-ROK relationship was officially elevated into a "Strategic Partnership," and the Framework Agreement and the Framework Participation Agreement came into effect in 2014 and 2016 respectively, which contributed to the bilateral security and political cooperation. Choi (2010) and Kelly (2011) assessed the effectiveness of the Strategic Partnership and the Framework Agreement and discussed their impacts in the future. Both agreed that the enhanced bilateral relationship would contribute to the expansion of South Korea's diplomatic influence on the global stage, but at the same time, they both doubted the profits that the EU would get and the possibility that they would form a real, meaningful bond in the future. Since then, studies on the political relationship between the two sides have continued to be published. However, such research focusing on the bilateral relationship between the EU and South Korea does not contain discourse about the EU's role in the peacebuilding process on the peninsula.

In the early 2000s, research on the EU policy toward North Korea started in the realm of politics. As the EU established diplomatic relations with North Korea, many scholars began to make in-depth analyses of the relationship between the two sides. Scholars such as Frank (2002), Berkofsky (2003; 2010), and Park (2002; 2006), who studied this area early on, were interested in the impact of North Korea's nuclear weapons development early on the EU-DPRK relationship and the EU's role in dealing with it. However, their focuses were not the nuclear policy in particular but rather the EU's overall policy, including humanitarian assistance and human rights. This line of in-depth analytical research into EU policies toward the country was continued by experts wondering why the EU, an influential international actor, punched below its weight in addressing issues related to the DPRK. Lee (2005; 2010) pointed out that the EU's two-track approach combining a hardline position on North Korea's weapons of mass destruction matters and a soft stance on humanitarian assistance lacked consistency and became a hurdle for the EU in taking an essential role in North Korean matters. Millard and Yi (2017) asserted that the EU should more actively participate in the process as it has the potential to become an effective mediator in resuming the stalled multilateral negotiation on denuclearization. Dehshiri and Shahmoradi (2019) saw the EU as a peripheral but essential player in the matter. Although its political leverage is limited compared to that of the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, Europe could still play an important role, especially if the denuclearization talks fail. Some scholars paid attention to the effectiveness of the current EU approach (Ballbach, 2019; Bondaz, 2020; Pardo, 2016; 2017). They all criticized the current critical engagement policy, arguing that this approach cannot bring the productive results that the EU expects. They asserted the need for the EU's new approach involving proactive measures and more tangible contributions toward peace and stability in the region.

Some scholars analyzed the EU's international identity with regards to the Korean peninsula's issues by using the concepts of CPE, MPE, and NPE. Pang and Ma (2014) asserted that the policy has both civilian power and normative power characteristics. However, most scholars argued the EU showed normative power when addressing the peninsula-related issues, notably the issues regarding North Korea, such as weapons of mass destruction, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. Lee (2012) assessed the EU's role as a normative power in promoting human rights in the country. He pointed out that while most international actors were interested in only the hard politics field, such as security and economy, the EU approached North Korea with human rights concerns, which can be interpreted as normative access. Pardo (2014) examined how the EU currently acts as a normative power for issues surrounding North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles.

There were some attempts to analyze the EU's policy shift. Alexandrova (2019) and Choi and Kim (2016) studied why the EU's policy paradigm shifted from the Active Engagement policy to the Critical Engagement policy. They argued that EU-US relations induced the EU's Pressure policy. Specifically, Alexandrova (2019: pp. 48–49) emphasized that the EU's security policy could not be divergent from US policy. Thus, the EU inevitably took a similar policy stance as the United States. The authors attempted to answer why Brussels' approach toward Pyongyang and presented reasonable explanations, but their studies only covered the EU's policy change from 2002 to 2003, not what happened in the late 2000s and the early 2010s.

So far, academic literature in the three domains related to the topic of this thesis has been reviewed. As seen above, the EU's policy toward North Korea, especially its changed attitude in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issues, have been pretty neglected by academia, while academic research has been actively conducted in the fields of the EU nuclear non-proliferation policies and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime against the DPRK nuclear weapons. Not much research exists in the academic area of European foreign policy toward North Korea and its nuclear weapons, in particular. Moreover, most of the existing analyses are on the EU's role in the Korean Peninsula peace process, the effectiveness of the Union's current North Korea policy, or its lack of capacity in handling the issue. Through this academic literature review, it can be affirmed that the EU's motivation for adopting the current Active Pressure Policy has been outside of most scholars' attention. Thus, it is worth examining, for further academic development, factors that could have driven the EU's policy changes.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

With the expansion of EU activities in international politics since the 1990s, animated discussions have arisen over how to interpret its behaviors as an international actor on the global scene. However, traditional theoretical frameworks focusing on states as actors and their relations have not been appropriate for interpreting the EU's *sui generis* characteristics. As Andreatta (2011: 22) pointed out, the Union is not like a state or an alliance, thus "it [...] represents a heterodox unit of analysis." To fill the gaps between reality and traditional theories, many new theories emerged among European studies; however, no single concept offers a solid explanation of European foreign policy (Andreatta, 2011). To better analyze the dynamics of the EU's policy change toward the Korean Peninsula more effectively, this thesis applies two different theoretical approaches to explain the EU's external policy: 1) concepts to define the EU's role in international relations and 2) intergovernmentalism. The former focuses on the global role and "actorness" of the EU's CFSP, while the latter, emerging to explain the European integration process, pays attention to how the EU's external policy has been decided. By examining various theoretical approaches, the EU's North Korea policy can be understood from various angles and its policy change toward North Korea more clearly analyzed.

2.1. CONCEPTS OF THE EU'S INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY

Since the creation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) —an informal consultation mechanism on foreign affairs between member states—in 1970, many scholars have paid attention to this new type of international actor and have tried to determine the EU's position on the international scene (Bull, 1982; Duchêne, 1973; Manner, 2002). They all agreed that the EU is a unilateral international actor that has established its own external identity differently from traditional actors. This means it cannot be analyzed using traditional international relations theories. However, different approaches have been taken by scholars in interpreting how the EU achieves its main external policy objectives and goals (Kim and Choi, 2019): Thus, MPE, CPE, and NPE are most frequently used to explain the EU's foreign policy identity. This chapter introduces how each concept is used to interpret the primary objective and means of the EU's external policy differently.

2.1.1. Civilian Power Europe

The concept of CPE was suggested as the first of various attempts to understand this new type of actor in international relations. Duchêne, an exponent of this idea, paid attention to the then European Community's use (pre-1993) of non-coercive measures such as diplomacy and negotiation in dealing with international affairs. He pointed out that European countries accelerated the economic cooperation that formed the EU's international influence. With significant economic power based on European cooperation, the EU could exercise its influence in international politics. In other words, the EU strengthened its external influence by applying economic and diplomatic policy rather than military force (Maull, 1990).

The concept of CPE emerged to explain such an approach. Duchêne (1973: 19) defined the CPE as a "civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force." This concept explains features of the EU as an international actor. First, the Union, as a civilian power, pursues the economic interests of the EU and the wider international community. It also promotes normative values in its relations with other actors or uses military capacities, but "economic interests are in the driving seat" (Duchêne 1994: 388). Second, CPE requires the active use of non-military means (such as trade, negotiation, development programs, and aid policies) to pursue the EU's interests and protect its values in external relations (Manners, 2002). In some cases, it uses "stick" policy measures such as suspending or cutting aid or imposing trade and economic sanctions to lead to behavioral changes of other actors in accordance with its interests. In sum, CPE believes economic measures based on a diplomatic approach are effective tools when dealing with international problems (Sjursen, 2006). Third, the EU prefers more diplomatic and multilateral cooperation based on legally binding international treaties to solve major international problems, rather than unilateral actions. It believes in multilateralism and international organizations' role in resolving international issues (Maull, 1990; Kim and Choi, 2019). Therefore, from the perspective of CPE, the EU is an international actor that prefers to use non-military approaches with a third country to maximize its own economic interests and those of the international community.

2.1.2. Military Power Europe

The concept of MPE requires that the Union possess the military power sufficient to take strategic actions in the area where European security and interests are at risk (McDonagh, 2015). This concept emerged to highlight the importance of European military power, refuting CPE in the early 1980s. Scholars of this perspective pointed out that in the international order (in which military capabilities were still essential), CPE would not be able to cope with an

international crisis effectively and could face limitations in its involvement in global politics (Bull, 1982). In other words, if the EU lacks the capacity to utilize sufficient military capabilities, its external influence will eventually be limited by the military capabilities of its major counterparts. MPE also stresses the importance of EU military capacities that enable the EU to implement the CFSP and respond to security threats effectively on the global stage (Smith, 2000). This view emphasizes the importance to reinforce the EU's military capabilities based on independent defense capabilities, not NATO, especially in the face of international crises, to address security threats (Pang and Ma, 2014).

Against this backdrop, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was first suggested in 1998 and established in 1999, eventually leading to the creation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. The introduction of the CSDP resulted in a gradual development of military capabilities at the EU level. Thus, the EU experienced significant changes in terms of military capability, such as improving defense cooperation and participating in peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations following the inception of the CSDP at the EU level (Pang and Ma, 2014). Shepherd and Salmon (2003) also suggested that the EU created the CSDP to overcome the EU's lack of military and crisis-management capabilities. The CSDP contributes to stability across Europe in cooperation with NATO and, more broadly, enables the EU to deploy military instruments to fight for European and international values, notably human rights (Trott, 2010). In sum, with strengthened military capabilities of MPE, the EU is able to exercise its influence effectively and further strengthen its external political and diplomatic clout in the international community.

2.1.3. Normative Power Europe

During the 1980s, political scientists began to pay attention to the way power is exercised through ideological or cultural intermediaries in the international political arena. Most notably, Nye (2004) introduced the concept of "soft power," referring to a third way (besides military and economic power) in which a state exerts influence over other actors' thoughts, preferences, and behavior. Soft power is exercised in a non-coercive way, while hard power is exercised through forcible means or economic incentives (Nye, 2004). This concept highlighting the ideological and cultural power in international politics helped European scholars to analyze European foreign policy: they started to explain the EU's international role in terms of soft power (Kim, 2007). Thus, NPE focuses on the EU's ideological power while CPE and MPE emphasize the importance of economic and military power. The introduction of soft power expanded discussion on the EU's external identity.

NPE argues that the EU is an international actor that acts differently to others, as its policies have been driven not only by its own best interests but also by ethical and universal agendas that can be interpreted as what *should* be done (Sjursen, 2006). Manners (2002) criticized the concepts of CPE and MPE because they only indicated that the EU pursued European interests as the primary policy objectives. These anachronistic concepts were suitable for explaining “the frozen nature of international relations during the cold war period” and “the fixed nature of the nation-state, the importance of direct physical power, and the notion of national interest” (Manners, 2002: 238). He asserted that in the post-Cold War period, the EU sought to change other actors’ behaviors in accordance with universally accepted European norms, such as human rights and peace (Manners, 2008). In other words, it wanted to “shape conceptions of ‘normal’” and had the ability to do so (Manners, 2002: 239). In fact, since the early 1990s, the EU has attempted to spread democracy and human rights norms worldwide. It has put effort into abolishing the death penalty in third countries (although this is not closely linked to its interests or profits). It established the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights to promote these issues in other countries and regions (European Commission, 2001b). When establishing political and economic partnerships with a third country, it takes into consideration the country’s domestic situation in terms of European norms. This approach was demonstrated in the process of signing the economic and political agreement between the EU and Mexico in December 1997. During the negotiation process, the EU demanded that three clauses should be inserted into the agreement: the democratic clause, the conditionality clause, and the clause of cooperation on human rights and democracy.³ The Mexican government strongly opposed the EU’s demands, arguing that these clauses would constitute intervention in Mexico’s domestic affairs. The bilateral agreement was on the brink of collapse without result, but the Mexican government eventually agreed to insert the clauses in the agreement. This case demonstrated the EU’s intention and will to spread its norms despite the possibility of losing political and economic interests (Szymanski and Smith, 2005).

The EU’s normative behaviors and its ability to shape “conceptions of normal” were rooted in its strategic approach to promoting the CFSP. The CFSP has been a field where member states continue to play an essential role in shaping policy directions, potentially causing friction and ineffectiveness in decision-making. Thus, the EU started to rely on common ideological values that all member states were willing to support to convene member states’

³ The all three clauses aimed to force Mexico to follow European and universal values in its domestic politics. The democratic clause states that both parties are obligated to respect human rights and democratic principles, and two other clauses indicate incentive and restrictive measures that encourage both parties to comply with the democratic clause (The EU-Mexican Economic and political agreement, 2000).

ideas and actions. Manners (2002: 242–243; 2008: 46) defined five core norms that the EU pursued in its policies: peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These common values embedded in EU governance were stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 and highlighted at the Cologne European Council Summit in 1999. At that summit, the European Council declared that “protection of fundamental rights is a founding principle of the Union and an indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy” (European Council, 1999a). Accordingly, European norms and principles embodied in legal documents have shaped the EU’s identity and role as a global normative actor (Bogdandy, 2000; Smith, 2001).

The EU spreads its norms in six ways (Manners, 2002: 244–245). First, it can unintentionally diffuse ideas to other international actors (*contagion*). For example, its experiment in regional integration has been exported as a virtuous example to other regions or countries, although the EU had no intention to do so—as shown by the case of the regional integration of the Southern Common market (Mercosur). European norms also can be diffused through strategic and declaratory communications, such as new policy initiatives, official statements, and publication of reports (*informational diffusion*). The process of institutionalizing a relationship between the EU and third parties also contributes to the spread of the EU’s norms through *procedural diffusion*, such as regional or interregional cooperation agreements and enlargement of the EU. The fourth measure is *transference*. This refers to the EU’s financial or economic means to encourage other actors to comply with European norms. Financial aid or compensation, economic sanctions, trade exchanges, and conditionality are examples of *transference*. It is also possible to diffuse norms through direct dialogue and physical contact between the EU and third parties, which involves the activities of European missions in third states and international organizations and visits of high-ranking foreign policy officials of the EU to these states (*overt diffusion*). Finally, *cultural filter* refers to the effects on the formations of norms in third countries. It has an effect on the influence of international norms and political learning in a third country, resulting in norm learning, adaption, or rejection (Manners, 2002: 245). It is evident from the view of NPE that the EU can be considered a normative power when it projects its ethical values and promotes its norms through its foreign policy governance (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006).

This notion of normative power, however, has been criticized. First, with its intervention in Cyprus and the Israel–Palestine conflict, the EU pursued its own self-interest rather than universal good. In doing so, it exposed the limits of the ethical representation of Europe and a lack of consistency in normative activities (Diez and Pace, 2011; Tocci, 2008). Some have suggested that its methods have not always been non-coercive. In its efforts to

strengthen security cooperation in Europe and globally (including actual military activities in Operation Artemis and Operation Atlanta), the EU’s actions have been incompatible with the notion of normative power (Kim, 2007; Manners, 2006; Trott, 2010). Finally, as Manners acknowledged, the concept of normative power is likely to be understood as “cultural imperialism” or a form of “mission civilisatrice” (2002:253) based on a belief in the superiority of Western civilization. Criticisms emerged that suggested the EU did not fully comply with the norms and values highlighted in its own official documents (Diez, 2005; Hurd, 2006). Currently, Europe is struggling with the rise of the extreme right, issues with Islamic immigrants, and tangible and intangible discrimination. Despite these criticisms, the concept of NPE is still frequently used to analyze the EU’s international role and identity because the concept of normative power is a helpful tool for understanding its behavior patterns that cannot be explained through power politics analysis.

Table 1. The EU’s foreign and security identity theories

	Military Power Europe	Civilian Power Europe	Normative Power Europe
Main policy objective	To expand its influences in European and global security issues	To seek its economic interests and global interests	To promote and spread European and universal norms
Main policy methods	Use of military force	Diplomacy, negotiation, economic assistance,	Contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, cultural filter

(source: Kim and Choi, 2019; Manners, 2002)

So far, three concepts for analyzing the EU’s foreign and security identity have been examined. These explain the EU’s external identity differently based on objectives and methods of its foreign policy. However, these powers are not mutually exclusive, and the EU may exercise two or three powers simultaneously in its policy toward a country because it may have various policy goals. For example, in its relations with South Korea, the EU showed both civilian and normative policy goals. Whilst pressing the South Korean government to abolish the death penalty that was foremost a normative power, at the same time, the Union concluded the EU–South Korea Free Trade Agreement to maximize its economic interests: a civilian power (Pang and Ma, 2014). Thus, to accurately analyze the EU’s actions in a specific foreign policy, it is essential to verify the primary policy objectives (Table 1). If the EU places more

importance on its economic benefits in its relations with a third country, it acts as CPE. However, if promoting human rights is the main policy toward a country, it can be said that the EU's policy is normative. Identifying the EU's role in relation to the North Korean nuclear issue should start with the verification of the primary objectives of the EU's North Korea policy.

2.2. THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

While theories of the EU's international identity explain how to identify its role and external policy in international politics, theories of European integration clarify how and why the EU was created and how it works today, which helps us understand the background and dynamics behind its policy-making processes. In other words, European integration theories can contribute to explaining how the current CFSP has been shaped (and why). According to Hix and Høyland (2011), to explain EU governance following the Maastricht Treaty, two broad theoretical frameworks have mainly been used: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.

The two approaches present contradicting positions in terms of the debate about who leads EU governance. First, intergovernmentalism recognizes leading actors in EU integration as member states with different national interests, while supranationalism emphasizes that EU institutions drive the process via spillover effects (Schmidt, 2016). Many scholars argue that the former is more widely applied to explain EU external policy because these policies traditionally adopt the principle of unanimity (Bickenrton et al., 2015; Des Courières, 2017; Helwig and Stroß, 2011; Johansseon-Noues, 2014). Where members can use their veto to interrupt the adoption of undesirable proposals by other actors, EU institutions only play an insignificant role in the decision-making process. In fact, by concluding the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union attempted to strengthen its external representation as a unitary actor on the global scene. Nevertheless, it is still asserted that intergovernmentalism is the most prominent characteristic of the CFSP (Johansseon-Noues, 2014). Accordingly, an intergovernmental framework is adopted in this thesis to examine the EU's policy-making process toward the North Korean nuclear program. For a better understanding of intergovernmentalism, supranationalism is also introduced in this chapter.

2.2.1. Supranationalism

By emphasizing the crucial role of supranational actors and the limited role of states in EU common policy design and implementation, supranationalism is supported by two factors. First, neofunctionalists argued that integration occurred when states agreed to expand common

policy areas to handle transnational issues in already integrated policy areas that could not be addressed at the national level. Accordingly, once competencies are transferred to supranational institutions, members are pressured to delegate more power to ensure the continued operation of the already interconnected areas (Helwig and Stroß, 2011). The second factor has been supported by rational choice institutionalists. As member states negotiate within the scheme that EU institutions have shaped, decision-making processes may be guided and restrained by existing supranational institutions (Pollack, 2000). The introduction of qualified majority voting in a policy field could help with the adoption of a set of policies that could not have been passed under the unanimous voting system, according to Pollack (2000: 6).

Taken together, the reasons supporting supranationalism explain the proposition that some EU policies adopted following decision-making processes might vary from the initial aims of member states' governments (Hix and Høyland, 2011). Accordingly, while member states still retain some power, it is easily constrained. As supranational decision-making procedures require majority voting, a member state may be forced to accept and implement an agreement against its national preferences (Leal-Arcas, 2007).

2.2.2 Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism sprang from neorealism as a way of explaining European integration. Realists saw the EU as a group of independent states where member states transfer some of their power to the EU and its institutions to pursue benefits, but at the same time, the transferred power can be retrieved at any time. Therefore, the EU can exist only while member states agree that the EU satisfies their interests (Katzenstein, 1997)

Intergovernmentalism emerged in the mid-1960s when Hoffmann criticized the approach in which the spillover effect constituted neo-functionalism and supranationalism over European integration (Hoffmann, 1966; Keohane and Hoffman, 1991; 1993). Hoffmann, an exponent of the realist tradition, separated political and economic integration: economic integration could not advance political integration because the economy remained in the area of low politics, not high politics (Hoffmann, 1966: 882). He asserted that while member states could advance integration in the area of low politics (where positive-sum games occur), the realm of high politics (strongly connected with national sovereignty and survival) forced states to play only zero-sum games (Hoffmann, 1966). Thus, from this perspective, the progressive diffusion of integration from the economic field to both political and military sectors would likely not happen.

Intergovernmentalism means that integration in high politics could occur when the

interests of large states coincide, although it would halt when the national interests of more than one member conflict with wider policy agreement. Accordingly, member states had the power to decide the pace of integration and determine supranational institutions' competencies: institutions could lose their competencies if member states felt the institutions contravened their national interests. In this regard, intergovernmentalists argued that the EU's policy-making process was led by member governments, not by supranational organizations. Thus, progress in European integration was a result of interactions between states pursuing their own interests (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991). This intergovernmental notion explains France's veto of Britain's accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1967 and the UK's opt-out from the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union in 1992.

Intergovernmental theory was reformulated by Moravcsik (2018) to solve the problem inherent in the existing intergovernmental approach: intergovernmentalism reached the limitations of explaining deepening integration across Europe in the 1990s.⁴ Liberal intergovernmentalism explains EU policy involvement with a three-stage process (Moravcsik, 2018). First, states form preferences motivated by domestic situations. Liberal intergovernmentalism sets the domestic political dimension as a crucial variable in defining national interests and state preferences, while the traditional realist view considers member states' domestic politics as a "black box" (Bulmer et al., 2020: 15; Cini, 2010: 92). Social pressures, such as social groups' interests and domestic political and economic environments, contribute to forming a state's policy and strategy on a specific issue. The second stage involves bargaining among EU member states. States with different national interests engage in negotiation to reach a positive-sum agreement, although they do not have equal bargaining power. The relative power of members has influence on reaching an agreement (Bulmer et al., 2020: 15–16). From the realist view, it might be assumed that some countries, such as France and Germany (the so-called hegemonic powers in European politics), have more influence than others. However, it is not necessarily argued through this theory that only powerful countries have more bargaining power (Jakobsen, 2009; Nasra, 2011; Pastore, 2013).⁵ As bargaining power can vary with asymmetrical interdependence, small countries may influence the process of reaching an agreement. The third stage is institutionalization. Once an agreement is reached

⁴ Hoffmann, a leading advocate of intergovernmentalism, admitted in his book that supranational organization, the European Commission in this case, played a crucial role in planning and negotiating common European policies (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1993: 385)

⁵ Jakobsen (2009), Nasra (2011), and Pastore (2013) refute the widely accepted view that small governments only play marginal roles in European common foreign policy. They argue that small states have been also able to reflect their national preferences in the CFSP with the examples of the Nordic countries, Belgium, and six new member states (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia).

through bargaining, supranational institutions with enough competencies transferred by member states start to engage in the process to ensure the commitment of national governments in respecting the negotiation outcome (Hooghe and Marks, 2019; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2019). This approach enriches and broadens intergovernmental discussions by evolving domestic politics otherwise regarded as a black box into a crucial variable for defining national interests and state preferences. However, liberal intergovernmentalists also fundamentally agree that EU common policy is a negotiation outcome of member states with different national preferences.

Accordingly, this broad intergovernmental framework is based on two essential assumptions (Hix and Høyland, 2011; Moravcsik, 1993; Nugent, 1999: 509). First, member states think and act reasonably. Member states with clear national preferences choose the most appropriate actions to maximize their national interests. Second, bargaining processes are aimed at positive-sum outcomes. The negotiation does not guarantee an equal distribution of gains, but member states attempt to reach agreement that can benefit all members involved (Moravcsik, 2018).

The EU has a special characteristic that distinguishes it from other regional cooperation organizations: a single European economic market encourages European countries to pursue mutual interests. Accordingly, in terms of European politics, member states are highly and complicatedly interdependent of one another through enhanced cooperation and expanded integration into various policy fields. An EU member state, according to intergovernmentalism, is a rational actor that establishes national preferences and strategy to not only maximize its national interests but also pursue mutual benefits from the process of European integration. In this regard, where further integration is expected to help attain priority interests, a state may choose to engage in the integration process at the expense of other non-crucial interests or some of its sovereignty.

CHAPTER 3

Policy of Active Engagement 1993–2003

Chapter 3–5 focuses on examining the EU policy toward North Korea in terms of nuclear non-proliferation from 1993, when the CFSP was established, until the present. Chapter 3 covers the EU's policy toward North Korea from 1993 to 2003, a period when the EU took a conciliatory approach to the country. During this period, Brussels' focus was active engagement: it sought to resolve North Korean-related issues, such as nuclear programs and human rights, through dialogue and economic incentives. The EU and most member states individually established official diplomatic relations with North Korea,⁶ and EU–DPRK bilateral political dialogue was held annually (Ballbach, 2019; Berkofsky, 2003).

3.1. BACKGROUND

3.1.1. Birth of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

European diplomatic and security integration began to develop relatively late in comparison to other policy areas. In the 1990s, security issues emerged as intractable problems at the national level. Facing the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, European countries started to believe that further integration would help member states address security issues better. In particular, the outbreak of the Gulf War in August 1990 and the Yugoslav Civil War in June 1991 served as momentum: Europe felt the limits of EPC to properly cope with international and European security issues (Dehousse, 1998). The unstable and challenging global security situation finally forced the European Community to strengthen its European cooperation in political and diplomatic fields. Meetings of the European Council and the Intergovernmental Conference were held throughout the early 1990s to discuss how to promote political integration among member states of the European Community (European Council, 1991). As a result, the CFSP was established under the Treaty on European Union (TEU), also known as the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 and effective in 1993. The Maastricht Treaty stipulated in Article B that establishing its identity in international politics was one of the EU's objectives,

⁶ All member states except France and Estonia were done with the establishment of a diplomatic tie with the DPRK in the early 2000s, but Portugal broke a diplomatic relationship with the country in 2017 following its continuous nuclear provocations. Currently, twenty four out of 27-member states maintain a diplomatic relationship with the country (North Korea in the World, 2021)

which could be achieved through the implementation of the CFSP (TEU, 1992: 7). The CFSP has become the second of the three pillars forming the European Union, and security and defense issues have been more clearly placed on the EU's common agenda. The TEU formed the basis of the legal and systematic political integration among member states (ibid.: 123–129). Establishing and promoting the CFSP was considered essentially significant for the EU, which would allow member states to speak with one voice and to have a strong presence as an international actor in international politics (Kim, G. 2011).

However, the establishment of the CFSP made no significant change to the EU's international presence: the EU remained passive and defensive in international conflicts. The EU intervened in the ethnic crises in Yugoslavia only by contributing to US-led NATO forces, while failing to respond to the crises and showing its presence as an international actor. Hill (1993) argued that while dealing with real problems, the CFSP exposed immaturity and a lack of ability stemming from a significant gap between high expectations and actual capacities as well as questions of competence in terms of EU institutions and member states. The lessons learned from the crises in the Balkan states enabled European countries to realize that the EU lacked the capacity to control and address regional conflicts in Europe, despite establishing the CFSP. To obtain a strong capability and presence, the Union needed to behave proactively, not reactively, and improve the CFSP's ineffectiveness resulting from uncoordinated responses between member states. As a result, the EU made the decision to strengthen its CFSP scheme further by amending the TEU, and the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 (Publications Office of the EU, n.d.; Lee, S., 2007).

The amended treaty improved the efficiency of the CFSP's decision-making processes. It prescribed the specific circumstances to which qualified majority voting could be applied in Article J.13, despite the principle of unanimity in foreign policy decision-making; the Council could act by qualified majority "when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy... [and] any decision implementing a joint action or a common position" (Amsterdam treaty, 1997: 14).⁷ It is evident that this institutional improvement enabled external policy decisions to be made faster and more efficiently. In addition, the Treaty (1997) stipulated the need to develop a common defense policy as an essential component of the CFSP (Article J.7), which provided the basis for developing and retaining the autonomous military capabilities of the EU. Furthermore, the position of High

⁷ The treaty of Maastricht also mentioned a qualified majority in Title V (Article J.3) that composed the CFSP but stated obscurely as follows: "the Council shall ... define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority" (TEU, 1992).

Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) of the CFSP was created following Article J.8, and Javier Solana became the first HR/VP (German Federal Foreign Office, n.d.). The changes brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam helped the CFSP to bring about more progress toward further political integration (Lee, S., 2007).

3.1.2. Birth of the EU Common Policy on Nuclear Disarmament

Europe's efforts to play an essential role in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were not a crucial political agenda at the European level for a long time—until the Maastricht Treaty. However, the European Commission enhanced its involvement in non-proliferation in the early 1990s with the birth of the CFSP. The strengthened common policy mechanisms helped the EU establish a more robust framework for addressing global nuclear proliferation issues. In accordance with France's enrollment in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, non-proliferation became one of the EU's top priorities, and the EU started to increase its role and activities in this area (European Parliament, 2020; Portela, 2021; Portela and Kienzle, 2015b).

As the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force and the CFSP was established in 1993, the EU was able to build a ground for a common non-proliferation policy. Although the words “non-proliferation” or “arms control” were not directly mentioned in the first version of the TEU, the treaty implicitly covered non-proliferation activities in its sphere of competence (Wessel, 2016).⁸ Furthermore, at the European Council meeting held after the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, member states agreed that non-proliferation was one of the issues requiring joint action (European Council, 1992). At the meeting in Corfu in June 1994, the European Council decided to take joint action to support the extension of the NPT and promote the system indefinitely and unconditionally (European Council, 1994b). However, despite the announcement of its ambitions, the EU's non-proliferation policy did not develop in detail until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. This led to concern among European countries about the possibility of terrorists acquiring WMD and the possible consequences for European and global security (Murauskaite, 2015). These unstable security situations surrounding Europe prompted the Union to engage more in the global efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD.⁹ The Union clearly declared its further efforts and

⁸ In the Preamble, it is stated that “implement[ing] a common foreign and security policy [...] to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world (TEU, 1992: 4).

⁹ Beyond the 9/11 attack, a series of terrorist attacks in member states (Spain, the UK, and France) also intensified the fear in Europe, and made European regard Islamist terrorism as a real and actual threat to Europe (Friesen,

participation in global non-proliferation and disarmament in the CFSP Annual Report of 2002 (UNSPECIFIED, 2002).¹⁰ However, although the Union was aware of the necessity to address emerging threats proactively, it did not build an appropriate strategy for the threat until 2003.

3.1.3. The DPRK's Nuclear Programs and International Responses

North Korea's nuclear development dates back to the 1950s, when—unknown at the time—it began a nuclear weapon program with the assistance of its former ally, the Soviet Union (Carrel-billiard and Wing, 2010; Moon, 2016). The first nuclear crisis occurred in 1993, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. In 1992, the IAEA conducted an inspection of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, North Korea. This inspection was a routine step following North Korea's first submission of a report on its nuclear activities under the IAEA–DPRK safeguard agreement. In this report, the country argued that no actions had violated the agreement with the agency; however, inspectors finally confirmed significant discrepancies between data collected during the inspection and the actual report. For example, while the country had reported the position of approximately 90 grams of plutonium reprocessed from its seven nuclear facilities to the IAEA, the inspectors found several kilograms of plutonium extracted from nuclear fuel rods during the verification process. Believing that a further and deeper investigation would help in resolving these significant discrepancies, the IAEA requested a further visit on December 12, 1992, to two sites that were suspected of storing nuclear waste to collect samples, but the request was declined. North Korea only allowed visual inspections at the one site. In response, the IAEA demanded a special inspection of some nuclear waste sites in North Korea, but this request was also rejected. On March 12, 1993, North Korea finally announced its withdrawal from the NPT¹¹, which accelerated tensions on the Korean Peninsula (IAEA, n.d.; Sigal, 2018).

The international community was worried that the same situation could be repeated in other countries and that the IAEA's inspection system would no longer be valid (Carrel-Billiard and Wing, 2010). On May 11, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to urge North

2007; Kobia, 2008)

¹⁰ In this paper (UNSPECIFIED, 2002: 56), it is stated that “[s]upport for the reinforcement of global non-proliferation and disarmament will continue to be at the core of the external action of the Union. The Union will contribute actively to the work in this area within the various international conferences and other fora aimed at these objectives”.

¹¹ Announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, North Korea made reference to Article X(1) of the NPT that guarantees the right to withdraw from the treaty to protect the national sovereignty of member states (Carrel-billiard and Wing, 2010; IAEA, n.d.)

Korea to accept the IAEA's special inspections and to reverse its withdrawal from the NPT; however, North Korea argued that it would not change its position because its nuclear program development was an appropriate reaction to the perceived threat to its regime's survival by the United States (IAEA, 1993; UNSC, 1993). Therefore, the first US–DPRK bilateral high-level talks were held in New York in June 1993 to negotiate the issue. After the talks, North Korea temporarily suspended its withdrawal from the NPT. Negotiation resulted in an agreed framework in Geneva, Switzerland in October 1994. According to this framework, the United States promised to build two light-water reactors in North Korea and provide 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually under the condition of North Korea's nuclear freeze (Carrel-billiard and Wing, 2010; Sigal, 2018).

It seemed outwardly that North Korea had ceased its nuclear activities when the first nuclear crisis was settled by the Geneva bilateral agreement of 1994. However, the country secretly continued to develop its nuclear program, and the second nuclear crisis did not emerge until 2003. After the Geneva Agreed Framework was signed between the United States and North Korea, follow-up measures were at first implemented smoothly. Following the framework, US–DPRK talks were held in January 1995 to discuss how to implement the framework, and KEDO was established in New York. North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facilities were also frozen. However, implementing the framework would soon face difficulties. As the disagreement over the inspection of the IAEA could not be resolved, the United States delayed the construction of the light-water reactors promised under the agreement. Meanwhile, following the inauguration of the Bush administration in January 2001, the American policy toward North Korea—including the Geneva Agreed Framework—was fully reviewed. In particular, after the September 11 attacks, the United States began to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue under its anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation policy. The tension between the two countries increased as the Bush administration's tough stance against North Korea became official: the classified Nuclear Posture Review of the United States revealed that the Bush administration named North Korea as one of its potential nuclear weapon targets (Bleek, n.d.; Richter, 2002).¹² In response, the Korean Central News Agency, the Korean state news agency, released a statement by a foreign ministry spokesman condemning the Bush administration and saying that DPRK would reexamine all agreements with the United States and suspend the Geneva Agreed Framework (Tongilnews, 2002).

¹² This secret document was originally submitted to the US Congress in January 2002 but leaked to American newspapers. This report claimed that the US should make provision for the use of its nuclear weapons against seven countries: China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea Russia, and Syria (Bleek, n.d.; Richter, 2002).

3.2. THE EU'S ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT

3.2.1. EU–DPRK diplomatic relations

EU relations with the DPRK began with the EU's humanitarian aid when the country suffered severe food shortages caused by floods in 1995. However, North Korea's WMD program was a significant barrier to enhancing bilateral relations further (Jung, 2018). The EU expressed concerns over North Korean issues, especially its nuclear development and the tension that it caused on the Korean Peninsula. Adopting "Toward a New Asia Strategy" in 1994 after the first North Korean nuclear crisis occurred, the EU specifically mentioned North Korea's refusal of the IAEA nuclear inspections as an Asian problem with which it needed to engage (European Commission, 1994). In line with this strategy, the EU joined KEDO in 1997 with the aim of addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis. It pledged to contribute 75 million US dollars to the organization for five years for its smooth operation and nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, which was carried out as scheduled (European Commission, 2001b). Furthermore, the European Council announced an EU policy framework in 1999 for its policy toward the Korean Peninsula. This framework—announced as a result of the 2198th General Affairs Council meeting—made the policy objectives of the EU's North Korea policy clear; according to the policy framework, the EU's North Korea policy had to contribute to securing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, strengthening economic cooperation with South Korea, and pressing North Korea to adopt more responsible behavior on security and human rights issues (European Council, 1999c).

In 1999, following a moratorium between the DPRK and the United States on testing any long-range missiles, European countries were quick to approach North Korea. In January 2000, North Korea established diplomatic relations with Italy, which led to further expansion of bilateral relations with other member states of the EU. As diplomatic relations between the country and member states expanded, the foreign ministers of EU member states adopted "the European Union Lines of Action Towards North Korea" in November 2000. This was motivated by a need to coordinate member states' policy toward North Korea at the EU level as relations between the DPRK and member states expanded (European Council, 2000). The EU made its policy direction clear, which was to be taken into account by member governments when they developed policies or took action against the North: it supported the approach of dialogue and incentives toward North Korea but also continued to evaluate its commitment to international non-proliferation and human rights (ibid.). On March 4, 2001, the EU released "the EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001–2004", comprising detailed plans in line with the "Line of Action."

The strategy paper (which allowed the EU and member states to systemize policy toward North Korea with one voice) contained detailed financing and technical supports plans to effectively address North Korean issues such as human rights, famine, and its nuclear program (European Commission, 2001b). After the EU troika visit to Pyongyang in 2001, Brussels eventually announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang on May 14, 2001. As a result, in 2002, the EU and all member states (except France) had forged diplomatic ties with North Korea (Jung, 2018; Wertz et al., 2016).

A series of actions by European countries contributing to the improvements in EU–DPRK relations allowed Pyongyang to recognize Brussels as a potential key partner that could help North Korea out of the political and economic problems it faced on the global scene (Lee, 2005; Park, 2002; Park, 2017). After the end of the Cold War, North Korea experienced a difficult time until the early 1990s. First, its communist allies either disappeared from the world map or made a transition to capitalism. Its remaining former allies normalized their relations with South Korea and the United States (major enemies of North Korea), which eventually led to estranged relations between North Korea and its former allies. In addition, severe drought and flooding affected the country in the 1990s, destroying its economy and pushing millions of people to the brink of starvation. As a result, it was estimated that around 3 to 5 percent of its population—more than 2 million people—died from hunger between 1995 and 1999 (Crossette, 1999; Seth, 2011). The international community offered humanitarian assistance to help North Korea recover from this dreadful domestic situation, although the amount of humanitarian aid soon decreased as its ambition to develop nuclear programs was revealed in the late 1990s (Manyin and Nikitin, 2014). However, the Union continued to provide humanitarian aid of around 250 million euros between 1995 and 2001 despite international disputes over North Korea’s nuclear program. Moreover, Brussels expanded the scope of its aid program: it not only organized long-term humanitarian projects, such as agriculture reconstruction and cooperation projects with NGOs but also provided financial and technical assistance by joining KEDO (Song, 2009). Furthermore, the EU and European countries established diplomatic relations and built communication channels with North Korea, which helped the country out of international isolation (Park, 2017). As a result, the EU became an important international actor for the North Korean government.

Since the establishment of the CFSP through the Maastricht Treaty and the adoption of “Toward a New Asia Strategy” in 1994, the EU and its member states continued to develop relations with North Korea. From 1993 to 2003, the EU actively communicated with the country to address the nuclear issue, as Table 2 shows. As stated in “the European Union Lines of Action

Towards North Korea,” during this period, the EU approached the North Korean nuclear issue with economic incentives and dialogue to persuade the country to abandon its nuclear program. To reveal the EU’s active engagement policy, the rest of this chapter will review in more detail how the EU engaged in the nuclear issue by examining the EU–DRPK political dialogue (a key bilateral dialogue channel) and the EU’s activities as part of KEDO, through which it provided economic and technical aid to North Korea.

Table 2. EU-DRPK Relations from 1993 to 2002

1995	Commencement of the EU’s humanitarian aid to the DPRK
September 19, 1997	Accession of the EU to KEDO
December 2, 1998	The first session of political dialogue (Brussels)
November 24, 1999	The second session of political dialogue (Brussels)
November 25–28, 2000	The third session of political dialogue (Pyongyang)
May 2–4, 2001	High-level EU delegation’s visit to Kim Jong Il, North Korea leader
May 14, 2001	Establishment of the EU-DPRK diplomatic relations
June 13, 2001	The first session of talks on human rights (Brussels)
October 27–30, 2001	The fourth session of political dialogue (Pyongyang)
June 2002	The first session of talks on human rights (Pyongyang)
June 15–18, 2002	The fifth session of political dialogue (Pyongyang)

(source: Arms Control Association, 2020)

3.2.2. Political Dialogue

European countries started to communicate with North Korea before establishing diplomatic relations in the early 2000s. Exchanges with North Korea at member state level began in 1995, mainly for economic purposes. For example, in January and November 1995, a North Korean ruling Workers’ Party delegation visited Western European countries, including France and Britain, to promote economic cooperation between Europe and the DPRK. Such active efforts encouraged and activated Europe–DPRK economic trade: this increased from 1996, and the EU became North Korea’s third-largest trade partner after China and Japan (Frank, 2002). North Korea also successfully arranged investment from European companies; it agreed with ING Bank, a Dutch multinational banking corporation, to establish a joint bank within its territory and signed an agreement with DCCG, a German barter trade company, to undertake barter trade of 100 million US dollars each year for the following three years (Flake, 1995; Jung, 2018).

North Korea put effort into expanding economic cooperation in other areas and

established communication channels that allowed regular and sustained interactions with the EU to break away from diplomatic isolation and promote European humanitarian aid (Jung, 1999: 283). In this context, they suggested a bilateral meeting with the EU in Brussels in 1998 to strengthen its bilateral political and diplomatic relations, and the EU accepted. The Brussels dialogue was held on November 26, 1998. The two sides agreed to have annual bilateral meetings to discuss political issues such as nuclear development, human rights, and humanitarian aid. The EU's consent to engage in annual political dialogue was in line with the "Toward a New Asia Strategy" (Jung, 2018: 23–25; Yonhap News Agency, 2003: 604–607).

The first political dialogue session at the working level was held in Brussels on December 2, 1998. Talks covered North Korea's nuclear and missile program, economic development, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. Of these topics, both sides concentrated on the nuclear weapons program as a top priority because the international community was paying close attention to North Korea's implementation of the Geneva Agreement at that time. The EU stressed the importance of complying with the NPT regime and called on Pyongyang to fully cooperate with the IAEA's inspection of its nuclear sites. However, North Korea reaffirmed its stance. The North Korean delegation asserted that the nuclear sites the IAEA wanted to inspect were secret military facilities that would not be disclosed to foreigners, even though the country well understood the need to fulfill international obligations. The first session was closed without progress on the nuclear issue, although it contributed to developing their bilateral relations and establishing momentum to continue bilateral communication. After the first round, the EU sent delegations to North Korea. A delegation of the European Parliament and of the European Commission visited the country in December 1998 and January 1999, respectively. On March 23, 1999, the European Parliament adopted an EU resolution to support the country with more economic and humanitarian assistance and constructive engagement. It also decided to establish an EU–DPRK liaison office in Brussels and a joint liaison office for the EU member states in Pyongyang (European Council, 1999b; Yonhap News Agency, 2003).

On November 24, 1999, the second session of political dialogue was held in Brussels in an amicable atmosphere between the two sides. During the dialogue, North Korea placed emphasis on the need to develop further relations between the two, while the EU claimed that changes in North Korea's attitude towards international norms such as human rights and non-proliferation should come before further assistance. The EU delegation argued it could only take more concrete and constructive steps demanded by North Korea when the latter acted responsibly as a member of the international community (Lee, 2002). The EU and North Korea

failed to reach an agreement on major issues, but relations continued to become closer. In 2000, many member states, including France, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, sent delegations to North Korea or invited North Korean delegations to hold high-level talks.¹³ In addition, EU member states rushed to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea after the official launch of Italy–North Korea relations in 2000.

The third session of political dialogue was held in Pyongyang in November 2000, but the change of venue failed to bring productive results from the dialogue, where both sides repeated the same arguments. The EU demonstrated a passive attitude toward North Korea. However, in a situation where most member states had already either established diplomatic relations with North Korea or announced plans to do so, the EU had no choice but to show a more flexible and softened attitude toward the country (Jung, 1999; Yonhap News Agency, 2003: 606). The visit of the European Council and Commission Mission to North Korea in May 2001 made a breakthrough in EU–DPRK relations. The mission unprecedentedly comprised of high-ranking officials of the EU, led by Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson. The delegation included Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations.¹⁴ During its two-day visit to Pyongyang, the European delegation held an EU–North Korea high-level meeting and had a meeting with Kim Jong Il, the North Korean supreme leader. It was the first time in history that Westerners leaders officially met the North Korean supreme leader. At that meeting, Kim promised to realize his visit to Seoul for trust-building between North and South Korea.¹⁵ He also pledged a moratorium on missile testing until 2003. In addition, the two sides discussed

¹³ The list of member states' delegations visiting North Korea in 2000 is as follows: a French delegation of foreign affairs officials and an Italian delegation of lawmakers in February; the Swedish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Italian minister for Foreign Affairs in March; a delegation of UK foreign affairs officials in May; the German Vice Foreign Minister and a delegation of the European Parliament in October; a delegation of German federal parliament in November. Also, France, Germany, Italy, and the EU invited North Korean delegations and had high-level and working-level meetings during the year of 2000 (Yonhap News Agency, 2001).

¹⁴ As Sweden chaired the EU Council presidency from January to June of 2001, Göran Persson led the mission of the European Council and Commission to North Korea. This mission also had an EU–South Korea Summit right after the two-day visit to Pyongyang. At the EU–ROK summit, Prime Minister Persson explained the results of its talks with the North Korea leader, Kim Jong Il, to the South Korean president (European Parliament, 2001b).

¹⁵ The first inter-Korean summit was held in Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000 where the two leaders announced the June 15th joint declaration for building peace on the Korean Peninsula. This joint declaration led the international community to expect that North Korea would soon give up its nuclear program and actively participate in building peace in the region. At the meeting, Kim Jong Il promised to visit Seoul at an appropriate opportunity. Many countries and international actors looked forward to the realization of the visit because they believed that his visit to Seoul would greatly contribute to achieving peace in the region. However, it was not realized (Foster-Carter, 2021; Kim, 2018)

bilateral relations. As a result, North Korea and the EU agreed to initiate annual bilateral talks on human rights,¹⁶ strengthen economic cooperation, and educate North Korean government officials in Europe on European economic policies in support of North Korea's economic reform (European Parliament, 2001a; Mo and Choi, 2018; Struck, 2001; Vestkusten, 2001). On May 14, 2001, ten days after the EU's troika visit, the EU officially announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Although the two sides finally reached certain important agreements at the high-level meeting in May 2001, they were motivated by different intentions. On May 3, 2001, North Korea's Rodong Sinmun, an official newspaper of the Communist Party, reported that the visit of the EU's high-level delegation to the North Korean leader provided an opportunity to build trust between the two sides and accelerate their relationship, which eventually would lead to the development of peace and security in the world (Rodong Sinmun, 2001a). On the same day, the newspaper also published an article introducing the EU as an important international actor that would accelerate the multipolarity of the international system (Rodong Sinmun, 2001b). These official articles of the ruling party about the visit helped to shed light on Pyongyang's ulterior motive. It wanted to expand its narrowed foreign policy—focusing on the United States and China—in a situation where US–DPRK relations were deteriorating, to use its relationship with the EU to create a favorable atmosphere for negotiating its nuclear program (Jung, 2018). Conversely, Brussels intended to produce changes in Pyongyang's actions and attitude. It was believed that regular bilateral talks, humanitarian aid, and economic cooperation would contribute to building peace and stability in the region (European Commission, 2001b). Thus, Brussels constantly asked, or sometimes pressed, its counterpart to take responsible actions in the fields of international security and human rights at the political talks and the summit in 2001. Thus, the two sides held the fourth and fifth sessions of political dialogue in the capital of North Korea in October 2001 and June 2002, respectively. However, their divergent ulterior motives hindered dialogue lasting for five years after initially producing constructive and meaningful results (Park, 2017).

3.2.3. KEDO

The first nuclear crisis emerged in 1993, when North Korea refused inspections on its nuclear facilities by the IAEA and eventually announced its withdrawal from the agency. The

¹⁶ Under the agreement reached at the meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and Prime Minister Persson, the first round of bilateral talks on human rights was held in Brussels in June 2001 where two parties exchanged their views on basic principles of human rights, but the talks were suspended after the second round held in Pyongyang in June 2002 (Mo and Choi, 2018).

crisis, which had been accelerating for a while, ended with the US-North Korea bilateral meeting in Geneva in 1994 and the signing of the Agreed Framework at the meeting. As the Framework included a clause that the US would establish an international consortium to financially support the project of constructing light-water reactor (LWR) power plants in North Korea, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization was formed in March 1995 (Agreed Framework Between the US and the DPRK, 1994). Although KEDO was established as part of the bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea, the United States needed more participants to reduce the financial burden. It first targeted countries in Northeast Asia that shared the same strategic interests as the United States because the North Korean nuclear program threatened peace and stability in the region. In response, South Korea and Japan participated in the process of establishing KEDO and provided financial support for the LWR construction project (Doh, 2012).¹⁷ The United States wanted to expand the scope of participants, and it targeted international actors, especially the EU. While preparing for the establishment of KEDO, the US federal agencies asked the German government whether German companies, notably Siemens, could make a contribution to implementing the Agreed Framework. The government answered that “(b)efore Siemens could get involved in supplying reactor equipment, third party liability and export control problems must be addressed” (Hibbs, 1994: 9–10). In December 1994, the European Council adopted a new regulation for the control of exports for dual-use goods that permitted exports related to nuclear activities (European Council, 1994a). Soon, the EU announced the plan to participate in KEDO at the European Council meeting in Madrid in 1995 and joined in KEDO on September 19, 1997, by signing an agreement between Euratom and KEDO.¹⁸ In the agreement, the EU promised to fund a total of 75 million euros—15 million euros per year for five years (Doh, 2012). Joining KEDO was the first time the Union politically intervened in security issues plaguing the Korean Peninsula. This accession of the EU to KEDO was meaningful as it sent a clear message to the world that the EU cared about security issues in Asia and was willing to engage with them to enhance political and security relations with Asian countries. The Union considered joining KEDO to be an opportunity to get involved in political and economic issues affecting the peninsula

¹⁷ The US failed to encourage China and Russia to participate in KEDO although they were ones of the major stakeholders of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Russia declared that it would not take part in the organization unless the organization chose the country as a main participant in the LWR construction project (Doh, 2012).

¹⁸ The Council of Ministers and the Commission knew the reality that the accession would not be approved if the agenda was treated as the CFSP issue because one third of member states representing anti-nuclear would not welcome the accession. They decided to join KEDO via Euratom, based on Article 101(2) of the Euratom Treaty that adopts a qualified majority and does not require consultation of the Parliament (Tindemans, 1999; HauteCouverture, 2020).

(European Commission, 1997).

The Union undertook a large part of KEDO financing after its membership. It provided 75 million euros (about 82 million US dollars) for five years, from 1996 to 2000 (KEDO, 2001).¹⁹ At the end of the first agreement, the Union's active engagement in the North Korean nuclear issue led to the EU renewing its agreement with KEDO in 2001, pledging to contribute 20 million euros every year by the end of 2005 (Park, 2017). As European contributions increased, KEDO expanded the role of the EU in its system. The renewal agreement ensured the EU's participation in the executive board's activities and allocated more places within the Secretariat to Europeans (Agreement Between Euratom and KEDO, 2001). In total, contributions from the EU from 1995 to 2002 reached approximately 120 million US dollars (KEDO, 2002).

As a member of the organization, the EU benefitted in several ways. First, it expanded its political presence into Northeast Asia. The EU's financial support was the fourth most significant funding for the KEDO project after South Korea, Japan, and the United States. By providing such a considerable amount of financial assistance, Europe expressed its will to participate in the security issue of East Asia. The EU was also able to exert influence not only on decision-making within KEDO but also on security issues of the Korean Peninsula outside the KEDO scheme (Doh, 2012). For example, it played an important role in adopting two joint declarations to promote peace-building on the peninsula at the Asia–Europe meetings held in 2000 and 2002 (Park, 2020). It also established communication channels with KEDO member states by participating in KEDO decision-making processes. Through cooperation amassed as part of the KEDO activities, the EU and South Korea concluded the EU–ROK Framework Agreement on Trade and Cooperation to build a future-oriented partnership (Doh, 2012).²⁰ Accordingly, the EU assessed that its involvement in KEDO helped increase its influence in dealing with East Asian issues (European Commission, 2001b). In addition, by joining the organization, the EU was able to show that the CFSP could work in accordance with the EU's external policy principle of dealing with security issues (Kim, 2006).²¹ However, although it

¹⁹ The amount did not include the contributions to KEDO at member states level. The UK, Finland, Germany, Greece, Norway, Switzerland and Netherlands made contributions to the organization before the EU's accession (KEDO, 2001).

²⁰ This Framework Agreement that came into effect in 2001 contained the bilateral accord on the establishment of political dialogues (Pardo et al., 2018)

²¹ The EU's approach to nuclear proliferation was to support multilateral systems against nuclear proliferation and encourage non-European countries to comply with the international non-proliferation regime by diplomatic means, since the mid-1990s (Grip, 2011).

gained political leverage in East Asia, such benefits failed to reserve a place for the EU in the North Korean nuclear deal process, the Six-Party Talks. Despite its considerable financing and will to join the process, the EU was excluded.

CHAPTER 4

Policy of Critical Engagement 2003–2009

Beginning with humanitarian aid in 1995, the EU continued to strengthen its relations with North Korea by funding KEDO and holding annual political dialogue, which eventually led to the establishment of the EU–DPRK diplomatic relations. While enhancing relations, the EU economically and politically engaged in North Korean issues to encourage the country to comply with the NPT system. However, the EU changed its approach to North Korea in 2003 from unconditional engagement to a two-track approach—the so-called a carrot and stick scheme—after North Korea’s second announcement of the withdrawal from the NPT following the disclosure of North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program for nuclear weapons by the United States in 2002.²² The EU significantly reduced aid assistance to North Korea, including the suspension of technical and financial aid, which was designed to encourage the country to halt the development of its nuclear program. Nevertheless, the EU did not give up one of the crucial parts of its engagement policy toward North Korea: its political dialogue (Park, 2017).

4.1. BACKGROUND

4.1.1. Changes in the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The Maastricht Treaty established the institutional framework for the CFSP, and the Amsterdam Treaty further developed the supranational aspect of the CFSP by creating the position of the HR/VP, who took charge of the CFSP at large. This guaranteed the use of qualified majority voting in some areas (although quite limited) and the laying of groundwork for EU autonomous military capabilities. After the Amsterdam Treaty, the CFSP continued to strengthen: it constructed EU’s autonomous defense structures with crucial agreements, such as the Franco-British St. Malo Summit in 1998 and the Treaty of Nice effective in 2003. It was estimated that the CFSP, which began with the Maastricht Treaty, was institutionalized to promote a common military policy at the Nice European Council and the following conclusion of the Treaty of Nice (MOFA, 2003).

However, until the early 2000s, the EU was not considered as a major actor on the

²² The US disclosed that North Korea was secretly developing the highly uranium enrichment programs for nuclear weapons while the US delegation represented by James Kelly visited Pyongyang in October 2002. This case is referred as the second North Korea nuclear crisis (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021; Snyder, 2007)

international scene, despite the progress of European political integration. The EU's influence in international relations remained low because its presence in international issues was invisible, as too many actors in the process of the CFSP resulted in ineffectiveness and inefficiency (Chaban et al., 2009). The communication report written by the European Commission (2006) also pointed out that the common policy lacked coherence, effectiveness, and visibility. The Commission suggested that the EU urgently needed to reform its systems to eliminate such weaknesses responsible for dismissing its political visibility and presence in international relations (European Commission, 2006a). In other words, despite the EU's continuous efforts, the CFSP could not free itself from its intergovernmental characteristics, which became an obstacle to the EU's better performance as a single international actor in international politics.

4.1.2. Evolutions of the EU Non-Proliferation Policy

After witnessing the September 11 terrorist attacks on ally territory, the EU recognized the necessity to reflect on new security challenges in its external policy. As a result, adopting the “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World” (ESS) at the European Council meeting in 2003, the EU reaffirmed the five significant security challenges that it faced while clarifying European strategic objectives and policy implications to counter threats regionally and globally. In the document (European Council, 2003b: 2–3), the European Committee addressed the proliferation of WMD as a threat that would become the greatest danger to global peace and security. The document also revealed its strategic objectives in being active in standing against such a threat, putting effort into keeping the Union safe and being dedicated to promoting a multilateral framework to measure up to global threats (ibid.: 8–12). Adopting the ESS, the Union announced its active and effective participation in the matters that would threaten the global and European security document.

On the same day that the ESS was officially approved, the European Council also adopted “The EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” (European Council, 2003a: 21–22). As Álvarez-Verdugo (2006) and Portela and Kienzle (2015b) asserted, the strategy did not represent a sea change in the EU's WMD policy. However, it reaffirmed the EU's willingness to use all instruments at its disposal: the rule of law, multilateralism, political and diplomatic measures, and economic sanctions would be mobilized to deal with international WMD issues (European Council, 2003c). Moreover, the EU also brought institutional reforms to address non-proliferation issues more effectively. For example, the position of personal representative on non-proliferation was created in October 2003, which was designed to coordinate and assist in implementing and developing WMD policy (Cottey,

2014). Adopting the two strategy documents, the Union and member states were fully committed to activities against WMD at the EU level. Since then, the EU has reinforced a prominent and active presence on the global scene in supporting the NPT regime and enhanced cooperation with international organizations, especially the UN and the IAEA (European Council, 2007). In 2008, the European Council reviewed its strategy on non-proliferation and adopted a new WMD strategic report, “the New Lines for Action in Combating the Proliferation of WMD” in 2008 to enhance the effectiveness (Cottey, 2014).

4.1.3. The DPRK’s Nuclear Programs and International Responses

After the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993, the international community put great effort into solving it but failed; the second nuclear crisis emerged in 2003 when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. This crisis began with the announcement of the Bush administration in October 2002 that North Korea was secretly developing a highly enriched uranium program for nuclear weapons and declared that the US government would stop supplying them heavy oil and building LWRs (Arms Control Association, 2020; Council on Foreign Relations, 2021; Snyder, 2007). In response, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003 (IAEA, n.d).

As the US–DPRK bilateral approach to solving the nuclear problem was wearing thin, China held a tripartite meeting inviting the United States and North Korea in 2003, which eventually developed into the Six-Party Talks in August 2003, including South Korea, Japan, and Russia. However, the first three rounds of the Talks failed to reach an agreement because the United States and the DPRK adhered to their original positions. The United States repeated the principle of refusing to offer rewards for bad behavior, demanding North Korea give up its nuclear weapons program without offering any compensation. Conversely, North Korea was only interested in rewards when it started the process of giving up its nuclear weapons program (Joo and Kwak, 2007). While the Talks stagnated, Pyongyang officially declared its possession of nuclear weapons in February 2005. After long negotiations, the six countries finally reached a constructive and fruitful result on the nuclear issue at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks: the Joint Statement of September 19 was announced in 2005, containing North Korea’s promise to end its nuclear program and return to the NPT (US Department of State, 2005).

It seemed that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could be possible. However, the decision that the US Treasury Department made four days before signing the statement halted its implementation: the Department froze 25 million US dollars held in North Korea’s

Banco Delta Asia account.²³ In response, North Korea refused to carry out its promise in the Joint Statement. The situation surrounding the North Korean nuclear program worsened. On February 2, 2006, John Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, stated at the hearing of the US Senate Committee on Intelligence that the intelligence communities believed the DPRK's claim to possess nuclear weapons (US Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2006). Three months later, KEDO decided to hold an executive board meeting in New York to terminate the light-water reactor project for North Korea. In this aggravated situation, North Korea conducted its first underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006, following long-range missile tests in July. In response, on October 14, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 that demanded the country suspend further WMD tests and return to the negotiating table with its first imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea. However, at the same time, the international community did not give up on resolving the nuclear problem peacefully through the multilateral talks: there was still hope that the multilateral talks would pave the way to build peace on the peninsula. In this context, in 2007, the six countries reached a new agreement, the Joint Statement released on February 13 as a result of the fifth round of the talks, and North Korea pledged full implementation of the Joint Statement at the inter-Korean summit in October 2007—that they eventually broke (Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity, 2007).

4.2. THE EU'S CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT

4.2.1. EU-DPRK Relations

In the early 2000s, EU–DPRK relations were further reinforced, although the second nuclear crisis put a damper on the relationship. The European Union's policy took a sharp turn to a critical engagement policy. In the early days of the crisis, when the United States disclosed North Korea's nuclear activities, the Union focused on the possibility of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through diplomatic means by calling on the country to comply with the NPT and accept the IAEA's demand for inspections (Park, 2017: 169). However, North Korea refused to accept the IAEA's nuclear verification procedure and freeze its nuclear facilities. Consequently, EU policy was set to bring in a reduction in assistance (Park, 2006). At the EU

²³ Banco Delta Asia is a small bank located in Macao. It has handled North Korea funds since 1970s. The US Department of the Treasury accused it for serving for North Korea as a “primary money laundering concern” and froze North Korea funds that the bank managed under the USA Patriot Act, which was around 25 million US dollars. (Arms Control Association, 2020)

Council meeting of General Affairs and External Relations on November 19, 2002, the European Commission and member countries adopted a new basic direction in policy toward North Korea, with a separation of security issues from humanitarian ones. The European Commission and member states' foreign ministers announced a full review of all EU and member states' support, such as technical assistance and trade measures, although humanitarian aid was not included (European Commission, 2002).

After North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, the EU's policy toward North Korea shifted toward critical engagement (EEAS, 2018; Gaertner, 2014: 340).²⁴ At the European Council in June 2003, European leaders adopted a conclusion urging the country to fully comply with the IAEA agreement and rejoin the NPT (European Council, 2003d). They also released the Presidency Conclusions after the Brussels European Council in December 2003, stating that the EU would enhance its cooperation with North Korea only when the North fully fulfilled its international obligations (European Council, 2004b). Eventually, it annulled all policies stated in the EC–DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001–2004 that offered financial and technical support for the country and decided to stop financial contributions to KEDO's LWR construction projects whilst cancelling all technical cooperation plans for the country's economic development (Ballbach, 2019). Accordingly, the EU's policy toward North Korea shifted to critical engagement (Gaertner, 2014: 340). Furthermore, in 2003, the EU started to participate in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) activities, a multilateral system created by the United States to halt the flow of WMD around the world (Bolton, 2003). The PSI's initial activities focused on DPRK–Iranian WMD trade, especially transactions from North Korea to Iran. Although the EU was not a member of this multilateral system, it cooperated with and made contributions to its activities. However, at that time, the EU did not think it necessary to impose sanctions against the country, doubting its effectiveness (The Guardian, 2003).


The first North Korean nuclear test in October 2006 changed the quality of the Union's policy toward the country. After the nuclear test, the EU released statements from the EU's highest diplomat, the European Parliament, the president of the European Parliament, and European foreign ministers. They strongly condemned the nuclear test as unacceptable and argued that the EU would take urgent action against North Korea's nuclear activities (European Council, 2006; European Commission, 2006b; European Parliament, 2006). As it signaled, the Union intensified its pressure. The Union expressed its willingness to faithfully implement UNSCR 1718 that imposed the first sanctions against North Korea at the supranational level on

²⁴ EEAS (2018) defined the EU's Critical Engagement policy as the approach combining dialogues and assistance programs on the one hand and pressure and restrictive measures on the other hand.

October 14, 2006, to condemn the first nuclear test. The European Council adopted the common position 2006/795/CFSP in November 2006 and regulation 329/2007 in March 2007, transposing UN sanctions into laws at the EU level (European Council, n.d.).²⁵

Nonetheless, Brussels continued to maintain dialogue channels with Pyongyang during this period. The bilateral political dialogue at this time, that began in 1998 continued to be held annually. Brussels and Pyongyang actively exchanged high-level delegations. For example, the European Parliament sent high-level delegations in 2005, 2007 (twice), and 2008, and received their counterparts in 2006 and 2007. In addition, the EU troika visited Pyongyang in 2003, 2007, and 2009. The 2007 visit aimed to encourage Pyongyang to rapidly fulfill the agreement of the Six-Party talks in February 2007 (Hindustan Times, 2007).

Figure 1. EU institutions' aid to North Korea, 2002–2009 (USD, Million)



Source: OECD.Statistics

Moreover, Brussels continued to support aid activities for North Koreans. Being aware of the importance of sustainable assistance at the regional level, the EU began to fund regional community assistance programs operated by six European NGOs in 2003: these programs were focused on improving food security and building basic capacity for sustainable agriculture (MOFA, 2020: 117). However, the unstable political situation affected its humanitarian aid. Due to the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear test, the North Korean office of the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office eventually closed in 2008 (Jeffries, 2009) and the amount of assistance steadily decreased, as Figure 1 shows (MOFA, 2020: 117).

²⁵ While the US started to impose sanctions on the country in 1992, and Japan and Australia adopted their own restrictive measures even before the adoption of UNSCR 1718, the EU firstly imposed on North Korea in 2006. However, it was an obligation with which every country joining the UN had to comply (Arms Control Association, 2020)

4.2.2. Political Dialogue

The EU–DPRK dialogue was one of the most important means for both the EU and North Korea to enhance bilateral cooperation. Although its policy line became tougher after the second nuclear crisis, the EU was still willing to talk because it regarded dialogue as an avenue for close discussions on non-proliferation and human rights. For North Korea, dialogue was one of few channels left to the country to engage with Western countries, as its continued nuclear development saw the United States refuse to resume bilateral talks (Go, 2018). Accordingly, the political dialogue that had begun in 1998 continued through 2003 and 2004 despite the second nuclear crisis of 2003 and the EU’s decision to cut off KEDO funds and technical support. During the sixth and seventh political dialogue held in Pyongyang in 2003 and 2004, the Brussels delegation called on Pyongyang to rejoin the NPT and cooperate with smooth discussions in the Six-Party Talks (Go, 2018; Park, 2017).

However, the political dialogue was suspended in 2005 as North Korea refused dialogue with the EU to remonstrate against the EU’s efforts in promoting North Korea’s human rights (Ministry of Unification, 2018). From the early stage of their relations, the EU showed interest in North Korea’s human rights situation, having it as one of the main agendas of bilateral meetings. However, the issue was never raised at the international level until the second nuclear crisis. As the country accelerated its nuclear program in the early 2000s, the EU and member states took the lead in discussions on North Korea’s human rights at the UN, which resulted in the first resolution on North Korea by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2003. North Korea was furious at the leading role of European countries in adopting the resolution and refused political dialogue with the EU in 2005. This situation remained until 2007, when North Korea reached the Joint Statement on February 13 at the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks. The EU wanted to resume the bilateral political dialogue, seeing North Korea return to the Six-Party table and cooperate in reaching the agreement (Institute for Unification Education, 2016). The EU–DPRK dialogue was held in a somewhat thawed atmosphere in 2007 and 2008 (Go, 2018)

4.2.3. KEDO

Before the end of 2002, KEDO was an effective diplomatic means for the EU to deal with the North Korean security issue. However, the second nuclear crisis meant that KEDO’s activities were at risk of being terminated, which negatively influenced the EU’s role in the process of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. The United States argued that as North Korea had violated the Agreed Framework signed between Washington and Pyongyang in 1994, the

construction of LWRs had to be suspended; the US government was concerned that North Korea might use the reactors to generate uranium for nuclear weapons (Alexandrova, 2019). On November 14, 2002, KEDO halted heavy fuel oil supplies to North Korea, following the US's claim (Arms Control Association, 2020). At the same time, the EU strongly insisted on maintaining KEDO's activities. Javier Solana, High Representative, argued during his visit to Seoul in February 2003 that KEDO should continue, although it might need to be reviewed (AP Archive, 2015). Glyn Ford, a member of the European Parliament, also asserted the importance of the organization's existence to deal with the North Korean nuclear program (Ford and Kwon, 2005). However, the Bush administration constantly commented on the lack of effectiveness of KEDO.²⁶ On November 21, 2003, the Executive Board of the organization announced it would halt its nuclear reactor construction project and review the future of the program (Arms Control Association, 2020). As the program's uselessness and inefficiency became a topic at KEDO, the EU also ended its financial support for the construction project (one million US dollars in 2003) (Haute Couverture, 2020). Ultimately, KEDO's nuclear reactor construction project was officially terminated in May 2006 following an announcement by the Executive Board (KEDO, n.d.).

The European Union's intervention in the North Korean nuclear issue through KEDO can be evaluated as half success and half failure. Despite its significant financial contributions and efforts with KEDO activities, the EU was not invited to the Six-Party Talks. After the dissolution of KEDO, it was difficult for the EU to directly participate in the North Korean nuclear deal as there was no room for the Union to sit at the table of multilateral negotiations replacing KEDO. However, by participating in KEDO, the Union was able to express its interest in the security issue in Northeast Asia, enabling political solidarity with the United States, South Korea, and Japan. North Korea could also pay keen attention to the political presence of the Union as an international actor that might supplant the United States (Park, 2017). Since then, the Union has operated channels of political dialogue with related countries, especially South Korea, and has been given a strong voice at the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) meetings. Ultimately, in accessing KEDO, the Union was able to establish its presence in relation to security issues on the Korean Peninsula (Doh, 2012).

²⁶ Adam Ereli, the US Department of State spokesperson, argued that KEDO had no future on November 5, 2003 (Kerr, n.d.).

CHAPTER 5

Policy of Active Pressure 2009–Present

Since 2009, the EU has taken a more critical stance toward North Korea, which has widened the political and economic chasm between them. This period is referred to as the active pressure period by many scholars because it clearly focused on sanctions rather than dialogue as the nuclear program of North Korea continued to advance (Bondaz, 2020; Esteban, 2019; Esteban, 2019; Ko, 2019; Vandenhoute, 2017). Although the EU stated in an official document (EEAS, 2016a) that its policy toward the North was a policy of critical engagement, this clearly changed: it abandoned its efforts to engage the North Korean issues politically and economically and adopted more restrictive measures, more so than the UN. The EU's policy toward North Korea eventually evolved into a sanction-based path in 2009.

5.1. BACKGROUND

5.1.1. Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

On December 18, 2007, a momentous step was taken; member states signed the Treaty of Lisbon amending the two treaties that had served as the EU's constitutional foundation (the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community). The Lisbon Treaty contained reform measures intended to strengthen the EU's external representation, decision-making efficiency, and policy cohesion and consistency. First, the Lisbon Treaty granted the EU legal personality (Article 47, TEU). Before the Treaty, the EU was considerably limited on exercising consistent and unitary influence in international politics because it had no legal basis to act as a single international actor representing member states; it was not able to sign an agreement under the name of the EU. However, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, this enabled the EU to sign international agreements and treaties, as well as to join international organizations under the name of the EU on behalf of member states. The Treaty of Lisbon also created the posts of long-term President of the European Council and the HR/VP and established the European External Action Service. The president of the Council is responsible for chairing Council meetings, reporting the outcomes of meetings to the European Parliament, and representing the Union externally at the level of Heads of State or Government, which has further strengthened the EU's external representation (Article 15, TEU). The creation of the HR/VP's duty enables the EU to strengthen its policy coherence and external representation in the CFSP. Article 18 of TEU enables the HR/VP to propose policy development to the Council,

implement the policy decided by the Council, and represent the Union externally at the ministerial level on foreign and security policy. The post of the HR/VP merged the functions of the Commissioner for External Relations with those of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (a post introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam); however, these missions overlapped with those of the Commissioner for External Relations, which led to increased inefficiency in implementing the CFSP. The Treaty of Lisbon was an attempt to improve this inefficiency by merging the functions of the two different posts and giving them to the HR/VP. As a result, the EU enhanced its policy consistency, simplified policy processes, ameliorated the efficiency of policy decisions, and strengthened external representation (House of Commons, 2008). The EEAS was established to support the missions of the HR/VP. It has coordinated opinions and promoted external cooperation between European institutions and member states' foreign ministries (Duke, 2009). The EEAS has further enhanced the EU's international status and influence by coordinating policies, minimizing duplication within tasks, and enhancing foreign policy consistency (Pang, 2011).

Despite these reforms, the CFSP still displays inter-governmental characteristics. It cannot be denied that the CFSP exhibits institutional features different from other EU policies. According to Nugent (2017), this unique feature—allowing member states to reflect their interest in making the CFSP—is attributed to the tight connection between the foreign and security policy and national sovereignty. As defined *sui generis* in Article 2(4) TFEU, the CFSP is established and coordinated by the European Council consisting of member states' leaders; the roles of the European Commission and the European Parliament are limited within CFSP policy-making while other policies are made across EU institutions (Cremona, 2015, The Royal Society, 2016). The HR/VP, who leads European foreign and security policy as Vice-President of the Commission, is also appointed by the Council and carries out his duties as directed by the Council (Article 18, TEU). Accordingly, member states' interests and intentions inevitably influence the CFSP's policy and implementation. Furthermore, the EU emphasized in its declarations annexed the Treaty of Lisbon that the Treaty, as well as newly established posts and organizations, did not provide additional authority to formulate the CFSP or affect member states' foreign policy to the Commission and the Parliament, which guaranteed the Council's competence in making the policy (European Union, 2007). The Treaty also exempts the CFSP from qualified majority voting. The Treaty expanded the areas where the Council could act using qualified majority voting: only the Economic and Social Committee acted by qualified majority in the 2000s, but after the Treaty of Lisbon, the committees able to use qualified majority voting increased to 45 (European Commission, 2003, TEU, 2008). However, Article 24 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union that clarified that the CFSP

was in principle enacted by unanimity. The use of this voting system is further constrained in the area of foreign and security policy by Article 31 of the Treaty that grants member states a veto “for vital and stated reasons of national policy” (TEU, 2008: 34) As is evident here, the EU has sought to overcome the institutional limits of the CFSP and strengthen its external representation and policy consistency by adopting the Lisbon Treaty. However, ironically, the Treaty reaffirmed that the European foreign and security area would remain intergovernmental.

5.1.2. Evolution of the EU Non-Proliferation Policy


There has been considerable evolution in the EU’s non-proliferation policy, motivated by the Lisbon Treaty and following changes in the Union’s foreign policy decision-making process (Portela, 2021; Portela and Kienzle, 2015a). Notably, the treaty contributed coherence and consistency in establishing and implementing non-proliferation policies under the single control of the HR/VP and the EEAS. Within the new EU’s external policy institution, the Division for WMD, Conventional Weapons and Space was created with the aim of formulating and implementing its policy against the expansion of nuclear weapons. The Treaty also allowed the HR/VP to chair meetings and coordinate tasks of different working groups of the European Council. For example, the European Council had three working groups related to the non-proliferation of WMD: Non-Proliferation (CONOP), Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control (CODUN), and Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM). Before the Treaty of Lisbon, there was no person or organization coordinating the three working groups at a higher level. Now, the HR/VP and the EEAS took charge. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty improved the coherence of the policy, although the decision-making process in the CFSP still has some intergovernmental features (Cottey, 2014).

In 2015, the JCPOA—a remarkable event in the history of European foreign policy—was launched. As stated in the ESS, the EU and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) attempted to resolve Iranian issues within a multilateral and rule-based framework. While the United States addressed the Iranian nuclear problem with a bilateral approach, the EU preferred to include multiple states and international organizations, such as the IAEA (Cronberg, 2017a; 2017b; McCloskey-Gholikhany, 2019). The EU encouraged the United States and Iran to return to the negotiating table, playing a mediating role. It also built a multilateral framework in which major parties could negotiate and exchange their opinions. At the same time, the EU complied with the UN security council resolutions against Iranian nuclear programs and even agreed to impose more strict sanctions on the country (Portela, 2015a). This dual approach of sanctions with diplomacy was successful in encouraging Iran and the United

States to resume the nuclear deal. As Helga Schmid (former Secretary-General of the EEAS) stated in her speech in 2017, the EU’s policy direction in the JCPOA negotiation played a crucial role in concluding the JCPOA.²⁷

The EU adopted the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) replacing the ESS in 2016.²⁸ However, while WMD was considered the biggest menace to European and global security in the ESS (European Council, 2003b: 5), the EUGS addressed non-proliferation as the fifth priority stating that WMD proliferation “remains a growing threat to Europe and the wider world” (EEAS, 2016b: 41–42). However, the EU still placed significant effort into dealing with these issues. As Figure 2 shows, the EU budget committed to non-proliferation activities had gradually increased from 2014 to 2019 (European Parliament, 2020). In addition, the EU has enhanced cooperation with the IAEA beyond just funding: it actively supported the IAEA’s activities to tackle the proliferation of WMD at the global level. Thus, although the non-proliferation of WMD became a lower priority in the EU’s security agenda, it continued to be one of Europe’s primary security concerns.

Figure 2 EU’s annual budgets allocated for non-proliferation



5.1.3. The DPRK’s Nuclear Programs and International Responses

North Korea reached agreements with five countries participating in the Six-Party Talks to abandon its nuclear program in February 2007 and pledged to faithfully carry out the agreement at the inter-Korean summit in October 2007 (Declaration on the Advancement of

²⁷ At the event held in May 2017, Schmid assessed the EU’s role in the negotiation as following: “[i]t was only the EU that was accepted because the EU was perceived by both sides as a neutral actor, as a moderator, a facilitator. We were bridge builders in the context between Iran and the US, which continues to be difficult.”

²⁸ The full name of document is “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (EEAS, 2016b).

South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity, 2007). Nonetheless, its promise was never fulfilled, as it refused to sign the verification agreement at the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in December 2008. On April 14, 2009, the North Korean government eventually announced through the Korean Central News Agency that it would stop taking part in the Six-Party Talks and that none of its previous international agreements would bind the country any longer (Arms Control Association, 2020; Kim and Herskovitz, 2009). Following the announcement, the Six-Party Talks were suspended, and the country continued to conduct additional intercontinental ballistic missile and nuclear tests. In sum, the country gave the impression it had the will to end its nuclear programs by participating in bilateral and multilateral dialogue; however, in reality it never stopped developing its nuclear program behind closed doors.

Table 3. Timeline of North Korea's nuclear tests

July 5, 2006	Ballistic missiles test (including a long-range missile)
October 9, 2006	The 1st nuclear test
April 5, 2009	Launch of a three-stage rocket, which Washington claims failed
May 25, 2009	The 2nd nuclear test
April 13, 2012	Launch of a three-stage liquid-fuelled rocket, which Pyongyang conceded failed
December 12, 2012	Relaunch of a three-stage liquid-fuelled rocket
February 12, 2013	The 3rd nuclear test
January 6, 2016	The 4th nuclear test
February–September 2016	A series of long-range ballistic missile tests
September 9, 2016	The 5th nuclear test
September 3, 2017	The 6th nuclear test
November 29, 2017	KNCA's announcement that it completed its nuclear program

(Source: Arms Control Association, 2020; Freidman, 2017; Reuters, 2021)

The international community ultimately admitted failure in its international attempts to resolve the nuclear issues of the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomatic approaches (Moon, 2016). The UNSC has since adopted a series of sanctions against North Korea.²⁹ However, these sanctions have also failed to produce effective results because the UNSC permanent member states with a veto have expressed different positions on the scope and level of sanctions due to their own interests. For example, Russia and China, two permanent members,

²⁹ Since the breakdown in the Six-Party Talks in 2008, the UNSC adopted seven resolutions against the country.

opposed adopting strict measures (Park, 2017). Only in 2016 did all UNSC member states agree to adopt the toughest and most effective sanctions against the country: Resolutions 2270 and 2321. These were unanimously adopted to condemn North Korea's fifth nuclear test. This was possible because China (previously reluctant to impose sanctions) accepted the proposal led by the three Western permanent member states of the UNSC: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. China agreed that the resolution included measures to restrict the quality of Chinese imports from North Korea (Snyder, 2016).³⁰ In response to the sixth nuclear test conducted in 2017, the international community attempted to tighten sanctions against the country further: the United States sought to include an export ban on refined petroleum products to North Korea to tighten the screw. However, due to objections from Russia and China, the UNSC was only able to impose parts of the original draft designed by the three Western permanent member states (UNSC, 2017). While the international community failed to speak with one voice in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea declared itself a nuclear state again in 2018.³¹ North Korea is currently estimated to possess more than sixty nuclear weapons according to US intelligence officials (Albert, 2020).

5.2. EU PRESSURE AND SANCTIONS

5.2.1. EU-DPRK Relations

North Korea announced its refusal to return to the Six-Party Talks and tested its long-range missile in April 2009. A month later, the country conducted the second nuclear test. This series of events forced the EU to change policy course toward the country (Institute for Unification Education, 2016). Since the end of 2009, the Union has adopted autonomous sanctions and gradually reduced its effort to continue dialogue and communications. This changed attitude has encouraged scholars to consider its current policy course having evolved into active pressure policy, although in 2016 the Union claimed to have maintained critical engagement policy (Ballbach, 2019; Bondaz, 2020; EEAS, 2016a; Esteban, 2019; Ko, 2017, 2019; Vandenhoute, 2017).

³⁰ Resolution 2321 contained the limit of \$400 million or 7.5 million tons/year of North Korea's mineral exports to China from 2017. As China have been the biggest destination of North Korea's export, the imposition of Resolution 2321 was expected to reduce North Korea's annual export earnings by 100 million US dollars, which could deal a fatal blow to the North Korean regime (Snyder, 2016).

³¹ Kim Jong Un, North Korean leader, announced that the country accomplished "the great, historic cause of perfecting the national nuclear forces" in his New Year's Address (Kim, 2018)


The EU–DPRK relationship since 2009 can be characterized by three key issues: a large volume of restrictive measures, a decline in trade, and reduced communications. First, the EU has regarded sanctions as an effective policy means for dealing with the North Korean issue since 2009. It has stated several times the necessity to use sanctions for denuclearizing the peninsula. In the document “East Asia Policy Guidelines,” the Union declared that the EU had to continue to urge North Korea to uphold the non-proliferation regime by fully implementing UN Resolutions 1718 and 1874 that imposed sanctions on North Korea (European Council, 2012). “The European Union Global Strategy” adopted in 2016 asserted that the EU’s activities had to respond to security crises through humanitarian aid, CSDP, sanctions, and diplomacy, mentioning that promoting non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula is one of its important tasks (EEAS, 2016b). Contradicting what the EU former top diplomat stated in 2003 (that the EU had not considered imposing sanctions against North Korea), sanctions became an often-applied measure in the North Korean case by the end of 2009 (The Guardian, 2003).

With this policy strategy, the EU transposed all sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council into the EU laws, which covered an arms embargo, freezing of assets, and a travel ban on persons linked to North Korean nuclear activities (European Council, n.d.). In addition, the Union enhanced the sanction regime by adopting additional autonomous sanctions. Whenever Pyongyang carried out nuclear tests and armed provocations, Brussels upgraded its sanction list (Go, 2018). Restrictive measures continue to serve as a focal point of North Korean policy. During trips to Europe in October 2018, South Korean President Moon requested that European leaders support the current peaceful atmosphere by relaxing sanctions against the North.³² He tried to convince leaders that easing sanctions was one of the most effective ways to encourage North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. However, his call for European support received little response. The E3 leaders repeated that pressure would not be eased without the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of its nuclear program (Ryall, 2018). This contradicted what the EU had shown in early 2000: in “the European Union Lines of Action Towards North Korea,” the EU and member states declared their support for South Korea’s endeavors to bring peace to the Korean peninsula (European Council, 2000). Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, underlined that the EU’s North Korea policy goal was the CVID of the peninsula, as well as the fulfillment of all UNSC resolutions in his opening remarks at the EU–ROK summit in 2018 (Tusk, 2018). Throughout his speech, the President clearly

³² The inter-Korean and the US–DPRK summits were successfully held in 2018. At the meetings, North Korea showed its willingness to build peace on the Korean peninsula in the cooperation with the US and the South. However, the summits were over without mentioning North Korea’s CVID (Kuo, 2018).

sent the message that the EU would not reduce sanctions until North Korea fully carried out the CVID of its nuclear program. Recently, on September 9, 2021, HR/VP Josep Borrell reaffirmed the Union’s effort to achieve the CVID of the North’s nuclear weapons (Yonhap News Agency, 2021). Brussels has clearly shown its position in supporting non-proliferation on the peninsula by transposing UN sanctions and adopting autonomous measures until Pyongyang fully accepts the CVID. European policymakers doubt that North Korea will complete nuclear disarmament when they relax sanctions because Pyongyang has already violated international agreements (Esteban, 2019). As declared, the Union’s primary goal is to get Pyongyang to return to the NPT regime renouncing its nuclear weapons. To achieve this goal, it continues to place pressure on the country with sanctions.

Figure 3 EU-DPRK trade, 2000–2017 (USD million)




Source: KOTRA and OECD Statistics, cited in Burghart et al. (2019)

Second, the volume of trade flowing between the EU and North Korea has continuously declined, driven by the sanction regime. As much as 348 million US dollars in 2002 failed to be sustained with only 11.5 million in 2017 (Burghart et al., 2019). As Figure 3 shows, after the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis in 2003, exports and imports started to decline (OECD, 2019). Since 2006 when the UN introduced its first sanctions regime toward the country, the EU has significantly reduced the volume of trade with the country. The consistent decline in imports and exports from 2009 indicates Brussels’ strong commitment to UN sanctions in order to increase pressure on Pyongyang (Ko, 2019). In addition, the European Council adopted a series of measures restricting trade with North Korea in 2017: banning imports of certain minerals and exports of refined petroleum products and oil. These measures hugely impacted North Korea because mineral products were its largest export to Europe, worth 240 million euros between 2011 and 2014, while chemical products were one of its major import items from

Europe (Burghart et al., 2019). As a result, trade volume between European member countries and North Korea has declined again since 2016 (KOTRA, 2021). In sum, the Union has reinforced its sanctions regime against North Korea, leading to the deterioration of EU–North economic relations.

Figure 4 EU-DPRK total trade volume, 2016–2020 (USD thousand)




Source: KOTRA (2021)

Finally, the EU’s active pressure policy brought about a significant downturn in EU–DPRK communication channels. The halt of bilateral political dialogue is the clearest example of this trend. After the European Council adopted the first autonomous sanctions in 2009, only two sessions of political dialogue were held, and no dialogue has been held since 2016. This suspension reflects the Union’s attitude to increased disengagement with the country. In addition, member states started to weaken diplomatic relations with North Korea to condemn its nuclear development program and force it to renounce the program. Spain expelled North Korean ambassadors from its territory, allowing only one North Korean diplomat to stay in the delegation in 2017. The Italian Foreign Minister announced in October 2017 that Italy had decided to exile the North Korean ambassador and refused to accredit any ambassador appointed by the North Korean government (The Italian Insider, 2017). Impressively, Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with the country, arguing that it would not reverse the decision until the North made meaningful progress toward denuclearization (Yonhap News Agency, 2017b). European aid for North Korea has also declined. Although not all funding was suspended, the amount gradually decreased, with EU aid that had reached around 18 million US dollars in 2008 falling to approximately 4.2 million US dollars in 2019. This can be

interpreted as one of the EU’s disengagement approaches (Figure 5). Since 2009, EU–DPRK relations have been tense up to the current time.

Figure 5 EU institutions’ aid to North Korea, 2008–2019 (USD, Million)



5.2.2. Political Dialogue

As mentioned in the previous section, political dialogue only took place twice from 2009 to 2015 and has been suspended since 2016. The dialogue had been suspended before 2016. North Korea refused to engage with bilateral meetings in 2005 and 2006, accusing the EU of actively trying to promote human rights in North Korea on the international stage. Political talks were again canceled between 2012 and 2014 following the death of North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011. As both sides agreed to resume the dialogue in 2014 when a delegation of the Workers’ Party visited Europe, the 14th session of political dialogue was held in Pyongyang in 2015 (EEAS, 2015; Richards, 2014). This particular dialogue—held after North Korea’s third nuclear test—demonstrated that the EU had not totally given up on maintaining the momentum of dialogue despite its tough response to Pyongyang’s continued armed provocations (Park, 2017).

However, Brussels’ efforts failed to bring any meaningful results. The 14th session failed to reach an agreement or a concrete promise for the future, although the EU brought up various issues related to North Korea that the international community had concern about. During the meeting held in Pyongyang, both Brussels and Pyongyang had in-depth discussions on Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile programs, regional security and stability, and human rights. At the meeting, the delegation urged its counterpart to reestablish meaningful relations with the international community on these issues, reaffirming its stance that bilateral

cooperation could be strengthened only when the North made substantial progress with the CVID of its nuclear program (EEAS, 2015).

Nonetheless, this clear demonstration of the EU's firm stance did not put a halt to North Korea's nuclear development. Two further nuclear tests and long-range ballistic missile launches were conducted the following year after the 14th session of talks. Eventually, the EU reinforced its sanctions against the country and suspended dialogue and communications. In an interview conducted by Free Asia Broadcasting in June 2016 (four months after North Korea's fourth nuclear test), an EU official, who requested anonymity, mentioned that the Union was unlikely to conduct any bilateral discussion or diplomatic visits with North Korea for some time (Yang, 2016). Although the EU's top diplomat Federica Mogherini asserted that economic restrictive measures would not be enough to achieve the EU's goals, the European ministers' decisions in September 2017 showed the EU's position in placing sanctions ahead of dialogue (EEAS, 2017). Its position remained firm, even in 2018 when Seoul and Washington began bilateral summits with Pyongyang. The Union reiterated that it had no plan to hold political dialogue for the time being until North Korea resumed political exchanges with the country in a peacemaking atmosphere (Yang, 2018).

Since the 2010s, the EU began to evaluate the effectiveness of dialogue with North Korea with some skepticism and disengaged from political communication. This demonstrates a change in policy course change critical engagement policy, where the EU used both pressure and dialogue, to the active pressure policy, where sanctions take precedent over diplomatic channels and dialogue.

5.2.3. The EU's Restrictive Measures against North Korea

One of the important aspects of the EU's active pressure policy is the imposition of sanctions on North Korea. The adoption of sanctions started in 2006 following the UN system, but sanctions have become the EU's major measures toward North Korea since the latter conducted its second nuclear test in 2009. In December 2009, the European Council announced the adoption of EU autonomous sanctions against North Korea to supplement UNSC Resolution 1874. This adoption inhibited member states from exporting all dual-use goods and technologies to North Korea. In addition, the Council added 13 North Korean individuals and 4 companies to its sanctions list, in addition to the 5 North Koreans and 8 companies already agreed upon by UNSC Resolution 1874 (European Council, 2009a).

After North Korea conducted long-range missile tests and the third nuclear test at the end of 2012 and early 2013, the EU imposed wide-ranging sanctions against the country,

including financial and trade restrictions and a freeze on North Korea's financial assets in EU member states. Transposing UN Resolution 2087 and 2094 and adopting autonomous sanctions, the European Council froze 33 North Korean assets in Europe and restricted financial transactions in Europe operated by companies or individuals suspected of being linked with North Korea's WMD program. The number of North Koreans whose travel to Europe was restricted increased to 26. The Council also declared the reinforcement of financial and trade restrictions, expanding the UN sanction list by banning the export of aluminum (which could be used for the WMD development), trade in precious metals and diamonds, and the prohibition of North Korea's and Koreans' banking transactions in Europe, such as remittances to the country and opening European bank accounts by North Korean companies and individuals (European Council, 2013).

Following North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January and ballistic missile launches in February of 2016, the UNSC adopted resolution 2270, including its toughest ever sanctions. The EU, transposing the resolution, added 18 persons and one entity to its sanction list as autonomous measures (European Council, 2016a). The Council also decided to adopt additional measures on May 27, 2016, emphasizing that North Korea's nuclear tests posed a serious threat to international and regional peace and security. This decision, being made separately from UNSC resolutions and complementing the existing sanction regime, imposed a wider range of sanctions, including in the investment and transport sectors (European Council, 2016b).³³


The UNSC adopted Resolution 2321 in September 2016 and Resolution 2375 in September 2017 following the fifth and sixth nuclear tests, respectively, which were all transposed into the EU legal framework (European Council, n.d.). In October 2017, the EU raised the level of sanctions to the maximum. Member states' Defense and Foreign ministers agreed on autonomous sanctions to block capital influx from Europe to North Korea that would contribute to the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This decision prohibited all EU investments in the country and exports of refined petroleum products and crude oil (European Council, 2017). The ministers also announced that North Korean workers would not be allowed to renew their work permits in the territory of member states. In 2018, the EU also transposed UNSC resolution 2397 and added 17 persons to the list as part of its autonomous sanctions (European Council, 2018).

As North Korea has continued to upgrade its WMD programs and conduct nuclear tests,

³³ Adopting new restrictions on 27 May 2016, the Council prohibited all investment by North Korea in Europe and by Europeans in certain sectors of North Korean industry. The new restrictions contained bans on landing in, taking off or overflying EU territory of airplanes operated by North Korea (European Council, 2016b).

the EU has upgraded its sanctions against the country. As of October 2021, a wide range of sanctions has been imposed on activities related to North Korea, and 137 persons and 84 entities are currently subject to EU's restrictive measures, of which 80 persons and 75 entities are also on the sanctions list made by the UNSC. The EU has actively participated in pressing North Korea by fully complying with the UNSC resolutions. As figure 6 shows, the EU's list is longer than that of the UN. It indicates that the EU has focused on the approach of pressure and sanctions to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

Figure 6 Accumulated number of persons and entities restricted by the EU and the UN



Source: European Council

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS

This master's dissertation examines how EU policy toward North Korea regarding nuclear non-proliferation changed from a conciliatory approach to a pressure strategy over recent decades. At the beginning of its involvement in North Korea-related issues, the EU applied an engagement policy, but its policy course gradually turned into a pressure approach as North Korea intensified arms provocations. However, this hardline policy approach contradicts its overall external policy focusing on dialogue. For example, the EU and E3 built a bridge between Iran and the international community, especially the United States to bring about continuous negotiations and peaceful settlement in the Iranian nuclear deal (Schmid, 2017). Why did the EU decide to take a more rigid stance, abandoning its traditional strategy? In Chapter 6, the dynamics behind these policy changes will be explored based on the previous examination of each policy period and the theories of the EU's international identity and European integration.

6.1. THE EU'S POLICY OBJECTIVES TOWARD NORTH KOREA

According to EU international identity theories, the EU's external policy objectives can be seen categorized into the following three domains: military, civilian, and normative objectives. The goal of the CFSP toward North Korea can be explained least convincingly through the perspective of MPE: the EU has followed this approach to ensure stability and its political clout in the region but has never used or considered military means. In the international realm, the EU has mainly sought a civilian or normative policy, as Ko (2019) argued. Of the two policy objectives, what has the EU pursued the most in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue? This part will consider whether the acceleration of North Korea's nuclear program led to the changes in the EU's primary policy objectives toward the country.

6.1.1. Active Engagement 1993–2003

The EU publicly announced its will to promote peace in the world and set a WMD non-proliferation agenda on one of its top priorities in the early 1990s. At the meeting held in Dublin in June 1990, the European Council announced its full commitment to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation and the NPT for global security (European Council, 1990). The European Council affirmed its will again in 1994 to support the NPT indefinitely and unconditionally, and

to aim for universality of the NPT, which was one of the first joint actions in terms of the CFSP (European Council, 1994b; Grand, 2000). The diffusion of the norm of WMD non-proliferation was one of the key components of the CFSP (European Commission, 1994). As demonstrated in Chapter 3, this approach by the EU was consistent with its policy toward North Korea. The EU expressed concern over the existing tension caused by North Korea's nuclear development and emphasized the importance of the EU's role in peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula, adopting three reports regarding North Korea from 1994 to 2001 (European Commission, 1994; European Council, 2000; European Commission, 2001b).³⁴

The diffusion of the norm of non-proliferation was not the only reason that motivated the EU to engage in this issue. Kim (2001) and Schmidt (2006) pointed out that the EU had another intention in participating in the Korean issues: the Union wanted to expand its influence as an international actor in a remote region. European countries believed that improving relations with North Korea and joining in the peace process of the Korean Peninsula could provide an opportunity to strengthen their presence and protect interests in East Asia, where they were relatively marginalized (Kim, 2001; Schmidt, 2006). The strategic report adopted in 1994 supported this argument, stating that the maintenance of peace and security in Asia was crucial for the EU's interests in the region (European Commission, 1994: 7). However, the EU placed the norm of non-proliferation ahead of its interests. In the 1994 Asian strategy report, the EU clarified that its engagement in Asian security issues was to promote international obligation, notably non-proliferation (European Commission, 1994). In addition, in 1999, the European Council agreed that urging North Korea to uphold the international non-proliferation regime was the main objective of the EU's North Korea policy (European Council, 1999c). In the second political dialogue of 1999, the North Korean delegation expressed its intention to enhance the bilateral relationship; however, the EU declined the proposal saying the constructive relationship must be preceded by North Korea's fulfillment of international responsibilities (Lee, 2002).

Internal disputes over the EU's accession to KEDO also showed the EU's position in prioritizing norm diffusion. The Union faced member states' opposition to joining KEDO in the initial stage. The United Kingdom and Finland (already members of the organization) were against it because of the double financial burden it would bestow, while neutral countries such as Sweden, Austria, and Denmark opposed the idea due to domestic anti-nuclearism (Cho, 1999, cited in Kim, 2006). The EU, realizing that its accession to KEDO could not be passed at the

³⁴ The three reports are following: "Toward a New Asia Strategy" in 1994 and "the European Union Lines of Action Towards North Korea" in 2000, and "the EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004" in 2001.

European Council due to the CFSP's principle of unanimity, decided to join the organization under the name of Euratom. One of the primary reasons the EU pursued accession—despite member states' objections—was the diffusion of non-proliferation into North Korea: European leaders believed that the EU's participation in KEDO would show North Korea that the whole world actively supported the initiative, which could help to strengthen the organization's credibility (Berkofsky, 2003). Accordingly, the main objective of the CFSP during this period was considered normative. The EU pursued its own interests, but the motive of common good was the primary goal of its policy. The Union wanted to promote the non-proliferation of WMD in the region and ultimately achieve peace at regional and international levels, which was one of the essential norms and values desired by both the EU and the international community.

The measures taken by the EU to achieve its goals also correspond with the NPE approach. During this period, the Union approached North Korea through economic assistance and physical contact, which align with *procedural diffusion*, *overt diffusion* and *transference*, respectively.³⁵ The EU's first step regarding non-proliferation was to join KEDO to dispel the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1997. The Union provided 75 million euros from 1996 to 2000, which was the fourth-largest financial support after Japan, South Korea, and the United States (KEDO, 2001). Immediately after, Brussels established its own dialogue channels with Pyongyang to increase physical contact. Brussels and Pyongyang held annual political dialogue from 1998 and exchanged political delegations. During sessions of annual political dialogue and occasional high-level meetings, non-proliferation was always an important agenda item: Brussels called on Pyongyang to stop developing its nuclear program and comply with the NPT regime, sometimes turning down its counterpart's proposal to strengthen the bilateral relationship (Yonhap News Agency, 2003). Finally, in 2001, Brussels established the official relations with Pyongyang.

During the period of active engagement, the EU pursued a normative objective in the matter of the North Korean nuclear program. It attempted to persuade North Korean authorities to accept the universal norm of WMD non-proliferation. Increasing economic incentives and contact with North Korea was the approach chosen by the EU to achieve its goal.

³⁵ Manners (2002: 244–245) described that the EU as a normative actor diffuses its principles through six ways. Of them, *Transference* refers to financial and economic means, including financial aids, economic sanctions, and conditionality, while *Over Diffusion* means the norm spread through dialogues and physical contacts. These means of norm diffusion are detailed in Chapter 2.1.3.

6.1.2. Critical Engagement 2003–2009

From 2002 to 2009, non-proliferation remained a crucial goal of the EU's policy toward North Korea. In 2003, the European Council adopted the first security strategy, the ESS, that defined principles objectives of the EU's security policy. In the ESS (European Council, 2003b: 5–6; 8), the EU stated that the Union recognized WMD proliferation, including North Korea's nuclear activities, as a key threat to Europe and the whole world and dedicated itself to mobilizing all possible instruments to remove nuclear programs from any region of the world. It was also coded in the ESS that non-proliferation and regional stability on the peninsula was one of the mainstays of its North Korea policy. In addition, the EU described itself as a power pursuing righteousness or non-proliferation (Kim and Choi, 2019). The ESS stated that “[...] the European Union [...] can be a formidable force for good in the world” (ibid.: 15).³⁶ Through the publication of its strategic paper, the EU revealed its goal of being a normative actor in dealing with international security threats. As noted in the ESS, the EU set a policy goal of acting as a normative power in its non-proliferation policy. The Union also revealed its will to deal with North Korean nuclear development in this context, considering the country's nuclear activities (and their damaging ramifications for regional security) as a real threat to the world (ibid.: 6; 8). This position was consistently engraved in the CFSP. At the Council meeting in December 2003, the European Council reiterated its commitment to a peaceful resolution to the tension on the Korean Peninsula, urging the North to fully comply with the international non-proliferation regime (European Council, 2004b). The Union did not just urge North Korea to rejoin the NPT, it wanted to increase its value by taking part in the peace process. Accordingly, during the period of critical engagement, the objective of the EU's policy toward North Korea—especially its nuclear program—remained normative.

The policy approach during this time can also be explained by the concept of NPE as the EU used the same approaches as it had used from 1995 to 2002. It mainly applied the approaches of dialogue (*overt diffusion*) and economic means (*transference*), although some changes were applied through its use of economic means. In terms of *overt diffusion*, Brussels maintained dialogue lines with North Korea to actively spread its norms. Political dialogue still took place almost annually, and Brussels and Pyongyang actively exchanged high-level delegations. For example, the EU troika visited Pyongyang three times during this policy period, and non-proliferation was one of the top agenda items for the EU (Hindustan Times, 2007). It

³⁶ The 2009 version of the European Security Strategy upgrading and replacing the 2003 version also stated that “the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world” in 2003 (European Council, 2009b)

was clear that Brussels actively attempted to coax Pyongyang into giving up its nuclear program through physical contact. In addition, the EU actively supported the Six-Party Talks, although it was not a member. When North Korea attended and fully cooperated with the Six-Party Talks, the EU encouraged the country to continue to maintain this approach by sending and welcoming high-level delegations. However, when the country committed WMD provocations or refused to return to the Six-Party Talks table in 2006, it also called off political dialogue³⁷. By doing so, the EU sent a clear message to North Korean authorities wanting to maintain a good relationship with Europe that EU–DPRK cooperation could be enhanced when the country complied with international obligations (Jung, 2018).

Transference was an essential tool used by the EU in its policy objective during this period, but it changed its approach from economic incentives to conditionality. The Union publicly announced this change of policy course at the 2464th General Affairs Council meeting in 2002 when it asked EU institutions and member states to review their actions, including all technical and economic assistance (except for humanitarian aid) in the light of North Korean nuclear development (European Council, 2002). The European Council, witnessing North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, announced that enhancing cooperation between both sides could only be possible when North Korean leaders decided to rejoin the NPT (European Council, 2004). As a part of this approach, the EU stopped its financial and technical support that was counted as a part of non-humanitarian aid. It also cut the budget of KEDO projects and suspended the whole technical support plan (Ballbach, 2019).

It can be concluded that the EU's policy objective was normative during this period. Its goal was to spread peace, specifically WMD non-proliferation, in North Korea, which was accepted as a European and universal norm. The policy tools also did not change. *Overt diffusion* and *transference* were the major tools that Brussels considered using. The EU's decision to work closely with the United States to address WMD proliferation more effectively made its approach to North Korea more critical, but its approach of conditionality was still a type of economic means. Thus, it can be said that the EU's external identity toward North Korea during this period was described as normative power pursuing normative objectives (Go, 2018).

6.1.3. Active pressure 2009–2021

Article 2 of the TEU revised in 2008 clarified that the EU aimed to promote peace and

³⁷ For example, in 2005 and 2007 when the Six-Party Talks reached agreements, the EU sent the Parliament high-level delegations to North Korea. In 2007, the EU troika visited the country to welcome its counterpart's full cooperation in attaining the meaningful result at the talks (Hindustan Times, 2007).

security in the region and around the world (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). This article showed the EU's willingness to actively engage in global peace and security issues as one of its primary external policy objectives (Chung, 2016). This principle was also well represented in the EU's policy toward North Korea. The direction of the CFSP toward North Korea was identified in the Council's 2012 "Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia." It was stated that the EU had to react to North Korea's policies that were causing regional and global instability in terms of peace (European Council, 2012). The EEAS also clarified its policy goals toward North Korea in the fact sheet about EU–DRPK relations released in 2016. According to the fact sheet, the EU policy objectives were "to support a lasting reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, the upholding of the international non-proliferation regime, and the improvement of the situation of human rights in the DPRK" (EEAS, 2016a: 1). The EEAS reaffirmed these objectives in the "2016 the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" replacing and upgrading the existing ESS. In terms of security, the EU pointed out that denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula was one of its missions in terms of Asian security (EEAS, 2016b). As it clearly declared in different EU papers, the EU has determined, from 2009 to the present, to reduce tension in the region provoked by North Korea's WMD provocations and to press Pyongyang to comply with international non-proliferation regimes, notably the NPT (Esteban, 2019). The EU prioritized non-proliferation—one of the norms pursued by the EU—in the security matter of the peninsula, which leads to the conclusion that the EU still maintained a normative objective.

During this period, the methods of EU policy tended to be firmer, as reviewed in Chapter 5. It suspended the use of *overt diffusion*. North Korea's consistent nuclear tests and WMD provocations caused the EU to reject direct discussions or physical contact with North Korea (Yang, 2016). Thus, unconditional and regular bilateral political dialogue during the two previous policy periods became conditional: the EU clarified that it would not have bilateral talks with North Korea until its nuclear program was dismantled completely (EEAS, 2017; Yang, 2018).

At the same time, the Union reinforced the means of *transference*. Its conditionality approach changed to economic sanctions. Using sanctions as a foreign policy tool was not entirely new in the CFSP. Before the creation of the CFSP, member states used restrictive measures against certain countries either collectively or autonomously. Following its establishment, the EU actively applied such measures as an essential policy tool (European Council, 2020; Portela, 2005). According to Portela (2014), this practice consists of three different categories. First, the EU decided to impose restrictive measures against the country

without pre-existing UNSC resolutions. The EU sanctions against Syria and Russia are examples of the first category. Second, the EU implemented sanctions adopted by the UNSC, which UN member states must follow. The adoption of sanctions on North Korea by the EU in 2006 was a case of this second category. Finally, the EU applied additional measures to the mandatory UNSC resolutions. This third approach was often taken when the EU did not think that an agreement at the UN level was not sufficiently severe to induce behavioral changes in target countries (Ko, 2019). The EU's sanctions policy toward North Korea after 2009 belonged to the third category (Portela, 2005). Dissatisfied with the level of UN sanctions, the EU adopted additional and tougher measures to press the North Korean regime. But why does the EU choose to use sanctions? The European Council stated that the aim of sanctions was to alter policies and behaviors of targets in order that the objectives of the CFSP could be efficiently achieved (European Council, 2020). Accordingly, the EU's changed attitude of active sanction policy resulted from the EU's further efforts to achieve its goal more effectively.

6.1.4. Assessment of Hypothesis 1

Brussels prioritized Pyongyang's renouncement of its nuclear program and the shutdown of its nuclear weapons production during all policy periods. The EU attempted to spread the norm of WMD non-proliferation in the country as its main policy objective. At the 2198th General Affairs Council meeting held during the active engagement policy, EU member states agreed to establish a policy goal of encouraging North Korea to uphold the NPT for peace on the peninsula (European Council, 1999c). However, as North Korea accelerated its provocations and upgraded its nuclear programs, the EU clarified its policy goal in its official documents. In the ESS published in 2003, the EU clearly stated that the Union considered the North Korean nuclear program as an urgent global and European security issue that the EU must actively address (European Council, 2003b: 5–6; 8). During the policy period of critical engagement, the Union pursued the dispersion of WMD non-proliferation in the country, which has remained until the EU's current policy. The EU–DPRK relations fact sheet paper issued by the EEAS in 2016 stated that peace and the upholding of the NPT took precedence over other issues in the North Korea policy. Thus, it is concluded that Brussels' policy principles have been normative without change since the inception of the CFSP.

This conclusion is followed by one question. If the policy objective was not responsible for the EU policy change, then what caused the change? The answer lies in its policy measures. The policy measures that the EU has taken can be categorized by Manners' explanations of norm diffusions. Specifically, the EU has adopted four channels in the case of North Korea, as

Table 4 shows. While *informational diffusion* and *procedural diffusion* were used intermittently, major norms transmitters have been *overt diffusion* and *transference*. During the period of active engagement, the EU established bilateral dialogue with North Korea and offered financial incentives. However, during the last policy course, it suspended talks with North Korea and shifted its financial approach to economic sanctions. Thus, the EU’s policy course changed from active engagement to active pressure, following shifts in the preferred diffusion channels by the EU to achieve its policy objectives effectively. Given that the interruption of diplomatic relations and talks is recognized as a type of sanction in a broad sense (European Council, 2019), sanctions were chosen in recent years as major tools to bring about change in the North Korean authorities’ minds regarding nuclear development. Manners (2002) asserted that sanctions might be used as a policy measure corresponding to the NPE. Actions may be deemed normative if they serve the objectives of promoting norms. This account corresponds to the EU’s argument. In the paper “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures,” the European Council (2004a: 2) stated that EU sanctions aimed “to maintain and restore international peace and security.” Through the paper, the Council emphasized the normativity of its sanction policy.

Table 4. Changes in EU policy measures toward North Korea

Years	Policy Period	Norm diffusions			
		Informational Diffusion	Procedural Diffusion	Overt Diffusion	Transference
1993–2003	Active Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Toward a New Asia Strategy (1994) - European Union Lines of Action Towards North Korea (2000) - EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004 (2001) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of official diplomatic relation (2001) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Join KEDO (1997) - Annual bilateral political dialogue (1998–2003) - EU troika visit (2001) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic incentive through KEDO (75 million euros from 1996–2000) - Trade - Humanitarian assistance

2003– 2009	Critical Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - European Security Strategy (2003) - Presidency Conclusions of Brussels European Council (2004) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Annual bilateral political dialogue (2003-2004; 2007-2009) - EU troika visits (2003; 2007; 2009) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Suspension of technical and economic aids - Implementation of UN sanctions
2009– 2021	Active Pressure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (2012) - European Union Global Strategy (2016) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Suspension of political dialogue (2016) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adoption of EU autonomous sanctions (since 2009) - Adoption of measures restricting trade (2017)

However, some scholars disputed Manners' view and the Council's argument, stating that sanctions were incompatible with norm diffusions (Checkel, 2005; Diez, 2005; Lenz, 2013; Whitman, 2013). According to them, the promotion of norms has to be normative: ways of persuading and teaching a third country to accept norms or processes in which the country adopts norms spontaneously fitted into the NPE framework. In this regard, the EU's recent practices, which are highly reliant on sanctions, are not normative, which means that the EU is not a normative actor in the case of North Korea's nuclear activities.

Sanction models proposed by Crawford and Klotz can be helpful in addressing the normativity of the EU sanctions. Crawford and Klotz (1999: 26–29) defied this rigid stance to sanctions by subdividing sanctions into four models in accordance with their purposes. According to the *compellance* model, sanctions are intended to affect the cost-benefit analysis to induce behavioral changes. The *resource denial* model prevents a targeted country from obtaining certain resources necessary for activities that sanctions imposers want to halt. The *political fracture* model implies that sanctions aim to produce internal political upsets and legitimation crises, which could lead to a policy change. Finally, the *normative communication* model is deeply related to moral arguments. Sanction imposers use sanctions to punish a state that breaks internationally accepted norms. By imposing sanctions, the imposers send the target a clear signal that implies its actions are considered wrong and hope that the target's norm will be replaced by the norms shared by the imposers but also adopted worldwide. The normative communication model is the only model regarded as normative, whilst the other three include

a form of coercion that is not compatible with the normativity (Crawford and Klotz, 1999).

The EU's sanctions on North Korea can be analyzed as comprised of multiple sanction forms. First, the EU's diplomatic sanctions (suspension of talks) were used as symbolic and non-material measures. Although the EU constantly argued against halting its nuclear development during bilateral policy dialogue with North Korea, North Korea did not stop. Witnessing the country's continued development, the EU eventually decided to express displeasure at North Korea's nuclear activities and missile provocations. Since 2016 when the dialogue was suspended, the Union reiterated that it would not resume dialogue until the CVID of North Korea's nuclear program. The EU used diplomatic sanctions to point out that North Korea's nuclear activities were wrong and should be abandoned as soon as possible. This may well be fit to the *normative communication* model. Its economic sanctions have a more complicated nature than the diplomatic ones. The European Council officially declared that EU sanctions are aimed at behavioral and political changes of a target in accordance with international norms, such as preserving peace (European Council, 2020). In this regard, the EU's economic sanctions on North Korea can be seen as normative. However, in reality, it also adopted the *resource denial* model. The sanctions targeting North Korea included asset freezes and export bans on certain materials, technologies, and remittances (European Council, 2009a; 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2017; 2018). This aimed to impede North Korea's nuclear and WMD development by blocking the influx of resources, funds, and technologies required for nuclear development. The *compellance* model can also be applied to this case. It seems that travel restrictions placed on individuals and export bans on luxury goods aimed to shift policy and behaviors by changing the cost-benefit calculations of the North Korean authorities. Thus, the EU sanctions on North Korea had natures of both normative diffusion and material coercion. This analysis portrays that the EU sanction regime did not entirely contradict the NPE framework but still included coercive measures.

The examination of the EU's external identity at different policy stages offers insight into Hypothesis 1: "*The EU's primary policy objective toward North Korea changed, which eventually led to the engage policy being abandoned while the pressure policy was reinforced.*" The EU's primary policy objective did not change. By setting normative objectives, the EU wanted to remain a normative power in the matter of North Korea's nuclear program. Thus, the EU's abandonment of the engagement approach was not a consequence of a change in its objective toward North Korea. Instead, its policy measures brought about changes in the policy course. The EU policy toward North Korea transformed from active engagement to active pressure as the Union took unfriendly approaches and eventually adopted sanctions. However,

these sanctions do not seem normative because coercive measures in discord with normative accounts were applied in the process of implementing sanctions. In the process of solving the problem, the EU adopted coercive means that were incompatible with the normative approach. This shows discrepancies in the EU's North Korea policy between normative objectives and reality.

6.2. MEMBER STATES' INTERESTS AND PREFERENCES

Intergovernmentalism emphasizes the importance of member states' national interests in formulating EU policies. EU foreign policy is made by reflecting member states' pursuits to maximize their respective national interests (Moravcsik, 2018). This theory helps correlate the EU's abandonment of engagement policy with the national interests and preferences of member states: did member states' changed interests facilitate the onset of the EU's coercive approach to North Korea? This chapter analyzes member states' interests and attitudes regarding North Korea, focusing on France and the United Kingdom and their ramifications for the EU's policy toward the DPRK.

6.2.1. Initial Attitudes toward the DPRK

From the beginning, EU member states played a significant role in setting the EU's policy direction toward North Korea. When the first North Korean nuclear crisis broke in 1993, member states disputed how to react to the crisis. France argued that the EU had to adopt a hawkish stance accompanying restrictive measures, while others, especially the United Kingdom and Germany, preferred to solve the issue with a more appeasing line (Ko, 2008). As the US–DPRK Agreed Framework in 1994 settled the nuclear issue, the United Kingdom and Germany's conciliatory stance—having a similar approach as the Framework—was supported by member states. Furthermore, until 2003, European countries did not recognize the North Korean nuclear program as a real threat to Europe. The “Toward a New Asia Strategy” published in 1994 and the 2198th General Affairs meeting in 1999 saw the EU express its will to address the nuclear issue to guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula, but not peace in Europe or the world. This contradicted its view in the ESS that regarded the North Korean nuclear program as a major European security concern (European Commission, 1994; European Council, 1999c; European Council, 2003a). In the international circumstance where the United States attempted to solve the issue in a conciliatory approach (for example, through KEDO), member states did not perceive that North Korea's nuclear development could be a real threat to Europe.

European countries clung to this stance until the early 2000s. The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Finland had joined KEDO with financial assistance before Euratom signed a treaty with the intergovernmental organization (Esteban, 2019). German Prime Minister Schröder compared the EU's North Korea policy to Germany's Ostpolitik, arguing that only dialogue and contact can bring about changes in North Korea (the Korea Times, 2000, cited in Onderco and Wagner, 2017). Many European countries sought to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea to promote bilateral dialogue. Although the EU had asserted a coordinated move toward the country in two Council Conclusions of October and November 2000, Italy acted alone for its national interest (European Commission, 2001a). Italy, motivated by national interest, became the first EU member state to establish official diplomatic ties with North Korea in January 2001³⁸, followed by establishing a series of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and other European countries. This active attitude toward the DPRK eventually led to official EU–DPRK diplomatic relations. Brussels could not delay the decision as most members had already reinforced bilateral relations with the North (European Parliament, 2001b). France consented to the EU undertaking them, acknowledging a cordial atmosphere between Europe and North Korea while refusing to establish its own bilateral diplomatic relations. Thus, the EU's active engagement policy was not led by EU supranational decisions but by some member states, such as Italy, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

6.2.2. Critical Attitudes toward the DPRK

The most important and notable feature of the EU's policy evolution toward North Korea around 2003 was that it started to converge with the United States, as the EU abandoned its unconditional approach and adopted a conditional and critical view, as also taken by the United States following the September 11 terrorist attacks (Quinones, 2003: 2). The EU's tendency to converge with US policy did not only emerge in its approach to North Korea. The EU's overall security policy tended to follow the US foreign and security policy line. For example, the EU showed a weak response to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, as did the United States; it also supported US unilateral sanctions in the Iranian nuclear negotiation process (Portela, 2015b). In addition, the EU asserted the importance of EU–US cooperation in terms of security policy: the EU's first strategy report stated that the transatlantic partnership was an “irreplaceable” basis for addressing international threats (European Council, 2003b: 18).

³⁸ Italy was worried that North African countries, especially Libya, would obtain missile technology from North Korea. The Italian government thought that missile transmissions from the North to Africa could be prevented by establishing diplomatic channels with the DPRK (Sigal, 2000: 4).

Why did the EU start to emphasize transatlantic cooperation in international security matters and maintain the same course with the United States? The answer can be found in the desire of member states to be of like mind with the United States.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has long been a close and trusted ally of the United States. Since forging a “special partnership” during the Second World War, the bilateral relationship has continued to address their shared interests in politics, economics, and security (Mix, 2018; Paek, 2020). Leaders have emphasized the importance of this bilateral relationship. For example, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated in her remarks arriving at the White House in 1981, that “[...] we, in Britain, stand with you. America’s successes will be our successes. Your problems will be our problems, and when you look for friends, we will be there” (Thatcher, 1981). In 2003, President Bush said that “[t]he United States has no truer friend than Great Britain” (Hewitt, 2016).

This relationship has been “special” and exceptional rather than close because it has included the field of intelligence and nuclear and military cooperation, including NATO (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2009: 19).³⁹ Although the two periodically faced disagreements and tension between them, the United Kingdom has aligned its foreign and security policy with the US and accelerated its cooperation with the US. The motivation for this policy alignment was clear. Given the political influence of the US in the world as a preeminent power, “its engagement and decisions are vital to nearly all priorities for British foreign policy” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2009: 14). The country desired to become one of the leading international actors and chose to engage in US policy to enjoy the fruits of the partnership. Accordingly, it was in the British interest to maintain a strong relationship with their US partners and understand and influence American policy decisions. In particular, the UK paid special attention to the US policy on terrorism and nuclear proliferation, such as the War on Terror and the Axis of Evil since the September 11 terrorist attacks (ibid.: Ev 88). The British government was reluctant to raise concerns about these policies publicly, but it did support them. For example, the US’s decision to invade Iraq faced fierce opposition from European countries—most notably, France and Germany—and even the British public opinion opposed military activities in Iraq.⁴⁰ However, the UK decided to send troops to the US-led coalition force for the Iraq

³⁹ No other nation shares security intelligence with the United States in the same way as the United Kingdom does, followed by Canada and Australia (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2009: EV 85).

⁴⁰ Throughout the year 2002, the British were not favourable to the Iraq War: most respondents to the poll opposed British military action in Iraq (Strong, 2017). Strong (2017) asserted that Tony Blair, Prime Minister at the time,

War (Kershaw, 2019; Strong, 2017).

The UK's attitude toward North Korea was also not immune from the US policy toward the country. Until 2001, the US addressed the North Korean nuclear program in an intensive diplomatic approach, such as establishing KEDO and providing technical and financial supports. In alignment with the American approach, the British government preferred to address the issue in an appeasing approach (Ko, 2018). However, as North Korea's WMD issue became one of Washington's top security agenda items after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the British changed its attitude (Quinones, 2003). Washington's North Korea strategy significantly shifted from the traditional stance of "diplomacy backed by deterrence" to an "assertive and unilateral approach" that included the possible use of nuclear weapons (Quinones, 2003: 3; Richter, 2002). Furthermore, the Bush administration stressed close cooperation with its allies to fight those countries constituting the "Axis of Evil" that threatened global security, and North Korea was named on this list alongside Iran and Iraq (Bush, 2002).⁴¹ Many European leaders criticized the remarks regarding the "Axis of Evil," arguing it could harm the EU's efforts to engage with the North Korean regime (BBC News, 2002b). However, during the US-UK summit in April 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair showed some support for Bush's remarks. He said:

[W]here countries are engaged in the terror or WMD business, we should not shirk from confronting them. Some can be offered a way out, a route to respectability. I hope in time that Syria, Iran and even North Korea can accept the need to change their relations dramatically with the outside world. [...] But they must know that sponsoring terrorism or WMD is not acceptable (Blair, 2002)

These different views on Bush's remarks showed that the UK decided to be aligned with the US attitude toward North Korea rather than attached to the EU's engagement policy. This signaled the critical attitude of the UK toward the country. Thus, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, the British government postponed the arrival date of its first ambassador to condemn this action (Ko, 2019). Also, it joined the PSI led by the US to halt the flow of WMD items on the global scene at the beginning stages (Bolton, 2003).

did not follow public opinion when deciding the British position on the Iraq War. Blair thought people would support the government's decision when it approached: as he predicted, support for the war rose from 38% to 54% (Strong, 2017).

⁴¹ At the 2002 State of the Union Address, US President Bush designated North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, as the "Axis of Evil" that referred to those states threatening the US and its allies by sponsoring terrorist groups and proliferating weapons of mass destruction and described North Korea as "a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens" (Bush, 2002). Washington even considered the use of nuclear weapons against the DPRK (Richter, 2002).

The United Kingdom actively engaged in the activities to strengthen the WMD non-proliferation regime in tandem with the United States (Pardo, 2014; 2016). In accordance with US policy, the policy of the United Kingdom moved away from the engagement approach.

France

France and the US have been traditional allies, sharing political, economic, and military interests, but have sometimes collided over certain international and European issues. France has had no intentions to become a pole in the international society on its own, but it has opposed American unilateralism, emphasizing the autonomy of policy decision-making for European countries (Acharya, 2004). The Iraq War was one of the issues where discrepancies arose. While the UK supported the Iraq War, France, alongside Germany, fiercely opposed the US invasion. From the very beginning, France was one of the most vocal opponents to the US actions in Iraq in Europe. France argued that the use of force in Iraq could only be justified when more extensive arms inspections were carried out (Lee, J.-S., 2007). French President Jacques Chirac publicly criticized the war, saying that “[w]ar is always a last resort, always an admission of failure, always the worst of solutions” (France 24, 2019). The French objections to American unilateralism played a certain role in arousing the opposition to the Iraq War in France. However, at the same time, its opposition was the result of reflecting domestic politics and economic interests.⁴² Iraqi oil, economic ties with Iraq, traditional pro-Arab foreign policy, and anti-American sentiment significantly contributed to forming national preferences in the French government. (Lee, J.-S., 2006). To protect its national interests, France inevitably took the opposite stance to the US invasion to Iraq. In addition, the country formed a coalition with Germany that was on the same page on the war.

However, these strong oppositions led by the Franco-German coalition placed the traditional transatlantic alliance at risk. They forged US skepticism toward pursuing common transatlantic interests based on NATO, which ultimately resulted in strained transatlantic relations (Gordon, 2003). The transatlantic tensions that erupted over the war in Iraq caused concern among European politicians, who expressed concern about the negative consequences of pursuing divergent policies with the US (BBC News, 2003c). France also acknowledged the importance of transatlantic relations to not only Europe but also France for certain reasons. First,

⁴² The French respond to the Afghanistan War was different from that to the Iraq War. In fact, the French government supported the US policy on terrorism toward Afghanistan by deploying 5,000 France military personnel for war (Lee, J.-S., 2006). Lee, J.-S. (2006) pointed out that the Afghanistan War did not threaten the major interests of France.

for the time being, Europe relied on the American military to protect its interests. France understood that its nuclear weapons and well-trained soldiers might protect its own interests but were not enough to address common European security challenges. The NATO, heavily dependent on US contributions, was the main alliance for France and Europe to defend French and European interests worldwide (Flournoy et al., 2005). Thus, cooperation with the US in terms of security was a rational decision for the French and European interests. The second reason was that the economy was a vital aspect of the US-Franco relationship. In the early 2000s, the US was one of France's biggest trade partners. During 2000–2002, the US was its top trade partner outside of Europe. In 2002, trade in goods and services between France and the US reached a volume of 48 billion US dollars, which was the fifth largest globally and the top volume outside of Europe (WITS, 2002). In total, 7.99% of its imports and 8.09% of its exports relied on the US (ibid.). Lastly, France and the US shared similar outlooks on global challenges. They regarded nuclear proliferation and global terrorism as security concerns that should be addressed urgently but require collaborative efforts at the international level (Lewis and Tertrais, 2015). As permanent members of both the UNSC and NATO, they were close partners on the NPT regime and counterterrorism efforts. From the early 1990s, formal dialogue on nuclear policy was held between the Pentagon and the French Ministry of Defence, and non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons and missiles were one of the main agenda items (ibid.). However, the disputes over the Iraq War between Washington and Paris halted dialogue. This gave the French government a clear signal of aggravating bilateral relations.

The French government eventually sought ways to repair the bilateral and transatlantic relations. At the Franco-American Summit in 2002, French President Chirac stressed the importance of the EU-US relationship. He said:

Relations between Europe and the United States are not only a very old, not only essential to the world equilibrium, but I would say, in reality, becoming more and more important (BBC News, 2002a).

At the talks with President Bush in September 2002, President Chirac explained that the French government only opposed the use of force prior to a diplomatic settlement (Chirac, 2012: 403–404). French Foreign Secretary Dominique De Villepin also asserted that the dispute over the Iraqi crisis was not a problem between the US and neither France nor the EU: he emphasized that France was still a friend of the US, and that the existing dispute was merely a disagreement in dealing with the issue (BBC News, 2003a). Thus, although its national interests concerning Iraq led to a confrontation with the US, France had no intention of deteriorating the relationship with the country that shared common interests in the realms of economy and security and

perspectives on the global agenda, such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, France started to show support for US foreign policy on other issues. In the following years, France backed the US Iran policy and deployed more troops to Afghanistan (Alexandrova, 2019).

The North Korean WMD issue was a topic that allowed France to promote transatlantic relations by supporting US policy on security. First, unlike in the case of Iraq, North Korea was not a country in which France's national interests remained or to which domestic politics sensitively reacted. Trade between the two only reached 13 million US dollars in 2002, which was an insignificant volume for the French economy (WITS, 2002). It was also the only European state that had not established diplomatic relations with North Korea. Thus, it was expected that the French government would face little resistance from domestic interest groups, despite adopting a notion in line with the United States (Choi and Kim, 2016). Furthermore, France could not tolerate North Korea's nuclear and missile activities as much as those of Iran. Despite the engagement of the international community, North Korea did not abandon its desire to become a nuclear state and attempted to sell Scud missiles and technology for WMD weapons to third countries (Portela, 2014). This contradicted France's commitment to the international non-proliferation regime. When North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin released a statement condemning the withdrawal. In the statement, he asserted:

It is a serious decision heavy with consequences, that has to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council. This major development underscores the necessity and the urgency of international mobilisation (BBC News, 2003b).

Accordingly, the French government halted any discussion on the establishment of diplomatic relations (Ko, 2019). In becoming one of the core member states, France also actively participated in military activities halting the WMD flow from North Korea to third countries. These activities gave France opportunities to not only commit to the NPT regime but also cooperate closely with the US. Its policy toward North Korea started showing tendencies of moving closer to the American approach.

Changes in the EU policy toward the DPRK

Through the Iraq Crisis, member states witnessed strained transatlantic relations. Acknowledging the danger of being divergent with the US in the matter of security, European states led by the UK and even including France—the toughest opponent to US policy—put in efforts to bring about a rapprochement with the US, which also created the mood for acting together with the US to address security affairs (Alexandrova, 2019). Accordingly, at the end

of 2003, European member states unanimously agreed to adopt the ESS (the EU's first security strategy report), emphasizing transatlantic cooperation that defined the relationship as "irreplaceable" (European Council, 2003b: 15). This was intended to restore strained transatlantic relations by addressing global security issues with shared common interests among all parties (Portela, 2015).

This tendency also was continued in the matter of North Korea, one of the global security issues. An attitude toward North Korea that aligned with the US was apparent in the UK and France. They formed national preferences of acting in line with the US in dealing with North Korea's nuclear activities. The United Kingdom prioritized its special partnership with the US that brought benefits while France wanted to restore its strained relationship with the US by cooperating in addressing an issue that was not very relevant to its domestic interests. Accordingly, their stance became tougher. They stalled further engagement with North Korea and participated in US activities, including military actions (PSI).

The two countries were not the only states that joined the US's coercive approach. Six more European countries (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain) actively joined the US's critical approach to North Korea: they became the core members of the PSI. This participation was motivated by each member state's will to enhance cooperation with the United States, especially in the field of WMD. For example, Spain even cooperated with US counter-WMD shipping activities before the creation of the PSI. In December 2002, the Spanish Naval swooped on the North Korean freighter *So San* en route to Yemen with 15 Scud missiles, warheads, and fuel, based on information provided by the United States (Dunne, 2013).⁴³ Poland was also a strong supporter of the US-led initiative when the first discussion on the PSI started. It fully shared the importance of this proactive counter-proliferation activity. However, above all, Poland wanted to establish itself as an essential regional ally of the United States (Kulesa, 2010). During the American–Polish summit in Kraków, Poland, in May 2003, US President Bush announced the PSI initiative (Bolton, 2003). North Korea's WMD connection to the Middle East was also the reason that European countries wanted to join in the PSI. North Korea did not hide its intention to sell its nuclear weapons and technology to a third country. Rather, in 2003, North Korean authorities announced their readiness to sell to "the

⁴³ The US and Spain were unable to seize them due to the lack of an international legal basis supporting such counter-WMD proliferation actions. The two countries allowed the vessel to resume its journey to Yemen after receiving guarantee from the Yemenite government that the items from North Korea would not be transferred to any third party. Although the US-Spain cooperation failed to have an effective outcome, the *So San* incident served as a momentum for the creation of the PSI. The US saw the clear gap in international law and sought to design a multilateral scheme to counter the WMD proliferation activities globally (Davenport, 2020; Dunne, 2013; Meier, 2013).

highest bidder” (Kittrick, 2007: 343). It was well-known that Pyongyang sold Scud missiles and technology for WMD weapons to countries of concern, especially Iran (Portela, 2014). The eight European states were concerned about the possibility of WMD proliferation by North Korea and joined in the PSI because they perceived the system as a more effective means than dialogue to stop North Korean arms transfers to the Middle East.

Member states agreed on the importance of cooperation with the US in dealing with security issues (including the North Korean issue), which led to the recognition of the transatlantic relationship in the EES. In addition, they recognized that the US’s approach was more effective in interrupting North Korea’s WMD proliferation, given the possibility of North Korea’s WMD proliferation to the Middle East (Pardo, 2014a; 2016). The EU’s active engagement policy did not correspond to either the ESS or the member states’ preferences—it needed to be changed. Eventually, the EU abandoned an unconditional approach and adopted a critical policy similar to the US. Its financial contribution to KEDO’s LWR construction projects and the technical cooperation plans with North Korea were all canceled in 2003 (Ballbach, 2019). The Union maintained an engagement approach (including humanitarian assistance and communication), but it was no more unconditional: the US’s principle of refusal to offer rewards for bad behavior became the basis of its engagement (Gaertner, 2014: 340). The convergence of some European countries with the US’s approach led to a reshaping of the EU’s North Korea policy in a hardline approach.

6.2.3. Sanctions

In the early 2000s, member states’ concerns over the deteriorated transatlantic relationship and the DPRK–Iranian nuclear cooperation encouraged the EU to reshape its approach toward North Korea in a less conciliatory and more oppressive way. However, the EU was still reluctant to use UN sanctions to pressure North Korea, despite its close stance with America’s foreign approach.⁴⁴ In 2003, Javier Solana, a top EU diplomat, stated that it was not the moment to impose sanctions on North Korea because restrictive measures could not help solve the North Korean nuclear issue (The Guardian, 2003). However, in December 2009, the Council adopted restrictive measures by not only transposing UNSC Resolution 1874⁴⁵ but

⁴⁴ The US adopted sanctions on North Korea in the 1950s and strengthened them further following North Korea’s worldwide bombings targeting South Korea in the 1980s. The US imposed a series of sanctions on many North Korean entities accused of being involved with WMD proliferation from 1992 to 2006 (The National Committee on North Korea, 2009).

⁴⁵ The first EU sanctions against North Korea were adopted following North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, but it was only UNSC Resolution 1718 that all UN member states were obliged to follow.

also imposing EU autonomous measures. The EU began using restrictive measures actively to pressure the country. This changed attitude was attributed to two member states—France and the United Kingdom—as permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Two European UNSC permanent member states

Before examining the roles of the two countries in adopting additional European sanctions, it is necessary to understand why they supported restrictive measures against North Korea. Until 2006, France and the United Kingdom were not in favor of sanctions, although they adopted a critical approach toward North Korea, convergent with the US. In 2003, the British Foreign Office made it clear that the UK government opposed the imposition of economic sanctions on the country (Traynor et al., 2003).

In July 2006, the US and Japanese governments pushed to impose new sanctions on North Korea to condemn its long-range ballistic missiles test.⁴⁶ They sought close cooperation with two European permanent members of the UNSC to guarantee the adaptation of sanctions at the UNSC meetings (Benard and Leaf, 2010). However, France and the United Kingdom were reluctant to act in concert with their traditional allies because supporting sanctions could cause unnecessary confrontations with China and Russia (ibid.).

At the time, France and the United Kingdom were waiting for Iran's reply to a framework agreement designed to halt the Iranian enrichment program proposed by themselves alongside China, Germany, Russia, and the United States (Arms Control Association, 2021). Despite a good understanding of the necessity of adopting more oppressive measures to stop North Korea's nuclear activities, they also acknowledged that China and Russia did not want to impose oppressive measures against North Korea.⁴⁷ They were afraid that disputes over sanctions might negatively affect their long-time efforts to address Iran's nuclear program (Bolton, 2007: 295). For them, addressing the Iranian nuclear issue was of importance due to their national interests closely linked to Iran. Instability in the Middle East (driven by the Iranian nuclear program) would inevitably harm the European security environment owing to the EU's

⁴⁶ On July 5, 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles. These missile launches alarmed the international community—especially the United States—because the missiles were not only able to deliver nuclear warheads but were also designed to reach Japan and even Hawaii (Benard and Leaf, 2010). Although the long-range missile tests failed, they indicated North Korea's intention to extend the scope of its striking distance to US territory. The next day, President Bush stressed the necessity to adopt a UNSC resolution condemning North Korea's missile tests (Stout, 2006).

⁴⁷ Especially China did not want to impose sanctions on North Korea because it believed that this could damage the stability of the existing pro-China regime (The International Crisis Group, 2006).

geographic proximity (McCloskey-Gholikhany, 2019; Yoon, 2020). European countries, including France and the United Kingdom, also had economic interests in Iran. In 2004, the EU was the main trading partner of Iran, gaining 35.1% of its total market share (Iran Watch, 2004). Iran was also one of the EU's main oil suppliers: as the sixth-largest supplier, Iran took up 3.9% of the EU's energy imports (ibid.). This strategic importance of Iran encouraged the two European countries to be reluctant to support the UK and Japan's initiative. Neither country wanted to risk their diplomatic efforts in the Iranian nuclear negotiation program. At a closed meeting of the ambassadors to the UN of four countries (France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) held on July 6, 2006, the French and British ambassadors expressed their concerns about the ramification of a resolution with sanctions (Bolton, 2007: 295).

Their position was faced with displeasure by the United States (Benard and Leaf, 2010). After acknowledging their stance and reasons, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice directly called British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett and French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy to persuade them to support the US-led resolution against North Korea, stating that the reluctance to support their ally in a time of need could influence future US–UK and US–France cooperation in any coming Iranian crisis (Bolton, 2007: 295). Eventually, the two countries had no choice but to shift their attitudes. This changed stance was motivated by relations with the United States and a hope for the smooth settlement of the Iranian problem. Since then, they have supported imposing sanctions on North Korea in consideration of benefits from the strengthened transatlantic relationship and North Korea's continuous provocations.

Internal negotiations within the EU

As permanent members of the UNSC, France and the United Kingdom began to maintain a stance positive toward the use of sanctions against North Korea, convergent to the US, and actively participated in drafting severe sanctions against North Korea. However, China and Russia often objected to the level of drafts designed by the three Western UNSC permanent members (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and toned down them. Thus, from the perspectives of France and the United Kingdom, the sanctions adopted at the UNSC were not sufficient to halt North Korea's nuclear activities (Ko, 2019). The two European countries bridged the gap with the EU's additional restrictive measures.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ The EU's supplementary sanctions in addition to the UN notion were not a rare occurrence. The EU often decided to supplement UNSC resolutions by adopting autonomous restrictive measures, which were usually led by the two European member states of the UNSC (Portela, 2014)

The first EU autonomous sanctions were adopted in 2009, following UNSC Resolution 1874. In 2009, the UNSC unanimously adopted a resolution to condemn North Korea for its second nuclear test. However, these sanctions were still less tough than the three Western UNSC permanent members had originally intended due to the objections from Russia and China (Nikitin et al., 2010). The two European permanent member states of the UNSC continued to attempt to impose strong sanctions on North Korea at the EU level: they attempted to adopt autonomous sanctions at the European Council that included targets excluded from the sanction list and more severe measures than those adopted by the UNSC (Portela, 2014). As a result, the Council imposed tougher sanctions than the UN in 2009: its sanctions had a longer list of targeted individuals and entities and included export bans on all dual-use goods and technologies (European Council, 2009a).⁴⁹ Since then, the EU has adopted autonomous sanctions, upgrading UN resolutions, a process in which France and the United Kingdom played a significant role. They encouraged the EU to take an aggressive pressure approach and abandon engagement (Esteban, 2019).

The internal negotiation processes of adopting the EU autonomous sanctions against North Korea went smoothly without any internal confrontation. Since sanctions need to be unanimously adopted by all EU member states, it can sometimes take a long time to adopt EU autonomous sanctions in cases where the geopolitical, security, economic, and political interests of member states lead to conflict. For example, the EU attempted to impose sanctions on Russia to condemn its annexation of Crimea in 2014 but faced serious disputes within the EU (Portela et al., 2021). Some member states that wanted to maintain interactions with Russia due to increasing economic connections and high energy dependence (such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy), showed strong opposition to adopting and renewing any strong, restrictive measures against Russia (ibid.). The sanctions were eventually passed unanimously, but the Council faced delays.

In contrast, additional sanctions were unanimously passed without delay and any dispute between EU member states in North Korean cases because national interests in terms of security and economy did not arise and member states recognized that North Korea's nuclear tests were an apparent violation of the NPT regime (Choi and Kim, 2016). After transposing sanctions imposed by Resolution 2770, condemning North Korea's fourth nuclear test at the end of March 2016, the EU attempted to expand restrictive measures against the country by adopting two autonomous measures. Accordingly, the Council added 18 persons and one entity

⁴⁹ Export bans on dual-use goods and technologies were first mentioned in UNSC Resolution 2321, adopted in 2016 (UNSC, 2016).

to its sanction list on May 19 and announced that it had adopted the legal basis to prohibit any European investment activities with and by North Korea, as well as the landing in, taking off, or overflying of EU territory of any airplanes operated by North Korea (European Council, 2016b). These decisions were made through the written procedure, which usually helps facilitate the decision-making process.⁵⁰ As a result, it was evaluated that the European sanctions against North Korea had been adopted faster than the EU's usual decision-making processes on sanctions (Jun, 2016). Thus, it can be concluded that the EU's active adoption of autonomous sanctions against North Korea in link with its active pressure policy was led by France and the United Kingdom in favor of pressuring North Korea to enhance cooperation with the United States in the Iranian nuclear matter. Moreover, their suggestions could be passed rapidly at the European Council level without delay or dispute due to the lack of national interests and the agreement on the severity of North Korea's NPT violation among member states.

6.2.4. Assessment of Hypothesis 2

Until the second North Korean nuclear crisis broke out in October 2002, most EU member states did not recognize that it could be a real threat to European security. Accordingly, they preferred to handle the North Korean nuclear program with a conciliatory approach. They supported KEDO activities, provided financial and technical assistance, and established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Their mild attitudes were not formed by the EU institutions. Rather, they chose to engage in North Korean affairs following their own interests. Accordingly, this amicable approach contributed to the EU's active engagement approach toward North Korea.

The situation changed in late 2002 and early 2003. When North Korea's secret nuclear program was disclosed by the United States, who wanted to handle this nuclear crisis in a hawkish way, European countries were willing to be in line with it. The relationship with the US was the key motivation for their action: they understood that the policy alignment with the US could bring greater benefit. The United Kingdom maintained a special relationship with the US in global security matters by supporting the US's approach to North Korea. On the other hand, France used the policy alignment to restore the bilateral relationships strained by the dispute over the Iraq War. Paris assumed that cooperating on other security issues could help

⁵⁰ Article 7 of the "Rules of Procedure of the European Council" prescribes the written procedure as follows: "Decisions of the European Council on an urgent matter may be adopted by a written vote where the President of the European Council proposes to use that procedure. Written votes may be used where all members of the European Council having the right to vote agree to that procedure" (European Council, 2009c).

reach out to Washington—the North Korean nuclear issue was chosen as one feasible way for achieving this goal due to its low relevance to France’s national interests. The French government recognized the issue as a breakthrough in repairing strained transatlantic relations. Other European countries also expressed their willingness to join a US-led coercive system (PSI) to enhance their relationship with the United States and to interrupt North Korea’s WMD proliferation effectively. As more member states supported the US approach and were in line with it, the EU, accordingly, shifted its unconditional assistance to conditionality, following its member states’ approaches.

The EU’s shift in policy to active pressure, based on sanctions, was also driven by certain member states. Prior to 2006, the EU and its member states did not think restrictive measures would effectively resolve North Korean nuclear issues. Even after witnessing North Korea launch long-range ballistic missiles in 2006, France and the United Kingdom did not support the US-led draft, which contained sanctions. However, they soon changed their position to cooperate with the United States in adopting sanctions against North Korea; they realized they could expect US cooperation on the Iranian issue when supporting US-led sanctions against North Korea. Accordingly, the two countries reformed their positive attitudes toward the use of sanctions on North Korea. This shift in the attitudes of the United Kingdom and France influenced the EU’s decision of choosing measures toward the DPRK. The two UNSC permanent members led the adoption process of EU autonomous restrictive measures. Other member states with no national interests at stake approved the suggestions presented by the two countries. As a result, EU autonomous sanctions were adopted as a major policy tool at the European Council without delay or dispute.

The attitudes of EU member states toward North Korean nuclear development were analyzed to test Hypothesis 2: “*The changes in member states’ attitudes and perceptions toward the North Korean nuclear program incited the evolvement of the EU’s approach to the country.*” As the preceding analysis demonstrates, from 2003 onward, member states changed their attitudes regarding North Korean nuclear weapons following their own necessities, which did not correspond to the EU’s active engagement policy. Accordingly, the EU started to abandon the active engagement approach, gradually adopted a critical stance, and finally pressured North Korea. Such changes in the EU policy were not directed by EU supranational decisions. Some member states (especially France and the United Kingdom) that needed the policy shift abandoned a conciliatory approach first, given their security and economic interests. Other member states that either agreed on the approach or had concerns also followed them. Based on the nature of the CFSP that allows member states’ policies significant roles in formulating

and implementing common policies, the EU adopted measures that the member states preferred and, as a result, demonstrated its hard-line approach in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

As the preceding chapters affirmed, the EU policy toward North Korea evolved in three different phases during the past three decades: active engagement, critical engagement, and active pressure. The EU engaged in the nuclear negotiation process with a conciliatory approach before the second nuclear crisis. However, in 2003, the EU's attitude toward North Korea changed: it cut financial and other types of assistance to the country (except for humanitarian aid) and pressured the country by participating in activities that interrupted North Korea's shipment of WMD-related items. In 2009, the EU accelerated its pressure on the country by transposing UN sanctions into its legal system and adopting its autonomous restrictive measures. During this active pressure period, its will to continue political dialogue with the DPRK reduced. The Union only held two political meetings with North Korea and suspended them entirely in 2016.

The aim of this thesis was to examine the EU's motivations for these policy changes. Based on the analysis of possible factors that might facilitate policy changes according to two theories (the NPE and intergovernmentalism), the research question can be answered as follows:

First, the policy shifts were the result of the adoption of coercive measures discrepant from its normative objectives. The EU's policy objectives in the matter have remained normative since 1995. Since joining KEDO, Brussels prioritized the norm of WMD non-proliferation in its policy toward Pyongyang. In its official documents, the EU constantly asserted that its policy toward North Korea was mainly focused on North Korea's return to the NPT and renouncement of its nuclear program, and, ultimately, on peace on the Korean Peninsula (European Council, 1999c, 2003b; EEAS, 2016a). However, EU policy measures changed, which was related to the shift in the EU policy course from active engagement to active pressure. Its suspension of technical and economic assistance introduced the period of critical engagement policy, and the adoption of EU autonomous restrictive measures and diplomatic sanctions led to the EU's hardline policy. However, its policy measures, especially economic sanctions, were coercive, which did not correspond to normative accounts. Thus, it can be concluded that the EU wanted to define itself as a normative power in addressing the North Korean nuclear development by setting normative objectives, but in the policy implementation, it failed to remain normative—it adopted coercive measures. The EU faced a discrepancy between the ideal and the reality in its policy.

Second, member states' national preferences led to the adoption of coercive measures at the EU level. Prior to 2003, member states attempted to solve the nuclear problem in a conciliatory way. In this mood, the EU held annual political talks with North Korea and established a diplomatic tie in 2001. However, in late 2002 and early 2003, some member states moved into alignment with the US in terms of their attitudes toward North Korea. Accordingly, the UK postponed the arrival of its first ambassador to North Korea, and France stopped discussing the possibility of diplomatic relations. Eight member states decided to join the US-led military joint activities to halt WMD proliferation by North Korea. Maintaining a good relationship with the US, as well as the effectiveness of the coercive measures, were key motivations for changing their attitude. EU institutions could not hold an active engagement approach that did not correspond to the member states' approaches. As a result, the EU started to be in line with the US—it halted economic and technical assistance. A similar situation occurred in the late 2000s: the UK and France had a positive stance on the use of sanctions toward North Korea due to the relationship with the United States and its political clout in the Iranian nuclear deal. As a result, both France and the United Kingdom supported the imposition of sanctions on North Korea at the EU level, which contributed to forging the EU's active pressure policy.

Given all of these points, the thesis reaches the following conclusions. First, although norms are of importance in the EU policy toward North Korea, they are overshadowed by the security and economic interests of its member states. When it comes to North Korea's nuclear issue, EU institutions wanted to act as a normative actor. It repeatedly assessed the importance of the NPT regime and urged North Korea to return to the negotiation table. However, member states preferred to address the issue in coercive measures, notably sanctions, which were formed by their national interests related to security and the economy. Given the features of the CFSP, by which member states play a major role in formulating policies, EU institutions could not act differently than adopt coercive approaches. The divergent interests on North Korea's nuclear issue between EU institutions and the member states caused the discrepancy between objectives and measures of the EU policy toward North Korea. Second, the NPE theory is useful in addressing the EU's role in the international community but has limitations in explaining the EU policy toward North Korea. This is mostly due to the fact that member states that had divergent interests with EU institutions were key players in the decision-making process. Thus, intergovernmentalism, focusing on member states' interests and preferences, can offer more profound and comprehensive explanations. It can be said that the theory of intergovernmentalism is more appropriate for analyzing the EU policy toward North Korea than the NPE.

However, this thesis has several limitations. First, the research heavily relied on official documents. Official documents contained the official positions and strategies of the EU and its member states, but policy negotiation processes within the EU and the UNSC were not revealed. Two politicians' memoirs were used in the research, but they were not sufficient to fully identify the decision-making processes and the positions of each state. Second, in the process of analyzing EU member states' national interests, this research simplified actors, focusing on France and the United Kingdom. This was due to the limitation of data access and the language barrier. However, this simplicity failed to generate a more comprehensive understanding of member states' national preferences. Lastly, the time frame became an obstacle. As this research covered almost three decades, it was almost impossible to cover all events with regards to North Korea's nuclear activities. Thus, this thesis focused only on major events and activities that significantly impacted the EU and the international community, which could lessen the comprehensiveness of this work. Future research should consider these limitations for a more comprehensive analysis. Gathering data in different ways, such as interviews with officers of the EU and its member states, will help better understand the national interests of member states and the inter-state negotiation processes within the EU. Also, it is suggested to analyze this time frame with different research methodologies and address more member states specifically, which will contribute to in-depth analyses.

Bibliography

- Acharya, A. (2004) Regional Security Arrangements in a Multipolar World: The EU's Contribution. In: M. Ortega ed. *Global Views on the European Union*. Paris: Chaillot, pp. 93–102.
- Adebahr, C. (2014) EU–Iran Relations: A Strategic Assessment. Available at: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/06/23/eu-iran-relations-strategic-assessment-pub-55984> [Accessed April 6, 2021].
- Aggestam, L. (2004) Role identity and the Europeanisation of foreign policy: a political-cultural approach, In: B. Tonra and T. Christiansen eds. *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp.81–98.
- Agreement Between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (2001).
- Agreement Between the European Union and the Republic of Korea establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Korea in European Union crisis management operation (2014). Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/framework_agreement_on_rok_participation_to_eu_crisis_management_operations_0.pdf [Accessed September 3, 2021].
- Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1994). Available at: <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1994/infcirc457.pdf> [Accessed August 25, 2021].
- Albert, E. (2020) *North Korea's Military Capabilities*. Council on Foreign Relations, Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/background/north-koreas-military-capabilities> [Accessed August 31, 2021].
- Alexandrova, I. (2019) The European Union's Policy Toward North Korea: Abandoning Engagement, *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, 28(1), 2019, pp. 33–62.
- Allen, D. (2012). The Common Foreign and Security Policy. In: E. Jones, A. Menon, and S. Weatherhill eds. *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 643–58.
- Álvarez-Verdugo, M. (2006) Mixing Tools against Proliferation: The EU's Strategy for Dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11(3), pp. 417–438
- Anderson, A. B. (2018) U.S. Coercive Diplomacy towards North Korea: Rocky Road to Singapore. *The Sigma Iota Rho Journal of International Relations*. Available at: <http://www.sirjournal.org/research/2018/10/11/us-coercive-diplomacy-towards-north-korea-rocky-road-to-singapore> [Accessed October 22, 2021].
- Andreatta, F. (2011), Theory and the European Union's International Relations. In: C. Hill and M. Smith, eds. *International Relations and the European Union*. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 18–38.
- Andreatta, F. and Zamberardi, L. (2017) The European Union as a Power. In: C. Hill and M.

- Smith, eds. *International Relations and the European Union*. 3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 73–93.
- AP Archive (2015) *Solana comments on NATO rift* [video] Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XLjwbwGF5Vw> [Accessed September 9, 2021].
- Arms Control Association (2020) *Chronology of U.S.–North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy*. Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron> [Accessed August 15, 2021].
- Arms Control Association (2021) *Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran*. Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran> [Accessed November 26, 2021].
- Arms Control Association (n.d.) *Bush Labels North Korea, Iran, Iraq an 'Axis of Evil'*. Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-03/press-releases/bush-labels-north-korea-iran-iraq-axis-evil> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- Ballbach, E. (2019) *The end of Critical Engagement: on the failures of the EU's North Korea strategy*. Elcano Royal Institute. Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/a-ri101-2019-ballbach-the-end-of-critical-engagement-on-failures-of-eus-north-korea-strategy [Accessed November 27, 2021].
- BBC News* (2002a) Bush holds talks with Chirac. May 26. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/05/26/france.bush/index.html> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- BBC News* (2002b) EU's Patten criticises US foreign policy. February 9. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1810615.stm> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- BBC News* (2003a) Dominique de Villepin against war. March 2. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/breakfast_with_frost/2812811.stm [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- BBC News* (2003b) N Korea nuclear crisis: World reaction. March 10. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2644839.stm> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- BBC News* (2003c) US and EU 'must not be rivals'. March 25. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2885169.stm [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Bendini, R. (2009) *The EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement*. Policy Briefing for European Parliament. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/inta/dv/792/792791/792791en.pdf [Accessed September 2, 2021].
- Benard, A. and Leaf, P. J. (2010) Modern Threats and the United Nations Security Council: No Time for Complacency. *Law Review*. 62(5), pp. 1395–1443.
- Berglee, R. (2012) *World Regional Geography: People, Places and Globalization*. Boston: FlatWorld.
- Bergmann, J. and Niemann, A. (2011), Theories of European Integration. In: K. Jorgensen., ed.

- The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy*. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 166–183.
- Berkofsky, A. (2003) *EU's policy towards the DPRK: engagement or standstill?*. European Institute for Asian Studies. Available at: <https://www.nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/eudprkstandstill.pdf> [Accessed November 27, 2021].
- Berkofsky, A. (2010) The EU's Relations with China, Japan and North Korea. Implications for the EU's role and Engagement in Asian Security. *ISPI*, 36, pp.1–27
- Bickenrton, C. J., Hodson, D. and Puetter, U. (2015) The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post–Maastricht Era. *Journal of Common market studies*, 53(4), pp. 703–722.
- Blair, T. (2002) *Speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library*. Crawford. April 7. Available at: <https://www.google.com/search?q=Speech+at+the+George+Bush+Senior+Presidential+Library%2C+Crawford%2C+2002+Tony+Blair&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- Blank, S. (2011) Rethinking the Six–Party Process on Korea. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, 20(1), pp. 88–122.
- Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., and Portela, C. (2015) Introduction. In: S. Blavoukos, D. Bourantonis, and C. Portela, eds. *The EU and the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3–11.
- Blavoukos, S. (2015) Capturing the EU's International Performance: An Analytical Framework. In: S. Blavoukos, D. Bourantonis, and C. Portela, eds. *The EU and the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 12–30.
- Bleek, P. C. (n.d.) *Nuclear Posture Review Leaks; Outlines Targets*. Contingencies. Arms Control Association. Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-04/press-releases/nuclear-posture-review-leaks-outlines-targets-contingencies> [Accessed August 15, 2021].
- Blockmans, S. and Viaud, A. (2017) *EU Diplomacy and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Staying power?* Centre for European Policy Studies. Available at: <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/eu-diplomacy-and-iran-nuclear-deal-staying-power/> [Accessed February 22, 2021].
- Bluth, C. and Winn, N. (2013) The European Union and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Collective Security, Confidence-building and Arms Control. In A. Marx, J. Wouters, W. Moon, Y. Rhee, S. Park and M. Burnay, eds. *EU-UK Relations in a Changing World*, Leuven: Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, pp. 289–304.
- Bogdandy, A. V. (2000) The European union as a human rights organization? Human rights and the core of the European union. *Common Market Law Review*, 37(6), pp. 1307–1338.
- Bolton, J. (2003) *Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles*. Remarks at Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting. Available at: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801.htm> [Accessed October 12, 2021].
- Bolton, J. (2007) *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations*. New

- York: Threshold Editions.
- Bomberg, E. and Stubb, A. (2003) *European Union: How Does it Work?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bondaz, A. (2020) *From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for The North Korean Proliferation Crisis*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/critical-engagement-credible-commitments-renewed-eu-strategy-north-korean-proliferation-crisis> [Accessed November 27, 2021].
- Bowen, G. A. (2009) Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9(2), 27–40.
- Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (2006) *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Brockmann, K. (2020) *European Union sanctions on North Korea: Balancing non-proliferation with the humanitarian impact*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-background/2020/european-union-sanctions-north-korea-balancing-non-proliferation-humanitarian-impact> [Accessed October 21, 2021].
- Brush, H. (2002) Giving Thanks for Freedom, *CBS News*, May 28. Available at: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/giving-thanks-for-freedom/> [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Bull, H. (1982) Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 21(2), pp. 149–170.
- Bulmer, S., Parker, O. Bache, I., George, S. and Burns, C. (2020) *Politics in the European Union*. Fifth Edition Oxford: Oxford press.
- Burghart, S., Park, D., and Zakharova, L. (2019) The DPRK's economic exchanges with Russia and the EU since 2000: an analysis of institutional effects and the case of the Russian Far East. *Asia Europe Journal*, 18(3), pp. 281–303.
- Bush, G. W. (2002) 2002 State of the Union Address, Washington D. C., January 29. Available at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> [Accessed October 14, 2021].
- Buszynski, L. (2009) Russia and North Korea: Dilemmas and Interests, *Asian Survey*, 49(5), pp. 809–830.
- Calder, K. E. (2012) *The New Continentalism: Energy and Twenty-First-Century Eurasian Geopolitics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Cameron, F. (2013) EU-Korea Cooperation: A Catalyst for Strengthening Global Governance in the Post-Crisis Era? In R. Youngs, ed. *A New Context for EU–Korean Relations*, Madrid, FRIDE and Korea Foundation.
- Carrel-billiard, F. and Wing, C. (2010) *North Korea and the NPT, Nuclear Energy, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament*. International Peace Institute, pp. 28–32.

- Cha, V. and Katz, K. (2018) The Right Way to Coerce North Korea—Ending the Threat Without Going to War. *Foreign Affairs*, 97(3), pp. 87–102.
- Chaban, N., Kelly, S. and Bain, J. (2009) European Commission Delegation and EU Public Policy: Stakeholders’ Perceptions from the Asia–Pacific. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 14, pp. 271–288.
- Checkel, J. T. (2005) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. *International Organization*, 59(4), pp.801–826
- Chirac, J. (2012) *My Life in Politics*. 5th edn. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Choe, S. (2009) South Korea Says Freighter from North Turns Back. *The New York Times*, July 6. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/world/asia/07korea.html> [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Choi, J. (2010) EUui jeonryakjeok dongbanja gwangye guchuk hyeonhwanggwa han-EU gwangye (Strategic Partnership of the European Union and the Korea-EU Relationship) *Yureobyeongu*, 28(3) pp. 55–78.
- Choi, J. and Kim, S. (2016) Gachiui guhyeongwa iigui silhyeon: ‘gyubeomjeok yureop’ gwa bukhaek munje (Fulfillment of Values and Realization of Interests: “Normative Europe” on North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program) *Gukjegwangyeyeongu*, 21(1), pp. 65–94.
- Chung, S. W. and Lee, J. (2019) Building the pillars of the EU–South Korea strategic partnership, *Asia Europe Journal*, 17(3), pp. 327–340.
- Chyba, C. F., Braun, C., and Bunn, G. (2007) New Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime, In: G. Bunn and C. F. Chyba, eds. *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy Confronting Today's Threats*. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Cini, M. (2010) Intergovernmentalism, In: M. Cini, and B, Nieves, eds. *European Union Politics*, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.86–103.
- Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union* (2008) OJ, C115/13. May 9, Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12008M/TXT> [Accessed July 13, 2021].
- Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* (2012) OJ 326, October 26. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=cel ex%3A12012E%2FTXT> [Accessed September 1, 2021].
- Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008). *Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory*. 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Cottey, A. (2014) The EU's Non–proliferation Strategy Ten Years On. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 19(1), pp.45–63.
- Council on Foreign Relations (2021) *North Korean Nuclear Negotiations 1985 – 2019*. Available at: <https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/> [Accessed August 10, 2021].
- Countryeconomy.com (n.d.) *South Korea GDP – Gross Domestic Product 2007*. Available at: <https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/south-korea?year=2007#:~:text=The%20GDP%20fig>

- ure%20in%202007,195%20countries%20that%20we%20publish. [Accessed September 3, 2021].
- Crawford, N. C. and Klots, A. (1999) How Sanctions Work: A Framework for Analysis. In: N. C. Crawford, and A. Klots eds. *How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 25–42.
- Cremona, M. (2015) *Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty – Improving Functioning of the EU*. European Parliament. Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/92843/AFCO%20briefing%20Lisbon%20Treaty%20CFSP.PDF> [Accessed September 2, 2021].
- Cronberg, T. (2017a) No EU, no Iran deal: the EU’s choice between multilateralism and the transatlantic link. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 24(3–4), pp. 243–259.
- Cronberg, T. (2017b) *Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran: Inside EU Negotiations*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Crossette, B. (1999) Korean Famine Toll: More Than 2 Million, *The New York Times*, 20 August. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/20/world/korean-famine-toll-more-than-2-million.html> [Accessed August 22, 2021].
- Davenport, K. (2020) *The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) At a Glance*. Arms Control Association. Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI> [Accessed October 21, 2021].
- Declaration on the Advancement of South–North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity (2007) Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KP%20KR_071004_Declaration%20on%20Advancement%20of%20South-North%20Korean%20Relations.pdf [Accessed August 29, 2021].
- Dee, M. (2015) The European Union and Its Performance in the NPT Negotiations: Consistency, Change, and Challenges. In: S. Blavoukos, D. Bourantonis, and C. Portela, eds. *The EU and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 77–94.
- Dehousse, F. (1998) After Amsterdam: a report on the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 9(3) pp. 525–539.
- Dehshiri, M. R. and Shahmoradi, H. (2019) The EU’s Role in Korean Peninsula Stability: Secondary but Important, *Global Asia*, 14(4). Available at: https://www.globalasia.org/v14no4/feature/the-eus-role-in-korean-peninsula-stability-secondary-but-important_mohammad-reza-dehshirihosseini-shahmoradi [Accessed April 8, 2021].
- Des Courières, C. B. (2017) Between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in the European union’s foreign policy: A principal-agent approach of the sanction policy in the CFSP framework, *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, 2017(43), pp. 9–34.
- Dieckhoff, A. (1988) Europe and the Arab World: The Difficult Dialogue. In: I. Greilsammer. and J. H. H. Weiler., eds. *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours*. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 255–282.
- Diez, T. (2005) Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power

- Europe. *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 33(3), pp. 613–636.
- Diez, T. and Pace, M. (2011) Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation. In: R. Whiteman, ed. *Normative Power Europe*. London: Springer Link, pp. 210–225.
- Doh, J. W. (2012) The EU's Participation in KEDO: Causes of the Involvement, Evaluation and Implication. *East and West Studies*, 24(2), pp. 1–28.
- Dryburgh, L. (2008) The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran, *European Security*, 17(2/3), pp. 253–271.
- Duchêne, F. (1973) The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence', In: M. Kohnstamm, and W. Hager, ed. *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 1–21.
- Duchêne, F. (1994) *Jean Monnet: the first statesman of interdependence*. New York: Norton.
- Duke, S. (2008) The Lisbon Treaty and External Relations, *EIPASCOPE*, 1, pp. 13–18. Available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/11042/1/20080509183907_SCOPE2008-1-3_SimonDuke.pdf [Accessed: July 19, 2021].
- Duke, S. (2009) Providing for European-Level Diplomacy after Lisbon: The Case of the European External Action Service, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 4(2), pp. 211–233.
- Dunne, A. (2013) *The Proliferation Security Initiative: Legal Considerations and Operational Realities*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIIPP36.pdf> [Accessed October 12, 2021].
- Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part* (2000) *Official Journal L 276*, Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A22000A1028%2801%29> [Accessed October 22, 2021].
- Ensor, D. (2002) U.S. has photos of secret Iran nuclear sites, *CNN*, December 13. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/12/12/iran.nuclear/> [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Esteban, M. (2019) *The EU's role in stabilising the Korean Peninsula – Elcano*. Real Instituto Elcano. Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/asia-pacifico/wp1-2018-este-ban-eu-role-stabilising-korean-peninsula [Accessed September 26, 2021].
- EURACTIV* (2017) Germany, France, Italy seek tougher EU sanctions on North Korea. September 4. Available at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-policy/news/germany-france-italy-seek-tougher-eu-sanctions-on-north-korea/> [Accessed October 22, 2021].
- European Commission (1991) *Revision of the Treaties: A Historical Outline*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_91_6 [Accessed July 19, 2021].

- European Commission (1994) Towards a New Asia strategy. COM(94) 314, August 13. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51994DC0314&from=EN> [Accessed August 18, 2021].
- European Commission (1997) *European Union joins North Korean nuclear security body*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_97_428 [Accessed 25 August 2021].
- European Commission (1998) Agreement on terms and conditions of the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation. *OJ*, L70/10, March 10. Available at: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/aac75b2e-8486-410c-8c46-d87fb3bc4122> (Accessed August 26, 2021).
- European Commission (2001a) *EU policy on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) – Supporting international efforts to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_01_159 [Accessed October 20, 2021].
- European Commission (2001b) *The EC – Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Country Strategy Paper 2001 – 2004*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/ec-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-dprk-country-strategy> [Accessed August 18, 2021].
- European Commission (2002) *Conclusion of the 2464th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting*, November 19. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_02_351 [Accessed September 6, 2021].
- European Commission (2003) *Summary of the treaty of Nice*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_03_23 [Accessed September 2, 2021].
- European Commission (2006a) Europe in the World — Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, COM(2006) 278, June 8. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/councils/bx20060615/euw_com06_278_en.pdf [Accessed August 11, 2021].
- European Commission (2006b) *Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP condemns nuclear test by North Korea*. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/declarations/91241.pdf [Accessed September 7, 2021].
- European Commission (2018) *EU–Republic of Korea Summit: building on a well-established partnership*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6146 [Accessed September 3, 2021].
- European Community (1998) *European political Cooperation (EPC), Office for Official Publications of the European Communities*. Available at: <http://aei.pitt.edu/45409/1/European.Political.Cooperation.pdf> [Accessed August 10, 2021].
- European Community (2000) Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation

- Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part. *OJ*, L276, October 28. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A22000A1028%2801%29> [Accessed July 15, 2021].
- European Council (1990) *Presidency Conclusions of Dublin European Council*. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20562/1990_june_-_dublin_eng.pdf [Accessed September 11, 2021].
- European Council (1991) *Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_91_2 [Accessed: August 11, 2021].
- European Council (1992) *Presidency Conclusions of Lisbon European Council*. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20510/1992_june_-_lisbon_eng.pdf [Accessed: August 11, 2021].
- European Council (1993) *Presidency Conclusions of Copenhagen European Council*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf> [Accessed July 19, 2021].
- European Council (1994a) Setting up a Community Regime for the Control of Exports of Dual-use Goods. *OJ*. EC 3381/94. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31994R3381&from=en> [Accessed November 27, 2021].
- European Council (1994b) *Presidency Conclusions of Corfu European Council*. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/cor1_en.htm [Accessed: August 25, 2021].
- European Council (1999a) *Presidency Conclusions of Cologne European Council*. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol1_en.htm [Accessed July 28, 2021].
- European Council (1999b) Resolution on relations between the European Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. *OJ*, C177, June 22. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A51999IP0326&qid=1629719352877> [Accessed August 23, 2021].
- European Council (1999c) 2198th Council Meeting General Affairs. *OJ*. 10135/99. Available at: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10135-1999-INIT/en/pdf> [Accessed August 18, 2021].
- European Council (2000) 2308th Council Meeting General Affairs. *OJ*. 13430/00. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_00_435 [Accessed August 18, 2021].
- European Council (2003a) *Presidency Conclusions of Brussels European Council*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20825/78364.pdf> [Accessed July 28, 2021].
- European Council (2003b) European Security Strategy. *OJ*. 15895/03 Available at: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15895-2003-INIT/en/pdf> [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- European Council (2003c) EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

- OJ.* 15708/03. Available at: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2015708%202003%20INIT/EN/pdf>.
- European Council (2003d) *Presidency Conclusions of Thessaloniki European Council*. Available at: <https://www.iranwatch.org/library/international-organization/european-union-eu/presidency-conclusions-thessaloniki-european-council> [Accessed April 8, 2021].
- European Council (2004a) *Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)*. Available: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10198-2004-EV-1/en/pdf> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- European Council (2004b) *Presidency Conclusions of Brussels European Council*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20825/78364.pdf> [Accessed September 7, 2021].
- European Council (2005) *EU-U.S. Joint Programme of Work on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Available at: <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/documents/2005-0620%20EU-US%20prog.pdf> [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- European Council (2006) *Conclusion of the 2756th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_265 [Accessed September 7, 2021].
- European Council (2007) Sixth-monthly report on the implementation of the European Union Strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. *OJ.* C 298/1, December 11. Available at: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021XG0726\(01\)&rid=6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021XG0726(01)&rid=6) [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- European Council (2008) *Council Conclusions and new lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems*, Available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17172.en08.pdf>. [Accessed June 11, 2021].
- European Council (2009a) Council Regulation (EU) 1283/2009 of 22 December amending Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. *OJ.* L346, December 23. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009R1283&from=EN> [Accessed September 13, 2021].
- European Council (2009b) *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*. European Union. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf> [Accessed September 13, 2021].
- European Council (2009c) *Rules of Procedure of the European Council*. Available at: https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/default/files/docs/body/rules_of_procedure_of_the_council_en.pdf [Accessed October 19, 2021].
- European Council (2012) *Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia*. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf [Accessed September 9, 2021].

- European Council (2013) Council Regulation (EU) 296/2013 of 26 March 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. *OJ. L 90*. March 28. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:090:0004:0009:EN:PDF> [Accessed September 13, 2021].
- European Council (2016a) *North Korea: EU adds 18 persons and one entity to sanction list*. Available at : <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/19/north-korea-eu-adds-new-persons-to-list/> [Accessed September 13, 2021].
- European Council (2016b) *North Korea: EU adopts new restrictions on trade, financial services, investment and transport*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/27/dprk-new-restrictions/> [Accessed September 13, 2021].
- European Council (2017) *North Korea: EU adopts new sanctions*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/16/north-korea-sanctions/> [Accessed September 13, 2021].
- European Council (2018) *North Korea: EU sanctions 17 DPRK nationals involved in activities aimed at evading sanctions*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/01/22/north-korea-eu-sanctions-17-dprk-nationals-involved-in-activities-aimed-at-evading-sanctions/> [Accessed September 13, 2021].
- European Council (2019) *Different types of sanctions*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/different-types/> [Accessed November 22, 2021].
- European Council (2020) *Sanction: how and when the EU adopts restrictive measures*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/> [Accessed September 29, 2021].
- European Council (n.d.) *EU restrictive measures against North Korea*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/> [Accessed September 8, 2021].
- European External Action Service (2015) *EU–DPRK Political Dialogue – 14th Session*. Available at : https://eeas.europa.eu/generic-warning-system-taxonomy/404_en/6336/EU-DPRK%20Political%20Dialogue%20%E2%80%93%2014th%20Session [Accessed September 10, 2021].
- European External Action Service (2016a) *Fact Sheet: EU–Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) relations*. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/factsheets/docs/eu-dprk_factsheet_en.pdf [Accessed September 9, 2021].
- European External Action Service (2016b) *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf [Accessed September 10, 2021].
- European External Action Service (2017) *Remarks upon arrival by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the Informal Defence and Foreign Ministers meetings*. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/31756/node/31756_th

- [Accessed September 13, 2021].
- European External Action Service (2018) *EU–Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Relations*. Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/8899/EU–Democratic%20People’s%20Republic%20of%20Korea%20\(DPRK\)%20relations](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/8899/EU–Democratic%20People’s%20Republic%20of%20Korea%20(DPRK)%20relations) [Accessed August 23, 2021].
- European Parliament (2001a) *Minutes of the session of the European Parliament adjourned on Thursday, May 17*. Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20010530+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN#creitem1> [Accessed August 23, 2021].
- European Parliament (2001b) *European Parliament resolution on the outcome of the Council and Commission mission to Korea*. Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2001-0307+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> [Accessed September 23, 2021].
- European Parliament (2006) *MEPs condemn North Korean nuclear test in debate with Solana*. Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20061010IPR11533+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> [Accessed September 7, 2021].
- European Parliament (2020) *Nuclear arms control regimes: state of play and perspectives, Policy Department for External Relations*. Available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603496/EXPO_IDA\(2020\)603496_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603496/EXPO_IDA(2020)603496_EN.pdf) [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- European Parliament (n.d.) *History of the Delegation for relations with the Korean Peninsula (DKOR)*. Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/dkor/about/history> [Accessed September 8, 2021].
- European Union (2007) *Declarations Annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference Which Adopted the Treaty of Lisbon*. OJ C326, December 13. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_5&format=PDF [Accessed September 2, 2021].
- European Union (2011) *Official Journal of the European Union*, OJ. L 127, May 14. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2011%3A127%3ATOC> [Accessed September 2, 2021].
- Fitzpatrick, M. (2006) *Iran and North Korea: The proliferation Nexus*, *Survival*, 48(1), pp. 61–80.
- Flake, G. L. (1995) *DPRK Briefing Book: International Economic Linkages of North Korea*, Nautilus Institute. Available at: <https://nautilus.org/publications/books/dprkbb/economy/dprk-briefing-book-international-economic-linkages-of-north-korea/> [Accessed 24 August 2021].
- Flockhart, T. (2004) *Trans-Atlantic Relations After the War in Iraq: Returning to – or Departing From – ‘Normal Politics’?* *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 5 (3), pp. 395–417.

- Flournoy, M. A., Smith, J., Ben-Ari, G., McInnis, K and Scruggs, D. (2005) *European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/051001_edi_report_.pdf [Accessed November 25, 2021].
- Finger, A. (2012) Europe and Global Zero. *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, 30, pp. 59–76.
- Foreign Affairs Committee (2009) *Global Security: UK–US Relations*. House of Commons. Available at: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114.pdf> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- Foreign Ministry of North Korea (2002) The full text of the statement of foreign ministry spokesman. March 14. Available at: <https://www.hankyung.com/politics/article/2002031439838> [Accessed August 15, 2021].
- Foreign Ministry of North Korea (2002) The Full text of the Statement of Foreign Ministry Spokesman. April 11. Available at: <https://www.kcna.co.jp> [Accessed August 15, 2021].
- Forti, D. (2018) *European Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward*. International Peace Institute. Available at: <https://www.ipinst.org/2018/08/european-contributions-to-un-peacekeeping-operations> [Accessed March 26, 2021].
- Foster-Carter (2021) Unhappy anniversary: Recalling the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, *NK News*, June 15. Available at: <https://www.nknews.org/2021/06/unhappy-anniversary-recalling-the-june-2000-inter-korean-summit/> [Accessed August 24, 2021].
- Framework Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other (2016). Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/korea_south/docs/framework_agreement_final_en.pdf [Accessed September 3, 2021].
- France 24 (2019) Chirac: an affable leader who said 'Non' to Iraq war, September 26. Available at: <https://www.france24.com/en/20190926-chirac-an-affable-leader-who-said-non-to-iraq-war> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- Frank, R. (2002) EU – North Korean Relations: No Effort without Reason, *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, 11(2), pp. 87–119.
- Friedman, U. (2017) *North Korea Says It Has 'Completed' Its Nuclear Program*, *The Atlantic*. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/north-korea-nuclear/547019/> [Accessed August 30, 2021].
- Friesen, K. (2007). The effects of the Madrid and London subway bombings on Europe's view of terrorism. *Review Digest: Human Rights & The War on Terror*. Available at: https://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/terror/europe_2007.pdf [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- Ford, G. and Kwon, S. (2005) Can Europe Help Break the North Korea Impasse?. *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 3(3). Available at: <https://apjjf.org/-Glyn-Ford/2090/article.html> [Accessed

October 21, 2021]

- Gaertner, H. (2014) North Korea, deterrence, and engagement. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 30(4), pp. 336–345.
- Gégout, C. (2002) The quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Fur–US Directoire at the Heart of the European Union's Foreign Policy Decision–making Process. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), pp. 331–44.
- George, A. and Bennett, A. (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- German Federal Foreign Office (n.d.) *The development of the CFSP*, Available at: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228306> [Accessed August 12, 2021].
- Gerring, J. (2007). *Case study research: Principles and practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gerring, J. (2011) The case study: What it is and what it does. In: R. Goodin, ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1133–1165.
- Ginsberg, R. H. and Eizenstat. S. E. (2001) *the European Union in International Politics*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Go, J.–H. (2018) EU's Normative Power and the Engagement Policy toward DPRK, *Yureobyeongu*, 50, pp. 31–71.
- Gordon, P. H. (2003) *The Crisis in the Alliance*, the Brookings Institution. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/> [Accessed 20 October 2021].
- Grand, C. (2000) *The European Union and the Non–proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Grip, L. (2011) *Mapping the European Union's institutional actors related to WMD non–proliferation*. EU Non–Proliferation Consortium. Available at: <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html> [Accessed: April 6, 2021].
- Haas, E. B. (1976), Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration. *International Organization*, 30(2), pp. 173–212.
- Harrison, L. (2001) *Political Research: An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Harrison, J. (2013) *European Union and South Korea*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Hautecouverture, B. (2020) *A look back on KEDO: the European involvement*. Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégie. Available at: www.frstrategie.org [Accessed August 27, 2021].
- Helwig, N. and Stroß, S. (2011), The Setup of the European External Action Service Inexplicable by Grand Theories of European Integration?. In: A. Boening, L. D. Romero, P. G. del Miño, N. Helwig, K. Lannoo, Simon Stroß, C. Törő, J. A. Yañez–Barnuevo, and B. Yilmaz, eds. *The EU as a Global Player*. Madrid: CEU Ediciones, pp. 9–20.

- Hewitt, G. (2016) US–UK: Strains on a special relationship. *The British Broadcasting Corporation*, April 20. Available: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-36084672> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- Hibbs, M. (1994) Germany, Siemens Mulling Role in Implementing U.S.–DPRK Deal, *Nucleonics Week*, 35(50), pp. 9–10.
- Hill, C. (1993) The Capability–Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(3), pp. 305–328.
- Hill, C. (2004) Renationalizing or regrouping? EU foreign policy since 11 September 2001, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(1), pp. 143–63.
- Hill, C. and Smith, M. (2011) *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford: OUP Oxford.
- Hindustan Times* (2007) EU delegation in North Korea for nuclear talks, March 6. Available at: <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/eu-delegation-in-north-korea-for-nuclear-talks/story-OCRTNcOEw9803I2mvAePUL.html> [Accesses September 8, 2021].
- Hix, S., and Høyland, B. (2011). *The Political System of the European Union*, 3rd edition. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hodder, I. (2000). The interpretation of documents and material culture. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research*. 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage pp. 703–715.
- Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation–state and the case of Western Europe. *Daedalus*, 95, pp. 862–916.
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2019) Grand theories of European integration in the twenty–first century. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(8), pp. 1113–1133.
- House of Commons (2008) *Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, the House of Commons*. London. Available at: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmcaff/120/120.pdf> [Accessed September 1, 2021].
- Huber, E. and Dion, M. (2002) Revolution or Contribution? Rational Choice Approaches in the Study of Latin America Politics. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 44(3), pp. 1–28.
- Hurd, E. (2006) Negotiating Europe: the politics of religion and the prospects for Turkish accession, *Review of International Studies*, 32(3), pp. 401–418.
- Husenícova, L. (2018) US. Foreign Policy Towards North Korea, *International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal*, 22, pp. 65–84.
- Hyde–Price, A. (2006) “Normative” power Europe: a realist critique, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), pp. 217–234.
- Hyett, N., Kenny, A. and Dickson–Swift, V. (2014) Methodology or method? A critical review of qualitative case study reports, *International Journal of Qualitative Studies on Health and Well–being*, 9, pp. 1–12.

- Institute for Unification Education (2016) *Understanding North Korea 2014: Totalitarian dictatorship, Highly centralized economies, Grand Socialist Family*. Seoul: Ministry of Unification, Institute for Unification Education.
- International Atomic Energy Agency (1993) *Report by the director general of the international atomic energy agency on behalf of the board of governors to all members of the agency on the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*. Available at: <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1993/infcirc419.pdf> [Accessed August 15, 2021].
- International Atomic Energy Agency (n.d.) *IAEA and DPRK: Chronology of Key Events*. Available at: <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/chronology-of-key-events> [Accessed August 14, 2021].
- Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003) *Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers*. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20071203230302/http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Iran Watch (2005) *Bilateral Trade Relations with Iran*. Available at: <https://www.iranwatch.org/library/international-organization/european-union-eu/bilateral-trade-relations-iran> [Accessed November 26, 2021].
- Jakobsen, P. V. (2009) Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47(1), pp. 81–102.
- Jasper, U. and Portela, C. (2010) EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons: A Common Deterrent for Europe?. *Security Dialogue*, 41(2), pp. 145-168.
- Jeffries, I. (2009) *Contemporary North Korea—A guide to economic political development*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Johansseon–Noues, E. (2014) *The European Union's external representation after Lisbon: from 'hydra-headed' to 'octopus'?*, EU–RSCAS Working papers. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272241932_The_European_Union's_External_Representation_after_Lisbon_From_'Hydra-Headed'_to_'Octopus' [Accessed November 27, 2021].
- Johnson, M. W., Christensen, C. C. and Kagermann, H. (2008) Reinventing Your Business Model. *Harvard Business Review*, 87(12), pp. 52–60.
- Joo, S. and Kwak, T. (2007) *North Korea's Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Security*, Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing
- Jun, H (2016) *EU Jejae Jungchake Hyunhwanggwwa Sisajum* (EU sanctions policy and implications). Korean National Diplomatic Academy. Available at: <http://knsi.org/knsi/> [Accessed October 19, 2021].
- Jung, I (2018) Bukhanui Dae Yureopjeongchaek: Jeonryakgwa Gimjeongeun Sidaeu Hamui (North Korea's National Policy Toward Europe – Its Strategies and Limitations). *Journal of*

- Ataeyeongu*, 25(2) pp. 5–30.
- Jung, K (1999) *Bukhanoegyoui Eojewa Oneul* (North Korean diplomacy – Yesterday and Today), Seoul: Ilsinsa.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (1997) Identities, Interests and Security: American–European Security Relations, *American Studies*. 42(1). pp. 25–34.
- Kelly, R. (2011) Korea–European Union relations: beyond the FTA?. *International Relations of the Asia–Pacific*, 12, pp.101–132.
- Keohane, R. and Hoffman, S. (1991) Institutional change in Europe in 1980s. In: R. O. Keohane, S. Hoffmann (eds) *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1–40.
- Keohane, R. and Hoffman, S. (1993). Conclusion: Structure, Strategy, and Institutional Roles. In: R. Keohane, J. Nye, and S. Hoffman eds. *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989 – 1991*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, pp 381–404.
- Kerr, P. (2005) *Exiles and Iran Intel. Arms Control Wonk*. Available at: <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/600517/exiles-and-iran-intel/> [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Kerr, P. (n.d.) *KEDO Suspends Construction of Nuclear Reactors*. Arms Control Association. Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-12/press-releases/kedo-suspends-construction-nuclear-reactors> [Accessed September 9, 2021].
- Kershaw, I. (2019) *Roller–Coaster: Europe, 1950–2017*. London: Penguin UK.
- Kessler, G. (2005) N. Korea Says It Is Committed to Talks. June 7, *The Washington Post*. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/06/07/n-korea-says-it-is-committed-to-talks/7770de98-b2ac-4740-b129-0da17d3441fe/> [Accessed August 16, 2021].
- Khoo, N. (2019) Retooling great power non–proliferation theory: Explaining China’s North Korea nuclear weapons policy, *The Pacific Review*, pp. 1–24.
- Kim, B. (2016) North Korea’s Siege Mentality: A Socio–political Analysis of the Kim Jong–Un Regime’s Foreign Policies. *Asian Perspective*. 40 (2): 223–43.
- Kim, G. (2011) Cooperation of Foreign and Security Policy: Search for the Autonomy and Identity, and Its Limitation, *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies*, 27(2), pp. 169–197.
- Kim, H. (2001) *Bukhan Dogil Sugyoui Baegyeonggwa EU Gukgadeurui Hanbando Jeongchaek Jeonmang* (The background of establishing diplomatic relations between North Korea and Germany and the prospects of European policy on the Korean Peninsula). Korea Institute for National Unification. Available at: <https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/547/1/0000595845.pdf> [Accessed August 18, 2021].
- Kim, H. (2006) The EU–North Korea Relations and the Peace–Building Process Between

- South and North Korea, *Korean Journal of Political Science*, 14(2), pp. 291–326.
- Kim, J. and Hundt, D. (2011) US Policy Toward Rogue States: Comparing the Bush Administration's Policy Toward Iraq and North Korea', *Asian Perspective*, 35(2), pp. 239–257.
- Kim, J. S. (2007) Normative Power and the European Union: A New Actor in World Politics?, *Journal of International Area Studies*, 16(2), pp. 1–29.
- Kim, J. U. (2018) 2018 New Year's Address. Available at: <https://www.ncnk.org/node/1427> [Accessed August 31, 2021].
- Kim, J.-U. (2019) China's quarter-century struggle with a nuclear North Korea with a focus on its strategic calculation, *Asian Education and Development Studies*, 8(3), pp. 319–327.
- Kim, M.-S. (2011) Review on the Correlation of Helsinki Process and Six-Party Talks from Legal Perspective, *The Korean Society of International Law*, 56(2), pp. 11–46.
- Kim, M. and Choi, J. (2020) What kind of power is the EU? The EU's policies toward North Korea's WMD programs and the debate about the EU's role in the security arena, *Asia Europe Journal*, 18, pp. 1–16.
- Kim, M. and Herskovitz, J. (2009) North Korea begins extracting plutonium, *Reuters*, April 25, 2009. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-idUSSEO30413320090425> [Accessed August 29, 2021].
- Kim, S. (2005) Yureobyeonhapui Sin Daebuk Hyeopryeokjeongchaek : EUjiphaengwiwonhoe Jeonryakbogoseoreul Jungsimeuro(1989-2002) (EU's New Cooperation Policy Towards North Korea: European Commission's Strategy Report (1989–2002)). *Hangukjeongchioegyosanonchong*, 26(2), pp. 29–56.
- Kim, S. (2018) Summit in 2000 made history with big hopes, *Korea JoongAng Daily*, April 25. Available at: <https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3047405> [Accessed August 24, 2021].
- Kim, T. W. (2005) 6jahoedamui Dajajuui Silcheonseong Geomjeunggwa Dajahyeopryeokgijeroui Baljeonbangan (Review on practicability of multilateralism and measures to turn six-party talks into multilateral cooperative organization). *Bukhanyeonguhakhoebo*, 9(2), pp. 1–20.
- Kittrie, O. F. (2007) Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore it. *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 28(2), pp. 337–430.
- Ko, S (2008), Vanguard of European Politics: The Role of Member States in the EU's Foreign Policy toward North Korea. *Journal of International and Area Studies*. 15(1), pp. 47–59.
- Ko, S (2010), Characteristics of the EU policy toward North Korea, In: Academic Conference of Research Group of Global Korean Business and Culture. Gwangju, June 2010.
- Ko, S (2019), EU's Policy toward North Korea: A Normative Realist Explanation. *Journal of Peace and Unification*, 9(1), pp.1-23.

- Kobia, R. (2008) The EU and Non-Proliferation: Need for a Quantum Leap?. *Nuclear Law Bulletin*, 81, pp. 31–53.
- Kocijancic, M. and Kaznowski, A. (2016) *EU–Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) relations*. European Union External Action.
- Kodama, M. (2005) The EU’s Relations with the DPRK : Involvement of the EU and its Implications on the International Politics over the Korean Peninsula, *Yureobyeongu*, 22, pp. 177–207.
- Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (2001) *2001 KEDO Annual Report*. Available at: http://www.kedo.org/annual_reports.asp# [Accessed August 26, 2021].
- Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (2002) *2002 KEDO Annual Report*. Available at: http://www.kedo.org/annual_reports.asp# [Accessed August 26, 2021].
- Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (n.d.) *About Us: Our History*. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Available at: http://www.kedo.org/au_history.asp [Accessed September 9, 2021].
- KOTRA (2021) *2020 North Korea External Trade Trend*.
- Kulesa, L. (2010) Poland and the Proliferation Security Initiative. *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 22(1), pp. 15–28.
- Kutsyuruba, B. (2017) Using Document Analysis Methodology to Explore Educational Reforms and Policy Changes in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: I. Silova, N. W. Sobe, A. Korzh, and S. Kovalchuk ed. *Reimagining Utopias*. Rotterdam: Sense publishers, pp. 199–214.
- Kuo, M. A. (2018) US–North Korea Summit: Short–Term Gain, Long–Term Loss?. *The Diplomat*, June 19. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/us-north-korea-summit-short-term-gain-long-term-loss/> [Accessed September 10, 2021].
- Latici, T. (2021) *Qualified majority voting in foreign and security policy*. European Parliament. Available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/659451/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)659451_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/659451/EPRS_BRI(2021)659451_EN.pdf) [Accessed October 19, 2021].
- Larsen, H. (2004) Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy. In: B. Tonra and T. Christiansen, eds. *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 62–80.
- Leal-Arcas, R. (2007) Theories of Supranationalism in the EU. *The Journal of Law in Society*, 8(1), pp. 88–113.
- Leander, A. (2009) Thinking Tools. In: A. Klotz and D. Prakash, ed. *Qualitative methods in international relations: a pluralist guide*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 11–27.
- Lee, J.–H. (2003) EU seeks to resolve N.Korea nuke crisis. UPI, 12 February. Available at: <https://www.upi.com/Archives/2003/02/12/EU-seeks-to-resolve-NKorea-uke-crisis/341045026000/> [Accessed 9 September 2021].
- Lee, J.–S., (2002) EU’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula", *Korea Social Science* 24.1 (2002): 221–245.

- Lee, J.-S. (2005) The Two Faces of EU–North Korea Relations, *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 17(1), pp. 33–52.
- Lee, J.-S. (2006) Defending the National Interests? Rethinking France and the Iraq War. *Korean Journal of International Studies*, 46(5), pp. 73–94.
- Lee, J.-S. (2007) Explaining the “Axis of Opposition”: Franco–German Coalition during the Iraq War, *Korean Journal of EU Studies*, 12(2), pp. 187–221.
- Lee, J.-S. (2009) The EU’s Economic Cooperation with North Korea: The Possibility as a Useful Tool to Complement Korea–US Cooperation, *International Area Review*, 12(2), pp. 125–149.
- Lee, J.-S. (2010) Between confrontation and cooperation: is there a security role for the European Union on the Korean peninsula? *IP–Global Edition* (5), pp. 45–51.
- Lee, K. (2013) Humanitarian Assistance and the Improvement of Human Rights for North Korea’s Vulnerable People. In: Korea Institute for National Unification, ed. UN Human Rights Mechanisms & Improvement of Human Rights Conditions in North Korea. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification. pp. 321–358.
- Lee, M. (2006) Yureobyeonhabui Daebukjeongchaek: Tonghabironeul Geunganeuro Gochal (The EU's North Korean Policy: A study based on Integration Theories). *Yureobyeongu*, 24, pp.165–185.
- Lee, M. (2012) A Step as Normative Power: the EU’s Human Rights Policy towards North Korea, *Asia Europe Journal*, 10(1), pp. 41–56.
- Lee, M. (2017) *The EU and the Six–Party Talks*. Istituto Affari Internazionali. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09706> [Accessed April 8, 2021].
- Lee, S. (2007) Yureobanbobangwijeongchaegui Hyeongseonggwa NATOui Daeung (Construction of the ESDP and Response of the NATO), *Yureobyeongu*, 25(3), pp. 1–26.
- Lenz, T. (2013) EU Normative Power and Regionalism: Ideational Diffusion and its Limits. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48(2), pp. 211–228.
- Lewis, J. and Tertrais, B. (2015) *US–French Nuclear Cooperation: its Past, Present and Future*. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. Available at: <https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/recherches-et-documents/us-french-nuclear-cooperation-its-past-present-and-future-2015> [Accessed November 25, 2021].
- Lim, E. C. (2009) 6jahoedamui dajajeok jedohwa: chogijogeongwa gyeoljeongyoin (Multilateral Institutionalization of the Six-Party Talks: Initial Conditions and Decisive Factors). *Tongiljeongchaegyongu*, 18(2), pp. 97–123.
- Lodge, J. (1996) The EU: From Civilian Power to Speaking with a Common Voice — The Transition to a CFSP. In: J. Wiener, ed. *The Transatlantic Relationship*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 67–94.
- Manners, I. (2002) Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), pp. 235–258.

- Manners, I. (2008) The Normative Ethics of the European Union, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 84(1), pp. 45–60.
- Manners, I. (2009a) *The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics*. Danish Institute for International Studies. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13211> [Accessed: April 5, 2021].
- Manners, I. (2009b). The EU's Normative Power in Changing World Politics. In A. Gerrits, ed. *Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion*. VH Den Haag: Clingendael Institute, pp. 9–24.
- Manyin, M. E. and Nikitin, M. (2014) *Foreign Assistance to North Korea*, Congressional Research Service, Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pdf> [Accessed August 22, 2021].
- Martin, C. H. (2007) G.W. Bush and North Korea: A Levels of Analysis View, *Pacific Focus*, 22(1), pp. 111–136.
- Marx, A., Wouters, J. Moon, W., Rhee, Y., Park, S., and Burnay, M. (2013) *EU – Korea Relations in a Changing World*, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies. Available at: https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/research_reports/001-eu-korea-executive-summary.pdf [Accessed September 3, 2021].
- Mauil, H. W. (1990) Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers, *Foreign Affairs*, 69(5), pp. 91–106.
- Mauil, H. W. (2005) Europe and the new balance of global order, *International Affairs*, 81(4), pp. 775–799.
- McCloskey-Gholikhany, L. (2019) *EU Foreign Policy Identity: A Case Study on the EU's Engagement of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. College of Europe. Available at: <https://www.tepsa.eu/eu-foreign-policy-identity-a-case-study-on-the-eus-engagement-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-leah-mccloskey-gholikhany-college-of-europe-bruges/> [Accessed October 15, 2021].
- McDonagh, K. (2015) Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk': Understanding the EU's Security Identity. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(3), pp. 627–641.
- Meier, O. (2013) Non-cooperative arms control. In: O. Meier and C. Daase, eds. *Arms Control in the 21st Century*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 39–66.
- Merriam, S. B. (1988). *Case study research in education: A qualitative approach*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Millard, A. S. and Yi, C.-D. (2017) The EU's Potential Role in the Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, 7(2), pp. 247–283.
- Millard, A. S. and Yi, C.-D. (2018) The European Union's common foreign and security policy reforms and its implications for Northeast Asia, *Asia Europe Journal*, 16(4), pp. 375–394.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea (2003) *EU Common Foreign and Security Policy*, Available at: <https://www.mofa.go.kr> [Accessed August 12, 2021].

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea (2020) *Overview of the European Union*. Available at: <https://www.mofa.go.kr> [Accessed September 9, 2021].
- Ministry of Unification of Republic of Korea (2018) 2018nyeon Bukhanihae (Understanding North Korea 2018). Available at: <https://unibook.unikorea.go.kr/board/view?boardId=9&categoryId=&page=&id=201459000&field=searchAll&searchInput=> [Accessed September 9, 2021].
- Minichiello, V. (1990). *In-Depth Interviewing: Researching People*. South Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
- Mix, D. E. (2018) *The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States*. Congressional Research Service. Available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL33105> [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- Mo, C. H. and Choi, J. (2018) EU's Human Rights Policy toward North Korea as a Normative Power, *Unification Policy Studies*, 22(1), pp. 143–173.
- Moon, S. (2016) Current North Korean Nuclear Development and Its Foreign Policy, *Unification Policy Studies*, 25(1), pp. 59–85.
- Moravcsik, A. (1993) Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(4) 473–524.
- Moravcsik, A. (1995) Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 33(4) 473–524, pp. 611–628.
- Moravcsik, A. (2018) Preference, Power and Institutions in 21st-century Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 56(7), pp. 1648–1674.
- Moravcsik, A. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2019) Liberal Intergovernmentalism, In A. Wiener, T. Borzel, and T. Risse, eds. *European Integration Theory*, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 64–84.
- Müller, H. (1987) *A European Non-proliferation Policy: Prospects and Problems*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Müller, H. (2013) *European Non-Proliferation Policy– 1988–1992*. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Available at: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp037e.pdf> [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- Murauskaite, E. (2015), Dynamics of the EU non-proliferation discourse in global context. In K. E. Jorgensen, A. K. Aarstad, E. Drieskens, K. Laatikainen, and B. Tonra, eds. *SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy*. London: SAGE, pp. 952–66.
- Nah, Y. J. (2020) China's Managing Situation on the Korean Peninsula and Changing the Role, *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, 23(1), pp. 231–258.
- Nakato, S. (2013) Japan's responses to the North Korean nuclear crisis: responsive engagement perspectives, *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 27(1), pp. 47–74.
- Nam, K. K. (2017) The Trump Administration's policy toward North Korea, *Journal of North*

- Korea Studies*, 3(2), pp. 159–188.
- Narushige, M. (2009) North Korea's Nuclear Armament and Japan's Response, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 16(2), pp. 30–49.
- Nasra, S. (2011) Governance in EU Foreign Policy: Exploring Small State Influence, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(2). pp. 164–180.
- Nikitin, M. B., Manyin, M. E., Chanlett–Avery, E., and Nanto, D. K. (2010) *North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874*. Congressional Research Service. Available at: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R40684.pdf> [Accessed October 18, 2021].
- North Korea in the World (2021) *North Korea's External Relations*. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations> [Accessed August 10, 2021].
- Nuclear Threat Initiative (2020) *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)*. Available at: <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proliferation-security-initiative-psi/> [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Nugent, N. (1999) Conceptualising and Theorising. In: N. Nugent. *The Government and Politics of the European Union*. 4thedn. London: Macmillan Education.
- Nye, J. S. (2004) *Soft Power : the Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs
- O'Carroll, C. (2020) North Korea wants an EU embassy, but France and Belgium won't let that happen. *NK News*. December 16. Available at: <https://www.nknews.org/2020/12/north-korea-wants-an-eu-embassy-but-france-and-belgium-wont-let-that-happen> [Accessed October 22, 2021].
- Onderco, M. and Wagner, W. (2017) The ideational foundations of coercion: political culture and policies towards North Korea, *European Political Science Review*. 9(2). pp. 279–302.
- Padurariu, A. (2021) *Foreign Policy: Aims, Instruments and Achievements*, European Parliament. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.1.1.pdf [Accessed September 17, 2021].
- Paek, S. (2020) Discouraging the Bomb: U.S. Counterproliferation Success against Libya. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*. 18 (3), pp. 197–214.
- Pahre, R. (2005) Formal Theory and Case–Study Methods in EU Studies, *European Union Politics*. 6 (1) pp. 113–146.
- Pang, C. R. (2005) Yureobyeonhabui Daeoejeongchaekgwa Dacheungjeok Geobeonseu Gwanhan Yeongu (EU External Policy and Multi–Level Governance), *Yureobyeongu*, 21, pp. 55–83.
- Pang, C. R. (2011) Lisbonjoyak Ihu EUui Daeoejeok Daepyoseong Byeonhwawa Geu Uiuie Daehan Yeongu (An analysis on the changes in the EU's external representation after the Lisbon Treaty and its implications). *Yureobyeongu*, 29(1), pp. 161–181.
- Pang, C. R. and Ma, M. H. (2014) EUui Dae Nambukhan Gwangyee Natanan

- Daeojeongchaegui Teukjinggwa Ironjeok Hamui: Siminjeok Gwonryeokgwa Gyubeomjeok Gwonryeoge Gwanhan Nonuireul Jungsimeuro (A Study on the EU's External Policy Towards Korea: Focused on Discussions of 'Civilian Power Europe' and 'Normative Power Europe') *Yureobyongu*, 32(1), pp. 161–183.
- Pardo, R. P. (2014) *The EU and North Korea: stopping bombs, encouraging shops*. Real Instituto Elcano. Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/asia-pacifico/ari32-2014-pachecopardo-eu-and-north-korea-stopping-bombs-encouraging-shops [Accessed April 8, 2021].
- Pardo, R. P. (2016) *The EU and North Korea: Engaging Kim Effectively*. , European Institute for Asian Studies, Available at: <https://eias.org/policy-briefs/the-eu-and-north-korea-engaging-kim-effectively/> [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- Pardo, R. P. (2017) *The EU and the Korean peninsula: diplomatic support, economic aid and security cooperation*. Istituto Affari Internazionali, Available at: <https://www.iai.it/en/publicazioni/eu-and-korean-peninsula-diplomatic-support-economic-aid-and-security-cooperation> [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- Pardo, R. P., Desmaele, L., and Ernst, M. (2018) *EU–ROK Relations: Putting the Strategic Partnership to Work*, KF–VUB Korea Chair Report. Available at: <https://www.ies.be> [Accessed August 26, 2021].
- Park, C. (2002) *Yureobyeonhabui Daebukhan Oegyoui Jeongaewa Hanguge Daehan Sisajeom* (EU's Policy towards North-Korea and the Influence of the Korean Peninsula). *Gukjejeongchinonchong*, 42(4), pp. 167–190.
- Park, C. (2006) EU Daebukjeongchaegae Isseoseo Byeonhwawa Yeonsokseong (The Changes and Continuances of the EU's North Korea Policy). *Hangukjeongchihakhoebo*, 40(2), pp. 215–233.
- Park, C. (2007) *Bukhaekmunjeui Haegyeolgwa Hyanghu EU-bukhangwangye Jeonmang* (Settling the North's Nuclear Issue and Prospecting of EU–DPRK Relations). *Gukjejeongchiyeongu*, 10(2), pp. 77–98.
- Park, S. (2014) Gyubeomhwaksan Mekeonijeume Gwanhan Yeongu: EUui Daebukhan Ingwonjeongchaegeul Jungsimeuro (A Study on the Mechanism of Norm Diffusion: The EU's Human Rights Policy toward North Korea), *Gukjejeongchinonchong*, 54(2), pp.47–80.
- Park, S. (2020) Why EU's Multilateralism Matters in Korea's Peace Process, *Revista UNISCI*, 18(52), pp. 35–50.
- Park, Y. M. (2017) Yureobyeonhapui Bukhaek Insikgwa Byeonhwa: 'Gwanyeojeongchaek'ui Byeonhwareul Jungsimeuro (Changes in the EU's Recognition of North Korean Nuclear Issue and Related Policy: Shift From 'Engagement' to 'Sanctions'). *Segyejiyeogyeeongunonchong*, 35(3), pp. 157–180.
- Pastore, S (2013) Small New Member State in the EU Foreign Policy: Toward 'Small State Smart Strategy'?, *Baltic Journal of Political Science*. 2(2), pp. 67–84.

- Patton, M. Q. (2001). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Pollack, M. A. (2000) *International Relations Theory and European Integration*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/1695/00_55.pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed October 25, 2021].
- Portela, C. (2003) *The role of the EU in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: the way to Thessaloniki and beyond*. Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.
- Portela, C. (2005) Where and Why Does the EU Impose Sanctions?, *Politique Européenne*. 17, pp. 83–111.
- Portela, C. (2014) *The EU's Use of 'Targeted' Sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness*. CEPS. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271325000_The_EU's_Use_of_'Targeted'_Sanctions_Evaluating_effectiveness [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- Portela, C. (2015a) EU Strategies to Tackle the Iranian and North Korean Nuclear Issues. In: S. Blavoukos, D. Bourantonis, and C. Portela, ed. *The EU and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 48–66.
- Portela, C. (2015b) *The EU's Evolving Responses to Nuclear Proliferation Crises: From Incentives to Sanctions*. EU Non-Proliferation Consortium. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC_no-46.pdf [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Portela, C. (2021) The EU's arms control challenge. Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_166.pdf [Accessed November 28, 2021].
- Portela, C. and Kienzle, B. (2015a) Capturing the EU's International Performance: An Analytical Framework. In: S. Blavoukos, D. Bourantonis, and C. Portela, ed. *The EU and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 12–30.
- Portela, C. and Kienzle, B. (2015b) European Union Non-Proliferation Policies Before and After the 2003 Strategy: Continuity and Change EU Strategies to Tackle the Iranian and North Korean Nuclear Issues. In: S. Blavoukos, D. Bourantonis, and C. Portela, ed. *The EU and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 188–204.
- Portela, C., Pospieszan, P., Skrzypczynski, J., and Walentek, D. (2021) Consensus against all odds: explaining the persistence of EU sanctions on Russia. *Journal of European Integration*, 43(6). Pp. 683–699.
- Prior, L. (2003) *Using documents in social research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Publications Office of the European Union (2016) *Division of competences within the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy*, Summaries of EU Legislation, Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Aai0020> [Accessed October 11, 2021].
- Publications Office of the European Union (n.d.) *Common Foreign and Security Policy, Summaries of EU Legislation*. Available at:

- <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/ALL/?uri=LEGISSUM:a19000> [Accessed August 11, 2021].
- Quinones, K. C. (2003) Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy, *Asian Perspective*, 27(1), pp. 197–224.
- Randolph, J. (2019) A Guide to Writing the Dissertation Literature Review, *Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation*, 14(1), pp. 1–13.
- Radio Free Europe* (2002) Iran Report: December 23. Available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/1342811.html> [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Read, M. and Marsh, D. (2002) 'Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods' in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. *Theory and Methods in Political Science* 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 231–248.
- Regelsberger, E. (1991) The Twelve's Dialogue with Third Countries – Progress Towards a Communauté d' action? In: M. Holland., ed. *the Future of European Political Cooperation*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 161–179.
- Reiterer, M. (2020) *The 10th anniversary of the EU–Korea Strategic partnership*. the KF–VUB Korea Chair. Available at: <https://www.korea-chair.eu/the-10th-anniversary-of-the-eu-korea-strategic-partnership/> [Accessed September 3, 2021].
- Reuters* (2021) Timeline: North Korea's tests and summits over recent years, March 25. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-timeline-idUSKBN2BH0DJ> [Accessed August 30, 2021].
- Richards, C. (2014) North Korea Admits to Labor 'Gulags'. *The Diplomat*, October 8. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/north-korea-admits-to-labor-gulags/> [Accessed September 10, 2021].
- Richter, P (2002) U.S. Works Up Plan for Using Nuclear Arms. *Los Angeles Times*, March 9. Available at: <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-mar-09-mn-31965-story.html> [Accessed August 15, 2021].
- Rodong Sinmun* (2001a) *Yureobyeonhap Gowidaepyodani Uri Widaehan Yeongdoja Gimjeongildongjireul Bangmunhayeosda* (The European Union's High-level Delegation Visited Our Great Leader Kim) May 3, p. 1.
- Rodong Sinmun* (2001b) *Joseonminjujuuinmingonghwagukgwa Yureobyeonhabui Gwangye Aljeoneul Wihan Saeroun Umjigim* (The new movement toward the development of the DPRK–EU Relations) May 3, p. 6.
- Ryall, J. (2018) South Korean president falls short lobbying for Pyongyang in Europe. *DW news*, October 24. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/south-korean-president-falls-short-lobbying-for-pyongyang-in-europe/a-46019592> [Accessed September 10, 2021].
- Schmidt, H. (2006) *Peace on the Korean Peninsula: What Can the EU Contribute to the Six-party Process?*. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Available at: <https://lib.ugent.be/catalog/ebk01:3810000000351130> [Accessed November 28, 2021].

- Schmidt, H. (2017) Keynote speech of the event of Europe and Iran: Beyond the Nuclear Deal on 17 May [video]. Available through: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/05/17/europe-and-iran-beyondnuclear-deal-event-5595> [Accessed July 4, 2021].
- Schmidt, V. A. (2016) The ‘new’ EU governance: ‘new’ intergovernmentalism versus ‘new’ supranationalism plus ‘new’ parliamentarism. *Les Cahiers du Cevipol*, 5, pp. 5–31.
- Schmitter, P. C. (1969) Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration. *International Organization*, 23(1), pp. 161–166.
- Seth, M. J. (2011) North Korea’s 1990s Famine in Historical Perspective, *Education About Asia*, 16(3), pp. 24–28.
- Shepherd, A. and Salmon, T. (2003) *Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?* Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers.
- Sigal, L. V. (2000) Negotiating an End to North Korea’s Missile-Making. *Arms Control Today*, 30(5), pp. 3–7.
- Sigal, L. V. (2018) For North Korea, Verifying Requires Reconciling: The Lesson from A Troubled Past—Part I, 38 *North*, Available at: <https://www.38north.org/2018/12/lsigal121418/> [Accessed August 14, 2021].
- Sjursen, H. (2006) The EU as a “normative” power: how can this be?, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), pp. 235–251.
- Smith, K. E. (2000) The end of civilian power EU: a welcome demise or cause for concern?, *International Spectator*, 35(2), pp. 11–28.
- Smith, K. E. (2001) The EU, human rights and relations with third countries: ‘Foreign policy’ with an Ethical dimension? In K. Smith and M. Light., eds. *Ethics and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 185–203.
- Snyder, S. (2007) The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK Negotiation Strategies. *Pacific Focus*, 22(1), pp. 47–72.
- Snyder, S. (2016) “Toughest Sanctions Ever”: *UN Security Council Resolution 2321*, Council on Foreign Relations, December 2. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/toughest-sanctions-ever-un-security-council-resolution-2321> [Accessed August 31, 2021].
- Snyder, S. and Byun, S.-W. (2009) The Obama Administration and Preparations for North Korean Instability, *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, 18(2), pp. 1–29.
- Solomon, J. and Dreazen, Y. J. (2009) U.S. Keeps Close Eye on North Korean Ship. *The Wall Street Journal*, June 24. Available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124571192210838865> [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- Song, T. (2009) EU's Policy Towards North Korea: Policy Backgrounds, Humanitarian Aid and Economic Exchanges, *Yureobyeongu*, 27(2), pp. 79–110.
- Starman, A. B. (2013) The case study as a type of qualitative research, *Journal of Contemporary Educational Studies*, 64(1), 28–43.

- Stout, D. (2006) Bush Urges North Korea to Drop Missile Program. *The New York Times*, July 5. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/05/world/asia/05cnd-missile.html> [Accessed October 18, 2021].
- Strong, J. (2017) *Public Opinion, Legitimacy and Tony Blair's War in Iraq*. London: Routledge.
- Struck, D. (2001) N. Korea Extends Missile Test Halt, *The Washington Post*, May 4. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/05/04/n-korea-extends-missile-test-halt/d2e138bf-970f-4e07-82ef-e3e24a5ce5a0/> [Accessed August 23, 2021].
- Stivachtis, Y. A. (2013) The EU as an international actor: 'Civilian', 'normative' or 'military' power?. In: Y.A. Stivachtis, ed. *The State of European Integration*, 1st edn. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 41–58.
- Szymanski, M. and Smith, M. (2005.) Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU–Mexico Global Agreement. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 43(1). pp. 171–192.
- Tabrizi, A. B. and Kienzle, B. (2020) Legitimation Strategies of Informal Groups of States: The Case of the E3 Directors in the Nuclear Negotiations with Iran, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 55(3), pp. 388–405.
- Thatcher, M. (1981) *Remarks arriving at the White House*, Washington DC. February 26. Available at: <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/104576> [Accessed November 24, 2021].
- The Global Economy.com* (2019) South Korea: Political globalization. Available at: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/South-Korea/kof_pol_glob/ [Accessed 3 September 2021].
- The Guardian* (2003) N Korea Sanctions Could Prolong Standoff. February 12. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/12/northkorea1> [Accessed October 15, 2021].
- The White House (2006) *Statement on North Korea Missile Launches*. July 4. Available at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/text/20060704-2.html> [Accessed October 18, 2021].
- The International Crisis Group (2006) *China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?* Asia Report. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/43fc28e24.pdf> [Accessed November 8, 2021].
- The Italian Insider* (2017) North Korean ambassador expelled from Italy. 2 October. Available at: <http://www.italianinsider.it/?q=node/5932> [Accessed 10 September 2021].
- The National Committee on North Korea (2009) *Timeline: U.S. Sanctions and other Treasury Departments Actions against the DPRK*. Available at: <https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Timeline-%20UN%20Sanctions%20against%20DPRK.doc> [Accessed October 15, 2021].
- The Royal Society (2016) *UK research and the European Union: the role of EU regulation and policy in governing UK research*. Available: <https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/eu-uk-funding/phase-3/EU-regulation-and-policy-in-governing-UK-research.pdf> [Accessed 2 September 2021].

- Tindemans, L. (1999) *Report on the Agreement on terms and conditions of the Accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation*. European Parliament. Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu [Accessed August 27, 2021].
- Tocci, N. (2008) *The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor*. CEPS.
- Tongilnews* (2002) EU considering overall re-examination on the EU–DPRK relations. December 14. Available at: <http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=26301> [Accessed September 15, 2021].
- Tonra, B. and Christiansen, T. (2004) The study of EU foreign policy: Between international relations and European studies. In: B. Tonra and T. Christiansen, eds. *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 1–9.
- Traynor, I., Borger, J., and MacAskill, E. (2003) US fears North Korea could nuke California, *The Guardian*. February 13. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/13/northkorea> [Accessed October 15, 2021].
- Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts (1997) *OJ*, C340, November 10. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/51c009ec4.html> [Accessed September 30, 2021]
- Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (2007) *OJ*, C306, December 17. Available from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT> [Accessed September 23, 2021].
- Treaty on European Union (1992) *OJ*, C191. July 29. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A11992M%2FTXT> [Accessed November 30, 2021].
- Trott, W. (2010) *An analysis of civilian, military and normative power in EU foreign policy.*, POLIS Journal.
- Tusk, D. (2018) Opening remarks at the EU–Republic of Korea summit, October 19. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2018/10/19/opening-remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-eu-republic-of-korea-summit/> [Accessed September 10, 2021].
- US Department of State (2004) *The United States and the Global Coalition against Terrorism September 2001–December 2003*. Available at: <https://2001–2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/33355.htm> [Accessed October 20, 2021].
- US Department of State (2005) *Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six–Party Talks Beijing*, September 19, 2005, Archive of U.S. Department of State. Available at: <https://2001–2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm> [Accessed August 16, 2021].
- US Senate Committee on intelligence (2006) *Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States*. Hearing. February 2. Available at: https://fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/020206threat.html [Accessed August 16, 2021].

- United Against Nuclear Iran (2021) *Iran & North Korea – Nuclear Proliferation Partners*. Available at: https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/Update_Iran-DPRK_3.17.19_CLEAN.pdf [Accessed October 13, 2021].
- United Nations (2006) *UN Council Members agree swift action needed after Korean missile launch*. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2006/07/184952-un-council-members-agree-swift-action-needed-after-korean-missile-launch> [Accessed October 18, 2021].
- United Nations Security Council (1993) *Resolution 825: Adopted by the Security Council at its 3212th meeting*, May 11, 1993. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/825> [Accessed August 15, 2021].
- United Nations Security Council (2006) *Resolution 1695: Adopted by the Security Council at its 5490th meeting*. July 16. Available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/578923?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header> [Accessed October 12, 2021].
- United Nations Security Council (2009) *Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People's Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions*. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm> [Accessed October 18, 2021].
- United Nations Security Council (2016) Resolution 2321: Adopted by the Security Council at its 7821st meeting, November 30. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2321.pdf [Accessed November 26, 2021].
- United Nations Security Council (2017) Resolution 2375: Adopted by the Security Council at its 8042nd meeting, September 11. Available at: [https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2375%20\(2017\)](https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2375%20(2017)) [Accessed August 31, 2021].
- UNSPECIFIED (2002) *Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities 2001*. Available at: <http://aei.pitt.edu/43159/> [Accessed November 27, 2021].
- Van Evera, S. (1997) *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Vandenhoute, J. (2017). Quo Vadis, North Korea? Prospects for Critical EU Engagement”, European Institute for Asian Studies Briefing Seminar. Available at: http://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/EIAS_Event_Report_Quo_Vadis_North_Korea_20.10.2017-2.pdf [Accessed August 27, 2021].
- Van Ham, P. (2011) *The European Union's WMD Strategy and the CFSP: A Critical Analysis | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2011/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/european-unions-wmd-strategy-and-cfsp-critical-analysis> [Accessed April 6, 2021].
- Versluys, H. (2008) Depoliticising and Europeanising humanitarian aid: Success or failure? *Perspective on European Politics and Society*, 9(2), pp. 208–224.

- Vestkusten* (2001) Göran Persson pays historic visit to North Korea, May 15. Available at: <https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=VEST20010515.2.5&e=-----en--20--1--txt-txIN-----1> [Accessed August 24, 2021].
- Voice of America* (2013) Pyongyang Admits to Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel Rods, October 2. Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/archive/pyongyang-admits-reprocessing-nuclear-fuel-rods-10-02> [Accessed August 15, 2021].
- Wertz, D., Oh, JJ, and Kim, I (2016) Issue Brief: DPRK Diplomatic Relations, *the National Committee on North Korea*. Available at: https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/issue-briefs/DPRK_Diplo_Relations_August2016.pdf [Accessed August 17, 2021].
- Wessel, R. A. (2016) Legal Competences of the European Union in Relation to the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In: *The Changing Landscape of EU Nuclear Non Proliferation Workshop*. Uppsala, November 17, Sweden
- White, R. (2001) *Understanding European Foreign Policy*. London: Springer Link.
- White, R. (2004) Discourse analysis and social constructionism, *Nurse Researcher*, 12(2), pp. 7–16.
- Whiteman, R. (2011) Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation. In: R. Whiteman, ed. *Normative Power Europe*. London: Springer Link, pp. 1–22.
- Woo, P. K. (2018) Russia’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue: Before and After, Imposing Sanctions against North Korea, *The Korean Journal of Security Affairs*, 23(1), pp. 63–79.
- World Integrated Trade Solution (2002) *France trade balance, exports and imports by country and region 2002*. [dataset] Available at: <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/FRA/Year/2002/TradeFlow/EXPIMP#> [Accessed November 25, 2021].
- Yang, H,-J. (2016) EU “Haeksilheom Bukhangwa Dangbungan Jeongchidaehwa Eopsda (EU–N. Korea Diplomatic Exchanges Likely to be Stalled). *Radio Free Asia*, June 14. Available at: https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/politicaltalk-06212016155418.html [Accessed September 12, 2021].
- Yang, H,-J. (2018) EU, Pyeongchang Huedo “Daebuk Jeongchidaehwa Jaegae An Hae (EU–N. Korean Political Dialogue Unlikely to be resumed). *Radio Free Asia*, March 2. Available at: https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/eunk-03022018161250.html [Accessed September 13, 2021].
- Yin, R. K. (1994). *Case study research: Design and methods*. 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case study research, design and methods*. 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Yongtao, L. (2010) Discourse, Meanings and IR Studies: Taking the Rhetoric of “Axis of Evil” As a Case, *CONfines de relaciones internacionales y ciencia politica*, 6(11), pp. 85–106.
- Yoon, S. (2020) EUui Hyoyuljeok Dajajuuiro Bon Iran Haek Hyeopsang (The EU’s Effective Multilateralism in the Iran Nuclear Negotiations). *Pyeonghwahagyeongu*, 21(4), pp. 35–58.
- Yoon, T. (2003) Bukhan Haekmunjewa Migugui ‘Gangaboegyo’: Danggeungwa Chaejjikjeopgeuneul Jungsimeuro (North Korea’s Nuclear Program and US “Coercive

- Diplomacy”: With Special Reference to the Carrot-and-Stick Approach). Gukjejeongchinonchong, 43(1), pp. 275–295.
- Yonhap News Agency* (2001) 2001 Bukhanyeongam (North Korea Yearbook 2001), Seoul: Yonhap News Agency.
- Yonhap News Agency* (2002) EU "Haekdonggyeol Haejesi Daebukgwangye Jaegeomto (EU will reconsider the EU–North Korea relations when North Korea unfreeze the nuclear facilities) December 14. Available at: <https://news.naver.com/main/read.naver?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=104&oid=001&aid=0000289678> [Accessed September 7, 2021].
- Yonhap News Agency* (2003) *North Korea Handbook*. New York: An East Gate Book.
- Yonhap News Agency* (2017a) S. Korea joins EU's anti-piracy operation around Gulf of Aden, March 5. Available at: <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170305002700315> [Accessed 3 September 2021].
- Yonhap News Agency* (2017b) Portugal cuts diplomatic ties with N. Korea: report, October 11. Available at: <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20171011003700315> [Accessed September 10, 2021].
- Yonhap News Agency* (2021) EU's top diplomat vows support for dismantling N. Korea's nuclear program, September 9. Available at: <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210909003152325?section=search> [Accessed September 10, 2021].
- Zwolski, K. (2011) Unrecognized and Unwelcome? The Role of the EU in Preventing the Proliferation of CBRN Weapons, Materials and Knowledge, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*. 12(4), pp.477–492.